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Abstract 
 
This study examines transitions from Nazism to socialism in Brandenburg between 
1945 and 1952. It explores the grassroots responses and their relative implications 
within the context of both punitive and rehabilitative measures implemented by the 
Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) and the communist Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (SED). The present study is based on archival and oral history sources and 
addresses two main research questions: First, in what ways did people at the 
grassroots attempt to challenge the imposition of punitive measures, and did their 
responses have any effect on the manner in which these policies were implemented 
at a grassroots level? These punitive measures were designed to remove remnants of 
Nazism and included punitive Soviet practices, Soviet NKVD camps and 
denazification and sequestering. Second, to what extent did grassroots 
Brandenburgers participate in political organisations which were designed to 
integrate East Germans during the rehabilitative stage and what impact did these 
responses have on the post-war transition? This study focuses on the National 
Democratic Party and the Society for German-Soviet Friendship as well as 
examining wider factors which may have impeded and facilitated the processes of 
post-war transitions. Two main arguments are proposed. First, the imposition of 
wide-ranging punitive measures often posed an existential threat at a grassroots 
level, and therefore at times elicited grassroots actions, albeit severely restricted by 
practical and political constraints. In turn, these grassroots responses could 
occasionally have some local impact and somewhat affect the manner in which 
policies were implemented at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. Second, it is argued 
that the rehabilitative stage, despite some challenges, generally provided a 
favourable system for grassroots integration in which the needs of the policy makers 
and a significant proportion of grassroots individuals somewhat converged, 
eventually contributing to the partial stabilisation of the emerging East German 
socialist state. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Following twelve years of Nazi rule, the collapse of the Third Reich on 8 May 1945 
brought with it the official end of its associated structures, functionaries and National 
Socialist ideology. This dramatic collapse of the National Socialist regime was 
accompanied by serious difficulties in both the economy and society, as Germany 
was marked by destruction. In the area which was to become the Soviet zone and 
subsequently German Democratic Republic (GDR), wartime bombing had 
demolished nearly 65% of housing in urban centres and nearly 40% of the 
population had lost all of their possessions.
1
 Here, the Soviet Military Administration 
(SMAD) was established on 6 June 1945 with the primary goals of supervising the 
unconditional surrender of Germany, administering the Soviet zone of Germany, and 
implementing the most important Allied decisions on military, political and 
economic matters.
2
 This also included the dissolution of the NSDAP and its organs, 
as well as the removal of National Socialist remnants from political, economic, 
social and cultural life. The period which followed the collapse of the Third Reich 
was marked by a steady transformation of the political, economic, social and cultural 
sphere until, seven years later, in the summer of 1952, the GDR leadership officially 
announced the establishment of socialism in East Germany. It is this East German 
transition from Nazism to socialism from 1945 to 1952 which this thesis wishes to 
examine at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. 
Prior to 1945 Brandenburg had been the largest Prussian province. Due to its 
proximity to the National Socialist centre of power in Berlin, it had established itself 
as a particularly important region for both the armament industry and military bases 
throughout the Third Reich, and especially in the final year of the war the province 
suffered greatly as Allied troops closed in on the capital.
3
 Following German 
capitulation, the western part of Brandenburg became a part of the Soviet occupation 
                                                 
1
 Gary Bruce, Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany 1945-1955 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), p. 46. 
2
 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-
1949 (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 21. 
3
 Ingo Materna and Wolfgang Ribbe, Geschichte in Daten: Brandenburg (München: Koehler & 
Amelang, 1995), pp. 198-199. 
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zone and was declared a new province on 4 June 1945. The eastern part of 
Brandenburg was subject to a provisional re-drawing along the Oder-Neisse border 
decided on by the Allies in the Potsdam Agreement in August, finally being ratified 
in 1950. As a result of this re-drawing of the border, Brandenburg lost approximately 
30% of its surface area.
4
 In 1947, when the state of Prussia was officially dissolved, 
Brandenburg was renamed a state, with Potsdam as its capital. Despite the reduction 
in size, Brandenburg continued to be the largest of the five provinces in the Soviet 
zone, although with only 2.25 million inhabitants it was also one of the most 
sparsely populated.
5
 After the official announcement of the establishment of 
socialism in July 1952, when the communist Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED) carried out administrative reforms which replaced the federal states with 
fourteen districts, the state of Brandenburg was dissolved and instead divided into 
three districts: Cottbus, Frankfurt/Oder and Potsdam.
6
  
 
1.2 Research questions and arguments 
The period of transition from Nazism to socialism between 1945 and 1952 in 
Brandenburg was characterised by a dual combination of punitive and rehabilitative 
measures which were intended both to remove the immediate legacy of National 
Socialism and to impose a new political system. These measures were implemented 
against a backdrop in which the East German population was faced with utter chaos, 
loss and destruction in the wake of the collapse of the Third Reich. Correspondingly, 
the present study will explore the following two main research questions.   
First, in what ways did people at the grassroots attempt to challenge the 
imposition of punitive measures, and did their responses have any effect on the 
manner in which these policies were implemented at a grassroots level in 
Brandenburg? Second, to what extent did grassroots Brandenburgers participate in 
political organisations which were designed to integrate East Germans during the 
rehabilitative stage and what impact did these responses have on the post-war 
                                                 
4
 In the eastern part of Brandenburg known as the Neumark, an estimated two-fifths of the population 
had died by 1945 as a result of military action, flight and expulsion. Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: 
From War to Peace (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), pp. 79-80. 
5
 Timothy R. Vogt, Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg 1945-1948 (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 30. 
6
 Jan Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR 
1945-1990 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), p. 5. This was to remain until October 1990 when the state of 
Brandenburg was once again re-established in its current form. 
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transition? The present study is based on a micro-historical framework and the term 
grassroots is adopted to refer to individuals and local communities in Brandenburg.
7
 
By focusing on this micro-level, this thesis examines the manner in which central 
policies were implemented at the periphery or ‘on the ground’ in Brandenburg.8 This 
thesis concentrates on the period from 1945 until 1952 and uses the term post-war 
transition in a chronological sense.
9
 
The first research question will be addressed by examining the following 
punitive measures which were designed to dismantle the existing Nazi political 
system: disciplinary measures carried out by the Soviet occupying army, Soviet 
secret police (NKVD) camps; and denazification and sequestering of the 
Brandenburg populace. The second research question will be addressed by 
specifically examining one mass organisation and one political party in the form of, 
respectively, the National Democratic Party (NDPD) and the Society for German-
Soviet Friendship (DSF). Both of these political organisations were part of a wider 
rehabilitative thrust which attempted to integrate the population into the social, 
political, economic and cultural structures in order to aid in the reconstruction and 
consolidation of the new political system. This study will then in turn focus on 
specific factors which may have both impeded and facilitated the process of post-war 
transition for selected oral history interviewees and other local Brandenburgers. 
Correspondingly, this study proposes two main arguments. First, it is argued 
that the imposition of these wide-ranging punitive measures to change the political, 
economic and social system often posed an existential threat at a grassroots level, 
and therefore at times elicited grassroots actions, albeit severely restricted by 
practical and political constraints. In turn, these grassroots responses could 
occasionally have some local impact and somewhat affect the manner in which 
policies were implemented at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. Second, this thesis 
                                                 
7
 Micro-history was pioneered by Carlo Ginzburg in the late 1970s with the intention of treating 
people of the past as actors with their own aims and strategies. Carlo Ginzburg, Der Käse und die 
Würmer (Frankfurt/M: 1979), p. 15 quoted in Jürgen Schlumbohm, ‘Mikrogeschichte – 
Makrogeschichte: Zur Eröffnung einer Debatte‘, in Mikrogeschichte – Makrogeschichte: 
Komplementär oder Inkommensurabel? ed. by Jürgen Schlumbohm (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998), 7-
32 (p. 20). In Germany, micro-history developed under the terms Alltagsgeschichte and historical 
anthropology. 
8
 Corey Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots: The transformation of East Germany, 
1945-65 (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 3. 
9
 Conversely, Frank Biess has defined ‘post-war’ not only as a chronological and thematic unit but 
also as an epistemological tool, see: Frank Biess, ‘Introduction: Histories of the Aftermath’, in 
Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe, ed. by Frank Biess and 
Robert G. Moeller (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 1-10 (pp. 2-3). 
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argues that the rehabilitative stage, despite some challenges, generally provided a 
favourable system for grassroots integration in which the needs of the policy makers 
and a significant proportion of grassroots individuals somewhat converged, 
eventually contributing to the partial stabilisation of the emerging East German 
socialist state.  
This study contributes to the historical scholarship on grassroots East 
Germany in the post-war period in a number of ways. First, whilst this study does 
not wish to downplay the repressive dictatorial system imposed on East Germany 
after the war, it provides a different perspective from previous top-down totalitarian 
approaches which have tended to neglect the potential influence which developments 
at a grassroots level could have on the implementation of policies in the post-war 
period. Second, to date no other study has examined the grassroots responses to both 
the punitive and rehabilitative measures during the post-war transition in 
Brandenburg. Therefore, this study contributes to the historical scholarship by not 
just focusing on one single policy but presenting a more comprehensive and 
multifaceted examination within the same investigation. Third, this thesis contributes 
to knowledge of the range of grassroots responses to the specific policies, and 
evaluates the relative implications for the transition from Nazism to socialism in 
Brandenburg from 1945 to 1952.  
 
1.3 Historiographical contextualisation and theoretical 
considerations 
By adopting a micro-historical framework in order to examine political and social 
developments at a grassroots level in post-war Brandenburg this approach both 
reflects, and is a product of, debates and interpretations of East Germany prevalent in 
both the media and academia, over twenty years after the collapse of the GDR. 
According to Martin Sabrow the three main strands of interpretation of the GDR 
which vie for influence in present-day political debates on the GDR are the 
‘Fortschrittsgedächtnis’, the ‘Diktaturgedächtnis’ and the ‘Arrangementgedächtnis’. 
These exist in a ‘tripolar force field’ within which the GDR past is constantly being 
re-negotiated.
10
 By exploring the links between the top-down exertion of power and 
                                                 
10
 The ‘Diktaturgedächtnis’ highlights the power and repression of the state apparatus, the 
‘Arrangementgedächtnis’ underscores the links between spheres of power and realms of experiences 
15 
 
the responses at the grassroots, the perspective adopted in this study is consistent 
with the ‘Arrangementgedächtnis’. In doing so it endeavours to move away from 
conceptualisations of East Germany which enunciate an idealised vision of the GDR, 
as well as from top-down totalitarian theories which tend to restrict their focus on 
communist and Soviet attempts to transform East Germany into a Soviet satellite 
state and to establish SED hegemony.
11
  
This study has been both informed and inspired by a number of recent studies 
which have also challenged such a top-down methodology and instead attempt to 
shed light on the grassroots population in the GDR. Mark Allinson has examined 
‘the interplay between state and party authorities in Erfurt on the one hand, and the 
general population on the other’, while Jan Palmowski, in his exploration of the 
invention of the GDR as a distinctive ‘nation’, has highlighted both how the Party’s 
actions affected its citizens and how the citizens responded.
12
 Similarly, Corey Ross, 
in his examination of land and industry reforms and the mobilisation of youth in the 
GDR, has focused on the grassroots reactions to political intervention ‘from above’ 
and how in turn these policies were subsequently converted at a local level. Using 
this approach of emphasising the ‘interplay between regime policies and popular 
responses’, he examines ‘some of the possibilities and consequences as well as the 
very real limits of human actions’ in the GDR.13 In her theoretical work on 
‘participatory dictatorship’, Mary Fulbrook sheds further light on the manner in 
which people living in the GDR actively sought to shape their own lives by learning 
to ‘play by the emergent rules’ and negotiating benefits for themselves within the 
existent political constraints.
14
 This study intends to build on these approaches by 
examining grassroots responses in relation to both punitive and non-punitive 
                                                                                                                                          
in society whilst the ‘Fortschrittsgedächtnis’ emphasises the idealistic tenets of the GDR’s founding 
ideas. Martin Sabrow, ‘Die DDR erinnern’, in Erinnerungsorte der DDR, ed. by Martin Sabrow 
(Bonn: Lizenzausgabe für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010), 9-25 (pp. 16-18). 
11
 See, for instance, Andreas Hilger, Mike Schmeitzner and Ute Schmidt, eds., Diktaturdurchsetzung: 
Instrumente und Methoden der kommunistischen Machtsicherung in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1955 
(Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung e.V., 2001), and Rainer Behring and 
Mike Schmeitzner, ‘Einleitung’, in Diktaturdurchsetzung in Sachsen: Studien zur Genese der 
kommunistischen Herrschaft 1945-1952, ed. by Rainer Behring and Mike Schmeitzner (Köln: Böhlau, 
2003), pp. 7-24. 
12
 Mark Allinson, Politics and popular opinion in East Germany, 1945-68 (Manchester: Manchester 
UP, 2000), p. 6. Similarly, Konrad Jarausch speaks about ‘the interplay of repression and self-
assertion in ordinary lives’. Konrad H. Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-
Cultural History of the GDR (Oxford: Berghahn, 1999), p. x of preface. Palmowski, Inventing. 
13
 Ross, Socialism, p. 4. 
14
 Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (London: Yale 
UP, 2005), pp. 235-249,292,295. 
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measures in Brandenburg and their possible implications for the emerging East 
German socialist state. 
When focusing on the impact of, and responses to, top-down policies at the 
grassroots level it is important to acknowledge theories which examine the 
underlying principal ontological questions of the relationship between society and 
the individual. Within both the social and historical sciences, the development of 
theories of agency, beginning with Karl Marx, Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, 
have explored the manner in which human actions are both constrained and enabled 
within social systems. Agency is a social theoretical concept which looks at the 
interplay between social structures and individuals, and concepts of agency examine 
how people ‘play a role in the formation of the social realities in which they 
participate’.15 The conceptualisation of how individuals function within societies has 
ranged from viewing individuals as entirely free actors on the one hand, to mere 
products of the societies in which they live on the other. More recent debates within 
the social sciences on the dialectic between agency and structure have been 
dominated by Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘practice theory’ and Anthony Giddens’ ‘theory of 
structuration’. Bourdieu emphasises the strong influence of external factors on the 
individual, while in contrast Giddens underscores the ability of human agents to 
engage creatively with societal structures and to respond to them in diverse ways.
16
 
In a similar vein, historians have grappled with how individuals act within 
their social worlds. Based on Alf Lüdtke’s work on Eigensinn which he has 
conceptualised as ‘demarcating a space of one’s own’, various studies have since 
employed this concept in a number of different ways.
17
 It is important to note that the 
significance attached to agency and the manner in which Eigensinn is defined have 
considerable implications for the way in which the history of the Soviet zone and 
GDR is conceptualised and analysed. On the one hand there are some historians of 
post-war East Germany who minimise the potential role which individual agency or 
                                                 
15
 Thomas Barfield, ed., The Dictionary of Anthropology, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), p. 4, 
referenced in Jennifer Dornan, ‘Agency and Archaeology: Past, Present, and Future Directions’, 
Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 9(4) (2002), 303-329 (p. 304). 
16
 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1984; repr. 2007). Bourdieu’s agents are more dominated by habitus; see Ritzer and Goodman, 
Sociological Theory, p. 404. 
17
 Alf Lüdtke, ‘Einleitung: Herrschaft als soziale Praxis’, in Herrschaft als soziale Praxis. Historische 
und sozial-anthropologische Studien, ed. by Alf Lüdtke  (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1991), pp. 9-63. See also Jan Palmowski, ‘Between Conformity and Eigen-Sinn: New Approaches to 
GDR History: German Historical Institute London, 11 May 2002’, in German History 20 (4) (2002), 
pp. 494-502. 
17 
 
Eigensinn can play, instead emphasising the structural aspects of state hegemony. 
For instance, in their research on post-war Saxony, Rainer Behring and Mike 
Schmeitzner argue that the very limited form of Eigensinn which could exist was 
entirely dependent on the arbitrariness of the ruling powers, who had the ability to 
close such ‘niches’ at will.18 In marked contrast to this lies Paul Steege’s recent 
study of post-war Berlin in which he credits individuals on both sides of the city’s 
emerging divide with playing ‘vital roles in shaping the Cold War’.19 Both of these 
approaches are problematic for different reasons. Studies such as that by Behring and 
Schmeitzner run the danger of crediting the powers that be with a form of 
omnipotence and unbridled influence, which ignores not only the very practical 
challenges of enforcing top-down control, but also neglects any potential influence 
of grassroots actors. Conversely, Steege’s study, although highly informative, does 
not successfully problematise the causal link between Berliners’ day-to-day attempts 
to survive and the outcome of larger Cold War developments, and therefore runs the 
risk of overstating the impact which individual actors could have on macro-historical 
events.  
In contrast, this thesis challenges assumptions that top-down hegemonic 
demands were always implemented in the manner in which they were intended, 
while at the same time it does not wish to claim that bottom-up actions could 
necessarily have a direct effect on the outcome of post-war politics and the 
establishment of the GDR. In other words, this study contends that neither the social-
deterministic theories, nor postulations of autonomy of individuals outside of social 
restrictions and influences, can satisfactorily explain the grassroots dynamic in post-
war East Germany.
20
 Therefore, rather than dichotomising human action either as 
being coerced or being autonomous, it positions Eigensinn on a continuum between 
impotence and influence.
21
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Correspondingly, this study defines Eigensinn as ‘purposive human action’, 
through which grassroots actors attempted to negotiate and shape their own lives in 
response to different punitive and rehabilitative measures in the post-war period in 
Brandenburg.
22
 Whilst the present study positions Eigensinn on a continuum 
between impotence and influence, the main emphasis is on uncovering acts of 
Eigensinn which potentially had an effect, however small, on the manner in which 
top-down policies were implemented at a grassroots level despite the existent 
practical and political constraints. It is argued that these acts of Eigensinn were 
mainly motivated by existential threats, including both socio-economic and political 
concerns, and that these manifested themselves in manifold ways. On the one hand, 
this included complaints to authorities and acts of petition writing, participation in 
informal networks of communication, as well as non-participation and public 
demonstrations of defiance which were discordant with officially prescribed norms.
23
 
On the other hand, Eigensinn could also manifest itself in participation in terms of 
‘strategic accommodation’ within the new political parameters in order to negotiate 
the best possible personal outcome within the structural and political constraints of 
the post-war period.
24
 By adopting this approach, this thesis moves away from 
dichotomous notions of resistance and consent, or compliance and defiance, and 
                                                 
22
 This part of the definition is based on the definition of agency by Miles Fairburn, Social History: 
Problems, Strategies and Methods (London: MacMillan Press, 1999), pp. 29,228, 309. Incidentally, it 
is also similar to that of Thomas Lindenberger, who describes Eigensinn as the desire and ability to 
act purposefully within an authoritarian framework: Thomas Lindenberger, ‘SED-Herrschaft als 
soziale Praxis, Herrschaft und “Eigen-Sinn”: Problemstellung und Begriffe’ in Staatssicherheit und 
Gesellschaft. Studien zum Herrschaftsalltag in der DDR, ed. by Jens Gieseke (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 23-47 (p. 32). For a further discussion on the dialectic between 
‘Herrschaft’ and ‘Eigensinn’ see also Thomas Lindenberger, ‘Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur 
Einleitung’, in Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der 
DDR, ed. by Thomas Lindenberger (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 13-44 (pp. 21-26). Similarly, Mary 
Fulbrook has defined ‘agency’ as ‘a capacity to negotiate or to affect the course of one’s own life’. 
Mary Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), p. 477. 
23
 Similarly, Andrew Bergerson, in his study of the Third Reich, has utilised Eigensinn to refer to the 
‘stubbornly persistent habits of everyday life through which ordinary people expressed themselves 
publicly in revolt against established authorities’. Andrew Stuart Bergerson, Ordinary Germans in 
Extraordinary Times (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004), p. 264. 
24
 Joan Gero, ‘Troubled travels in agency and feminism’, in Agency in Archaeology, ed. by M. 
Dobres, and J. Robb, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 34–39, referenced in Jennifer Dornan, Agency, 
p. 319. Similarly, Paul Betts has defined Eigensinn as ‘doing things one’s own way’. Paul Betts, 
Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 14 and 
Corey Ross describes Eigensinn as ‘a sense of one’s interests’: Corey Ross, The East German 
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 
50. It must, however, be acknowledged that these thoughts and actions were rooted in a particular 
place and time. Alon Confino has argued that ‘people have agency while they think and act within 
determined historical conditions’. Alon Confino, ‘Telling about Germany: Narratives of Memory and 
Culture’, The Journal of Modern History, 76 (2004), 389-416 (p. 410). 
19 
 
instead explores grassroots responses on a spectrum from dissent to assent in relation 
to the corresponding post-war policies.
25
 
Therefore, to paraphrase Karl Marx, it is argued that post-war 
Brandenburgers had the restricted potential to make their own history, but not in 
circumstances of their own choosing.
26
 This study treats this restricted potential and 
occasional latitude to exert acts of Eigensinn as Handlungsspielraum or room for 
manoeuvre within the severely constrained circumstances presented by the post-war 
transition period. This room for manoeuvre may have been a function in part of the 
‘limits’ of the East German dictatorship which served to dilute and curb SED 
aspirations for hegemony.
27
 Given that these other limits to the East German 
dictatorship existed, the potential effect which grassroots actions had on the 
implementation of post-war policies can not be overstated and must be considered to 
be only one among many different factors which could somewhat affect the manner 
in which top-down rule in post-war Brandenburg was realised.  
 
1.4 Geographic contextualisation 
In order to assess grassroots responses in relation to specific post-war punitive and 
rehabilitative measures in Brandenburg this research adopts both a regional and local 
focus. A focus on regional and local areas has become increasingly popular in recent 
decades, particularly in research on the Third Reich, in which historians have 
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emphasised both the benefits and limitations of regional and local studies. For 
instance, Ian Kershaw, in his examination of Bavaria during the Third Reich, has 
cautioned that whilst his findings based on a regional or local case study approach 
may be limited in their generalizability, macro level studies may conversely 
generalise with ‘scant regard for regional or local nuances’ and may not necessarily 
deal with genuinely ‘typical’ trends; in other words, he argues, no region accords 
wholly with the fictional ‘norm’ of ‘typicality’ imposed abstractly from outside’.28 
Similarly, Mark Allinson has investigated how ordinary East Germans experienced 
political and social upheavals in Thuringia during the Soviet occupation and the 
GDR, without attempting to make wider generalisations as to Thuringia’s 
‘uniqueness or its typicality’.29  
With respect to Brandenburg, Arnd Bauerkämper justified his regional focus 
on Brandenburg’s rural communities during the agricultural reforms by contending 
that such a micro-historical perspective enables ‘a reconstruction and explanation of 
perceptions, interpretations and actions in individual communities’.30 Some, such as 
Timothy Vogt, Torsten Hartisch and Dieter Pohl, have utilised the state of 
Brandenburg as a framework with which to explore specific post-war 
developments.
31
 Other researchers in this area have narrowed their focus onto one 
specific local town, such as Charles B. Lansing in his illuminating study of 
Brandenburg school teachers.
32
 Similarly, Matthias Helle has also recently examined 
the Brandenburg district of Zauch-Belzig, yet he focuses on structural aspects of the 
transition, without examining grassroots reception.
33
 Thus, whilst there have been a 
considerable number of studies on various aspects of Brandenburg’s history during 
the Soviet occupation and the GDR, none have thus far examined grassroots 
reception to punitive Soviet practices and policies, NKVD camps, denazification and 
forms of political transition and integration. Thereby this thesis contributes to wider 
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historical scholarship, both on the specific issues under examination, as well as 
presenting new empirical evidence with respect to Brandenburg. 
Whilst this investigation involves focusing on grassroots actions across the 
Brandenburg province and their potential impact on policy makers at the local and 
regional level, it also utilises two case study towns, Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde, in order to increase the heterogeneity of source material. 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde were selected as local case studies for a 
number of reasons. Both are mid-sized, industrialised, cathedral towns within a 
hundred kilometre radius of Berlin, with Brandenburg/Havel in the West and 
Fürstenwalde in the East.
34
 Furthermore, the two towns were home to both National 
Socialist and Soviet organs of terror and imprisonment before and after 1945, 
making them ideal microcosms with which to examine the post-war transition from 
Nazism to socialism. Despite these important developments in Brandenburg/Havel 
and Fürstenwalde, both before and after 1945, their histories in these contexts are 
both under-researched.
35
 
Brandenburg is a tenth-century cathedral town situated on the banks of the 
river Havel, seventy kilometres west of Berlin. Its pretty, red-bricked medieval 
centre boasts an array of historic ecclesiastical buildings, while the town’s hinterland 
is filled with myriad lakes and waterways, making it a popular cultural and tourist 
destination. The town is the third largest in the state of Brandenburg and has a long 
tradition of iron and steel works – in the years leading up to the war, 
Brandenburg/Havel thus developed into an armaments and military hub. The 
population, excluding military personnel, rose rapidly from 64,196 in 1933 to 83,726 
in 1939. Although Brandenburg/Havel had suffered from a high level of 
unemployment in the early 1930s, by 1935 the demand for skilled labourers had 
outstripped supply in the town. By spring 1942 industry in Brandenburg/Havel had 
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roughly 5,000 foreign labourers; by late 1944 this had increased to 15,000.
36
 During 
the Third Reich, Brandenburg/Havel had also been the site of the first experimental 
gassing in Germany as a part of the T4 euthanasia programme, as well as being home 
to Germany’s largest and most modern prison, notorious ‘Brandenburg-Görden’, 
which housed political prisoners such as Erich Honecker.
37
 Subsequently, from 1945 
to 1947, the Brandenburg prison was used by the Soviet military authorities to intern 
collaborators and simultaneously by the NKVD as an interrogation prison.
38
 In 
addition, the NKVD established their local headquarters and an ancillary operative 
prison in the centre of the town. Brandenburg/Havel was also exposed to Allied 
bombing campaigns as well as ground battles at the end of the war, as a result of 
which approximately 15% of the town had been completely destroyed by May 
1945.
39
 Colonel P.A Wolkow became the Soviet town commander after the collapse 
of the Third Reich and a new German magistrate was established on 22 May 1945, 
consisting of a combination of SPD and KPD members. Max Herm, who had 
represented the KPD in the Reichstag prior to 1933 and was a native of the town, 
became Lord Mayor in May, after his release from Sachsenhausen concentration 
camp. He was later replaced by the KPD member Fritz Lange in September 1945, 
only to become mayor again in the late 1950s.
40
 Lange was to remain as Lord Mayor 
until early 1949 when he was replaced by SED member Otto Kühne who held the 
post until 1953. 
The second town under examination, Fürstenwalde, is a thirteenth-century 
cathedral town on the banks of the river Spree, sixty kilometres east of Berlin. Its 
town centre is also home to a number of historic buildings and museums, while the 
town is surrounded by a landscape of lush coniferous forests and lakes. It too 
developed into a local industrial centre in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
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benefitting from its geographical position as a thoroughfare between Berlin and 
Frankfurt/Oder. Prior to 1945, satellite camps belonging to both Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen concentration camps had been established in the town, with local 
industry ballooning with the expansion of armaments production and employing a 
significant number of forced labourers. In Fürstenwalde the population had averaged 
around 30,000 prior to the end of the war. By July 1945, however, it had dropped to 
19,962, increasing slightly by January 1946 to 23,152.
41
 Immediately following 
occupation, the Soviet NKVD set up the notorious Speziallager no. 5 ‘Ketschendorf’ 
on the site of the former Sachsenhausen satellite camp, in which over 10,000 
suspected German ‘fascists’ were interned until 1947. Fürstenwalde, even more so 
than Brandenburg/Havel, had been heavily affected by the the physical destruction 
entailed by the war, with more than 45% of the town’s buildings being extensively 
damaged by May 1945.
42
 Colonel S.P. Kitschigen became the Soviet military 
commander, and on 25 April 1945 he appointed Wilhelm Zernicke, a local former 
town councillor for the KPD, as mayor.
43
 In September 1945, Zernicke was replaced 
as mayor by Berthold Wottke, a KPD member and previous employee in the town’s 
municipal administration. Wottke was then superseded by SED member Paul 
Schmidtchen, also a former employee in Fürstenwalde’s municipal administration, in 
the summer of 1946, only to be followed as mayor by Paul Papke, the former SED 
district administrator in Lebus, from 1948 to 1951 and Alfred Leonhardt (SED) from 
1951 to 1952.
44
 It was these local administrators who would have to attempt to deal 
with the unprecedented level of chaos which existed in Brandenburg in the aftermath 
of the Third Reich’s collapse as well as overseeing the post-war transition from 
Nazism to socialism within their localities. 
 
 
                                                 
41
 KALOS F/Stadtverwaltung/994, ‘Tätigkeitsberichte des Einwohnermeldeamtes 1945-46’, no pag. 
and BLHA, Rep. 202E/24, ‘Bevölkerungsstatistik der Landkreise der Provinz Mark Brandenburg 
1945 (A-L)‘, p. 52. 
42
 KALOS F/RdS/258, ‘Erfassung der Kriegsschäden an Wohnhäusern und Industrieanlagen 1946-
1950‘, no. pag. 
43
 Klaus Geβner and Wladimir W. Sacharow, Inventar der Offenen Befehle der Sowjetischen 
Militäradministration des Landes Brandenburg (Frankfurt/M: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 49. 
44
 Paul Papke (1896-1970) was a long-time KPD functionary who had been imprisoned in 
Sachsenhausen until May 1945. After holding a number of posts as district administrator until 
becoming mayor of Fürstenwalde in 1948, he was eventually removed from this position during the 
SED purges of the early 1950s. He subsequently became the director of a district agricultural school 
in Brandenburg. See, Weber et al, Kommunisten. 
24 
 
1.5 Remarks on methodology and sources 
In order to examine grassroots responses and their possible implications on the post-
war transition, I have examined archival material and conducted twenty semi-
structured oral history interviews. The following section will outline the written and 
oral sources used, discussing advantages and disadvantages associated with both 
methods and the rationale for combining these approaches. 
In order to contextualise regional and local events in Brandenburg at a macro 
level, a variety of collections in the Berlin Federal Archives (BArch and SAPMO) 
were examined. The Ministerium des Innern (DVdI) files provide an insight into both 
the centralised administration as well as grassroots field and opinion reports on a 
wide range of issues such as denazification, sequestering, returning POWs, 
criminality and judicial proceedings against Nazi criminals. The Kommission 
Sequestrierung und Beschlagnahme collection includes a large number of 
sequestering lists, statistics and directives as well as grassroots complaints. The 
Gesellschaft für Deutsch Sowjetische Freundschaft files contain information on 
conferences, membership numbers as well as reports, analysis and statistics on 
grassroots developments. The National Komitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD) and 
NDPD 1948-1990 collections, which are to date still under-researched, include 
minutes of meetings and gatherings, regional and central party congresses, reports on 
regional and local political activities, and accounts from regional associations of the 
NDPD Party. Other macro collections utilised include the SED ZK: Abteilung für 
Sicherheitsfragen, the Ministerium der Justiz, the Oberstes Gericht der DDR, the 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft der DDR as well as the files in the Nachlass Wilhelm 
Pieck.  
At a regional, meso level, collections in the Brandenburg State Archive 
(BLHA) in Potsdam were examined. Of notable importance was the collection of 
files from the Ministerium des Innern which provided a valuable insight into 
regional concerns on a wide range of matters such as sequestering, complaints and 
their responses, the combatting of ‘anti-democratic’ activities, a large number of 
denazification protocols, as well as expellees and returning POWs. The files of the 
Büro des Ministerpräsidenten provided further insight into expropriations, complaint 
letters and complaint statistics as well as cabinet decisions. Other relevant collections 
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utilised included the Statistisches Landesamt, the Oberlandratsamt Eberswalde and 
Oberlandratsamt Lebus-Seelow. 
At a micro level in Brandenburg/Havel, the archival holdings of the 
‘Stadtarchiv Brandenburg’ (SAB) were examined, particularly utilising collections 
such as the Rat der Stadt Brandenburg: Bereich Oberbürgermeister which provided 
grassroots information on a broad range of issues such as denazification, 
sequestering, relations with the SMA and salient local problems. The collections of 
the Rat der Stadt Brandenburg: Bereich 1. Stellvertreter des Oberbürgermeisters, 
the Rat der Stadt Brandenburg: Bereich Inneres and the Rat der Stadt Brandenburg: 
Bereich Sekretär des Wahlbüros also provided useful local information on post-war 
Brandenburg/Havel. 
Lastly, the archival holdings for Fürstenwalde, which had been rescued from 
a coal cellar after 1990 by a committed local archivist and are now held in the 
‘Kreisarchiv Landkreis Oder-Spree’ (KALOS) in Beeskow, proved invaluable. The 
Rat der Stadt Fürstenwalde provided an insight into matters such as denazification, 
sequestering, local relations with the SMA, and reports on businesses and 
institutions. The Stadtverwaltung Fürstenwalde collection also yielded important 
information on population statistics, sequestering, schools and hospitals, former local 
Nazis, public notifications, administration reports and denazification among others. 
The collections of the Rat des Kreises Fürstenwalde/Spree, and the Stadtverwaltung 
Fürstenwalde Museum were also valuable. 
Such archival material, just like any historical source, must however be 
treated cautiously. Administrative and political reports written by functionaries on 
varying ends of the power spectrum are likely to have been influenced by personal 
agendas and subjectivities. Particularly more junior officials may have been tempted 
to embellish their reports in order to impress superiors. Yet arguably, although files 
produced in later decades of the GDR tended to demonstrate an increasingly uniform 
style and discourse, the files produced in the Soviet zone and very early GDR years 
provide a somewhat different perspective. As Jonathan Osmond argues, ‘in the early 
years the reporting language was only marginally affected by party gibberish’, and 
interestingly the incidence of what the SED regarded as ‘negative opinion’ in these 
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reports is in fact rather higher than one might expect.
45
 One reason for this may be 
due to the fact that the creation of the SED in 1946 was followed by a short phase of 
open articulation of problems which were considered to be negatively affecting the 
self-portrayal of the Party.
46
 In fact, the reports in these early years tended to paint a 
picture of post-war chaotic circumstances, during which administrations and 
administrators often struggled to cope. Moreover, the very practical challenges 
facing administrations charged with the transition from Nazism to socialism can be 
seen in the fact that due to a chronic shortage of paper, report writers were often 
forced to re-use office supplies from the Third Reich, creating the paradoxical 
situation that the reverse side of early KPD/SED reports are peppered with swastikas 
and acclamations of Hitler.  
It is conceivable that the higher incidence of negative reporting from this 
time means that successes may have been toned down whilst difficulties may have 
been overstated in order to receive more support and funding to combat economic, 
political and social challenges. Yet on the other hand, it is also not surprising that the 
magnitude of the difficulties presented by the collapse of the Third Reich were 
reflected in the archival material. Nonetheless, this period of relative openness was 
short-lived, and between 1948 and 1953 numerous waves of political cleansing were 
initiated, leading to the beginning of an increased uniformity of party-political 
doctrine in report and letter writing.
47
 Notwithstanding these factors, this archival 
material allows a snapshot of the post-war transition period, and particularly the 
‘Eingaben’ or petitions in these archival collections, penned by disgruntled former 
Nazis and ordinary citizens alike, provide valuable contemporaneous information on 
the responses and strategies of grassroots actors. As Paul Betts highlights, citizens’ 
communications are particularly interesting as they ‘straddled the line between the 
public and the private’, and thus permit an insight into the impact which post-war 
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measures had within localities.
48
 Similarly, Lex Heerma van Voss maintains that 
such petitions, which demanded favours or the redressing of injustices, enable 
present-day historians to hear the voices of those who would otherwise remain 
silent.
49
 These archival sources, therefore, despite these qualifications, provide a 
window into the manner in which central policies were implemented at a grassroots 
level in Brandenburg as well as some of the grassroots responses and problems 
encountered. 
In addition to archival sources, this thesis is based on twenty oral history 
interviews which were conducted in the towns of Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde in 2009. The oral history approach was applied in this study in order to 
explore further subjective experiences, perceptions and memories of the post-war 
period at a grassroots level. From a methodological standpoint, there are a number of 
differing approaches within oral history; these have been most usefully categorised 
by Paul Thompson, who has identified four distinct principal methods.
50
  The 
methodology and analytic tool utilised in this thesis is based on Thompson’s fourth 
approach known as ‘reconstructive cross-analysis’ whereby:  
The oral evidence is treated as a quarry from which to construct an argument 
about patterns of behaviour or events in the past [...] wherever the prime aim 
becomes analysis, the overall shape can no longer be governed by the life-
story form of the evidence, but must emerge from the inner logic of the 
argument. This will normally require much briefer quotations, with evidence 
from one interview compared with that from another, and combined with 
evidence from other types of source material.
51
  
This method has also been termed by Lynn Abrams as an ‘evidential approach’ 
which she defines as ‘the application of oral history for evidence gathering, the use 
of oral testimony as data, providing information to support an argument’.52  
This approach has, usually implicitly, been recently used by some other 
historians researching the Soviet zone and GDR, with greater and lesser degrees of 
success. For instance, Jan Palmowski has complemented his written evidence with 
45 semi-structured interviews; however, his study lacks reflection on oral history as 
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a method and his interviewees often remain formless and out of context, frequently 
without the inclusion of basic information such as year of birth.
53
 Similarly, Paul 
Betts has also conducted 45 interviews and 40 questionnaires in East Berlin for his 
recent fascinating study on private lives, yet this also occurs without a 
methodological discussion of his interviews. Moreover, Mark Allinson has used only 
‘informal conversations’ with Thuringians to supplement his archival findings whilst 
Corey Ross conducted no interviews and instead used opinion survey material.
54
 In 
contrast, and in line with previous research conducted by Dorothee Wierling, this 
thesis applies the ‘reconstructive cross-analysis’ and ‘evidential approaches’ by 
combining both archival sources with oral history interviews, thereby permitting a 
reflective analysis of convergences and divergences of findings across multiple 
sources.
55
 
This utilisation of the oral evidence as a ‘quarry’ in this thesis, rather than 
adopting a different oral history methodology, has both advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand the drawback is that, unlike with life-history 
interviews, given that the focus is thematic rather than biographic, some of the 
essence of the individual and their life experiences gets pushed into the 
background.
56
  Moreover, the decision not to undertake a systematic narrative 
analysis means that the manner in which the individual interviewees may have 
created and used stories as interpretive devices is not explored in this thesis.
57
 Yet on 
the other hand, the benefit of the ‘evidential’ or ‘reconstructive cross-analysis’ 
approach is that personal experiences are directly contrasted with those of 
contemporaries as well as being placed within a wider historical context. As this 
thesis weaves material out of both archival and oral history sources, it thereby 
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provides an insight into a much wider range of perspectives, experiences and 
memories than is possible with the other oral history methodologies. 
In order to find suitable interviewees, a purposive sampling technique was 
adopted specifying that all interviewees had to been born before 1933 and were to 
have lived in Brandenburg/Havel or Fürstenwalde before, during and after the post-
war transition period.
58
 This target group was selected in order to understand the 
post-war transition period from the perspective of long-term residents of these 
Brandenburg towns at a grassroots level. It was decided to find such interviewees 
with the help of local newspapers and contact was established with the two local 
archives who generously facilitated contact to the local media. Subsequently, 
newspaper articles appeared in the ‘Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung’ (MAZ) and the 
‘Märkische Oderzeitung’ (MOZ) which highlighted my doctoral research project and 
invited individuals interested in being interviewed to establish contact. Both articles 
stated that I was interested in interviewing local residents about their experiences 
amidst political and personal changes during the transition from National Socialism 
to the Soviet zone and early GDR.
59
 The respondents were given the option to decide 
on the location of the interview and were informed that the interview would take 
approximately two hours. Ten interviewees were selected from each of the two 
towns. The majority of the interviews took place in their own homes. Seven of the 
twenty interviewees requested that their interviews be anonymised and were 
therefore given pseudonyms.
60
 
I designed a semi-structured interview schedule, consisting of predominantly 
qualitative questions with a number of corresponding quantitative questions based on 
Likert items embedded throughout the interview.
61
 The interview addressed the 
perceived impact of past experiences ranging from childhood to the later GDR years, 
with a strong emphasis on the post-war period. All items in the interview schedule 
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were read aloud to the interviewees and great care was taken to avoid leading or 
biased questions.
62
 The interviews lasted between 1.5 hours and 4 hours. 
Whilst all of the interviewees were relatively young during the post-war 
transition period and lived in the region of Brandenburg, they differed markedly in 
terms of life experiences and their characteristics varied along a number of important 
dimensions. Fourteen of the interviewees were male and six were female. The oldest 
of the interviewees was born in 1921 at the time of Germany’s first reparations 
payment as part of the Versailles Treaty, while the youngest was born in 1933, two 
days after Hitler was appointed Chancellor. In fact, two interviewees were born 
during the period of hyperinflation, ten were born between 1924 and 1929 during 
Weimar’s golden age, and eight were born between 1930 and 1933 during the Great 
Depression. Thus, as Trevor Lummis has argued, ‘the date of the private life-cycle 
events of each cohort will fall into a different period of public historical events’, and 
the group of twenty interviewees born between 1921 and 1933 experienced 
important personal developments at different points in time.
63
  
Generally speaking, the group of interviewees was geographically stationary 
throughout their lives, despite the various political ruptures which they experienced; 
fifteen of them were born in either Brandenburg/Havel or Fürstenwalde, with the 
remaining moving there as very young children, whilst by 2009 only three had 
moved away and even these had remained within the locality of Brandenburg.  
Whilst this is unrepresentative of the population as a whole, given the relatively high 
proportion of refugees and expellees, it is not unusual for the majority of GDR 
residents who tended to be far less mobile than their West German counterparts.
64
 
The persistence of patterns of local memory was a key focus for my study, which is 
why I selected interviewees on this basis.  
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In terms of education, four had the equivalent of A-Levels (Abitur), seven 
had the equivalent of O-Levels and eight had left after primary school. Only one 
respondent, Fritz Krause, did not complete school due to his internment in an NKVD 
camp. For those who did complete school, the mean school leaving year was 1944. 
All twenty respondents then undertook further qualifications and apprenticeships – 
the mean year for finishing the first qualification or apprenticeship was 1951. 
Thirteen went on to undertake a second qualification after this, while almost half of 
these again went on to complete a third qualification. Two of the twenty interviewees 
held doctoral degrees, further underscoring the fact that this interview cohort cannot 
be considered to be representative of East German society. The professional 
trajectories of the interviewees also varied – three had semi-skilled or skilled manual 
jobs in the GDR, eight had middle level jobs in supervisory or executive roles, while 
nine later held high professional posts. The earliest year for retirement amongst the 
interviewees was 1983, whilst the last interviewee retired twenty years later in 2003. 
The relative heterogeneity of this group of individuals and the diversity of their life 
experiences were also reflected in the interviews, as the respondents, who were aged 
between twelve and twenty-four in 1945, also differed considerably in their political 
views and retrospective accounts of both the Third Reich and the GDR.  
Methodologically, the use of oral history has a number of benefits. It 
provides an opportunity to uncover the grassroots perspectives and memories of 
individuals who might not otherwise appear in the historical record, while also 
allowing access to a different mode of information. This is particularly the case in 
relation to this study, given that those who experienced the transition from Nazism to 
socialism in East Germany are an increasingly dwindling demographic.
65
 Bearing in 
mind that ‘oral history is not intrinsically more or less likely to be accurate than a 
written document’, it is also a valuable source with which to complement archival 
material.
66
 However, the use of oral history, just like other methodologies, also 
presents some difficulties. Depending on the sampling technique and size used, the 
results can rarely claim to be representative of larger groups and instead merely 
provides a window into some of the personal perceptions and memories which 
existed at a grassroots level at a certain point in time. Particularly with the use of a 
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small cohort as in this thesis, it is impossible to provide an adequate representation 
of, for example, male and female, rural and urban and generational differences. 
Moreover, given that the issues addressed in the interviews took place more than 
fifty years ago it must be acknowledged that the passage of time may have had an 
influence on the accuracy of their recollections. 
Further consideration also needs to be given to the mode of recruitment of 
this interview cohort and possible associated self-selection biases. For instance, 
given that the initiative had to come from the interviewees themselves to establish 
contact in response to the newspaper articles, it may be argued that their level of 
initiative may not be representative of other individuals of this age cohort in 
Brandenburg. Furthermore, even though every care was taken not to mention any 
specific political practices and policies in the newspaper articles and therefore pre-
empt some of the possible responses, the decision to participate may nevertheless 
have been influenced by personal motivations and experiences which may not have 
been characteristic of the population more generally. Thus, none of the findings 
based on the present cohort of twenty interviewees can be generalised or considered 
to be representative of wider East German society.  
Moreover, as an oral history interview is a process of reflexive social 
intercommunication, both interviewer and interviewee invariably affect the 
interaction, while as Elizabeth Tonkin points out, an additional way in which recall 
is ‘wrong’ comes from the ‘well-known presentation of self-in-the-best-light’.67 
Furthermore, unlike archival material, oral history does not provide access to a static 
historical ‘truth’, as memory is not a stagnant entity. Clearly archival material and 
oral history evidence function within two differing chronological paradigms, and 
therefore require a weaving of threads of layers of memory and time. In other words, 
the archival material provides a subjective snapshot of how events were represented 
in the past, whilst oral history evidence provides a subjective snapshot of how the 
past is remembered in the present. Given that interviewees are social agents who 
have internalised both their own experiences as well as wider discourses over time, 
oral history interviews, by their very nature, provide an insight into a combination of 
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individual memory as well as public discourses. There are a number of theorists 
whose conceptualisations of this phenomenon are relevant in relation to assessing the 
oral history evidence in this thesis.  
In relation to individual memory, Aleida Assmann maintains that memory 
consists of both ‘appresentation and representation’, and is thereby simultaneously 
‘mediated and processed’ by the memory agent.68 Similarly, Jay Winter and 
Emmanuel Sivan utilise the terms ‘retroactive interference’ and ‘proactive 
interference’ in order to describe how memory can work both forwards and 
backwards, as when ‘newly encoded memory traces reshape, cover, or eclipse older 
memory traces’, or when older memories remain salient and ‘shape our sense of the 
context or relative importance of later experiences’.69 Wulf Kansteiner focuses more 
on the emotional component of individual memory and contends that ‘private 
memories appear to be particularly flexible and able to integrate diverse images and 
story elements irrespective of their historical accuracy’.70 In line with these 
assessments, recollections based on the oral history interviews in this thesis can 
therefore not be considered to be ‘objective’ accounts of the past, but rather 
subjective retrospective perceptions and interpretations which will have been subject 
to both revision and (re)interpretation. These personal memories also exist within the 
wider social framework of changing public discourses, both before and after 1989, 
which will at times correlate with private experiences, whilst in other instances 
might also stand in stark contrast with personal memories and convictions.  
Similar to the dialectic between structures and individuals discussed above, 
issues surrounding the question of how the memories of oral history interviewees are 
potentially shaped by public discourses throughout their lifetimes reflect certain 
wider ontological assumptions amongst different theorists. For instance, Dorothee 
Wierling has attempted to assess ‘the interplay between personal and official 
narratives’, by emphasising the ‘instances of mediation between these two 
spheres’.71 Lynn Abrams argues that rather than individual memory being entirely 
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constrained by dominant societal influences,  ‘most respondents are capable of 
agency’, or what S.B. Ortner calls a ‘critical subjectivity’, which ‘involves a subject 
internalising, reflecting upon and then reacting against a set of circumstances or a 
widely accepted version of the past’.72 Similarly, this study is based on the 
assumption that individual memories and public discourses exist in a state of 
interplay with one another. On the one hand individual memories can influence 
public discourses, although this was less likely in an authoritarian system such as the 
GDR where discourse was usually dictated from above. On the other hand, public 
discourses from the Third Reich and the GDR may have consciously or 
unconsciously coloured the memory of individual actors. Furthermore, this applies 
not just to pre-1989 political narratives, but also to those in the current cultural and 
political sphere. The contemporary discourses which exist about both the Third 
Reich and the GDR in German society today, are constantly being influenced by 
politicians, journalists, historians, as well as through films and television in a 
continually changing ‘kaleidoscope’.73  Therefore, the oral history interviews need to 
be interpreted with great caution as it is likely that some of the perceptions and 
memories of the interviewees had also been shaped by some of these more recent 
representations of the past. 
Particularly during the period under investigation in this thesis, this dynamic 
between individual memory and official discourse was greatly influenced by the 
asymmetric power struggle by Soviet occupiers and the SED to dominate official 
discourse, thereby attempting to stifle grassroots experiences and memories which 
may not have been in accord with the new political rhetoric after 1945. As a 
consequence of this, this battle to subjugate possible antithetic grassroots 
experiences and memories could lead to the emergence of what Michel Foucault has 
                                                 
72
 S.B. Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power and the Acting Subject (London: 
2006) pp. 252-3, quoted in Abrams, Oral History, pp. 48, 70. 
73
 Martin Sabrow, DDR, p. 12. On the roles of politicians, contemporary eyewitnesses and historians 
in the memory politics which influence public commemoration of post-1989 East Germany, see 
Carola S. Rudnick, Die andere Hälfte der Erinnerung. Die DDR in der deutschen Geschichtspolitik 
nach 1989 (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011). Rainer Wirtz explores the popularisation of historical themes 
in German television which took place from the 1980s onward, calling it a ‘historical industry within 
the television industry’. Rainer Wirtz, ‘Alles authentisch: So war’s! Geschichte im Fernsehen’, in 
Alltag, Erfahrung, Eigensinn: Historisch-anthropologische Erkundungen, ed. by Belinda Davis, 
Thomas Lindenberger and Michael Wildt (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2008), 311-324 (p. 318). See 
also: Judith Keilbach, Geschichtsbilder und Zeitzeugen. Zur Darstellung des Nationalsozialismus im 
bundesdeutschen Fernsehen (Münster: LIT Verlag 2008). See also Nick Hodgin and Caroline Pearce, 
The GDR Remembered. Representations of the East German State since 1989 (Rochester: Camden 
House, 2011). 
35 
 
termed ‘counter-memory’ at a grassroots level.74 More recently, Jan and Aleida 
Assmann have expanded on this concept by exploring attempts by ruling elites to 
establish ‘legitimising and de-legitimising memory’ in order to legitimise themselves 
both retrospectively and prospectively. Following from this work, this thesis 
examines the grassroots responses to attempts to alter such discourses on the recent 
Nazi past through political strategy, new laws, (re)educational programs and the 
erecting of memorials.
75
 Thus, in its treatment of the ‘bottom-up’ memories of the 
oral history interviewees, as well as in its archival examination of the ‘top-down’ 
attempts to redefine the official discourse of the immediate past in the Soviet zone 
and early GDR, this thesis follows Wierling by using the term ‘memory’ in reference 
‘to both public representations of the past and the individual act of visualising one’s 
personal experiences’.76 Similarly, Jeffrey Olick maintains that ‘‘memory’ occurs in 
public and in private, at the tops of societies and at the bottoms, as reminiscence and 
as commemoration, as personal testimonial and as national narrative’.77  
Furthermore, recent studies on the private lives of individuals living under 
socialism in the twentieth century provide important insights for this thesis into the 
boundaries, or lack thereof, between the public and private sphere. For instance, in 
the context of the Soviet Union, Lewis Siegelbaum considers private spheres to be 
composed of the ‘overlapping realms of intimacy, familial relations, and 
friendships’. In turn, this private sphere is in a ‘dynamic, interactive tension’ with the 
public sphere, which is also ‘understood as a complex multi-layered category’.78 In 
contrast to historians such as Ehrhart Neubert, who treat the private sphere simply as 
a form of resistance in the GDR, Paul Betts has concluded that the private sphere 
was a ‘semi-permeable haven from public life’ in which politics was privatised and 
the private was politicised.
79
 Similarly, Josie McLellan has argued that private and 
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public worlds of politics, economics and social policy were not discrete. She 
maintains that one should not assume that regime and popular agendas were always 
mutually exclusive: ‘At times they diverged radically, but the most popular and 
enduring changes were based on the overlap between state and individual 
interests’.80 Likewise, this study recognises that when examining oral and written 
sources, there is always an overlap between the public and private spheres and a 
bilateral (but not equal) influence of one realm on the other. Thus, by exploring some 
of the overlaps as well as the incongruities between the memories of the oral history 
interviewees and the evidence in the archival source material, this thesis illustrates 
some of aspects in which individual needs and policy measures appear to have both 
diverged and converged at a grassroots level during the post-war transition period 
from Nazism to socialism in Brandenburg. 
 
1.6 Scope of study and overview of thesis 
This study adopts what Miles Fairburn defines as a ‘problem-led’ approach to social 
inquiry.
81
 In order to explore the reactions and Eigensinn of the local population, this 
exposition examines the responses to a greater range of post-war transition policies 
than some previous studies; but it does not in any way aspire to present an 
exhaustive chronicle of all of the post-war policies implemented in Brandenburg in 
order to facilitate the transition from Nazism to socialism. Nor does it attempt to 
develop a comprehensive and explicitly differentiated account of post-war East 
German society, differentiated along the lines of gender, class, generation, or other 
relevant criteria. Moreover, to examine German post-war experiences and suffering 
does not in any way detract from the horrific crimes committed by Germans 
throughout the Third Reich and this thesis, to borrow from Norman Naimark, is not 
meant as a contribution to ‘the pseudoscience of comparative victimology’.82 
Whilst this study explores the experiences of grassroots Brandenburgers in 
the post-war period, it does not examine the fate of Jewish Brandenburgers and the 
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dark legacy of anti-Semitism in East Germany. Instead, there have been a number of 
excellent studies which have explored the treatment of the Jewish community as well 
as the legacy of the Holocaust in both the Soviet zone and the later GDR.
83
 
Similarly, given that the focus is on those ordinary local Brandenburgers who lived 
in, returned to or remained in the area during and after the Third Reich, the 
experiences of German expellees are therefore only briefly addressed and form the 
subject of other studies.
84
 Furthermore, given that this thesis explores the post-war 
period from the perspective of predominantly stationary Brandenburgers, this study 
does also not examine the fate of those East Germans who fled to the Western zones 
during the post-war period. Whilst this study recognises that between 1945 and 
1949, roughly 876,200 inhabitants left the Soviet zone for a variety of reasons, it 
instead has chosen to focus its attention on the large majority who decided to remain 
in the Eastern sector.
85
 This decision was taken not only for reasons of feasibility, 
but also because, as Henrik Bispinck and Damian van Melis have demonstrated, the 
flight of East Germans to the West was not central to SED policy in the immediate 
post-war years as the authorities only began to take this issue seriously from the 
early 1950s onwards.
86
 Nonetheless, the potential to abscond to the West no doubt 
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played an important role in both stabilising and destabilising the post-war transition 
in Brandenburg, and this study must be implicitly situated within this wider 
context.
87
  
Moreover, although this study highlights the grassroots responses to post-war 
policies in East Germany, it does not explore external foreign policy factors such as 
the Cold War on the development of the Eastern zone in the early years.
88
 Similarly, 
the western sector of Berlin, and later the West German state naturally played a 
considerable role as both an influence and a counter-point to developments in 
Brandenburg, yet the interactions and impact of this dynamic, although they are 
implicitly mentioned, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Part one of this study focuses on the grassroots responses to punitive 
measures by examining disciplinary measures carried out by the Soviet occupying 
army, Soviet secret police (NKVD) camps, as well as denazification and 
sequestering of the Brandenburg populace. The second part of the thesis explores 
grassroots responses to the National Democratic Party (NDPD) and the Society for 
German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) and examines both impeding and facilitating 
factors to the post-war political transition at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. 
Whilst these two political organisations were part of the wider network of five 
political bloc parties (KPD/SED, CDU, LDPD and DBD) and the multitude of mass 
organisations in East Germany, they were arguably those which were most expressly 
established in order to re-write the official political discourse in relation to tenets of 
National Socialism as well as altering the parameters of those who now could be 
(and should be) politically rehabilitated and (re)integrated within the new socialist 
state. 
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Part 1: Grassroots responses within the context of punitive 
measures in Brandenburg 
 
Part one of this study addresses the question in what ways people at the grassroots 
attempted to challenge the imposition of punitive measures, and whether their 
responses had any effect on the manner in which these policies were implemented at 
a grassroots level in Brandenburg. Chapter two will explore grassroots responses to 
the disciplinary measures carried out by the Soviet occupying army and assess the 
extent to which local Brandenburgers may or may not have had latitude to react to 
these incursions. Chapter three will then focus on the manner in which grassroots 
Brandenburgers responded to the Soviet secret police (NKVD) camps and chapter 
four will examine grassroots reactions to attempts to denazify and sequester property 
in Brandenburg and the manner in which the implementation of these measures were 
realised on the ground. It is argued that the imposition of these wide-ranging 
punitive policies to change the political, economic and social system often posed an 
existential threat at a grassroots level, and therefore at times elicited grassroots 
actions albeit severely restricted by practical and political constraints. In turn, these 
grassroots responses could occasionally have some local impact and somewhat affect 
the manner in which some of these policies were implemented at a grassroots level in 
Brandenburg.
40 
 
Chapter II: Grassroots responses to punitive Soviet 
measures in the immediate post-war period  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The first Soviet soldiers arrived in Fürstenwalde and Brandenburg/Havel in late 
April 1945. Whilst a small proportion of the Brandenburg population welcomed their 
arrival as liberation from Nazism, the large majority had experienced the build-up of 
the Soviet arrival with fearful apprehension. Wolfram Wette highlights that 
especially after the defeat in Stalingrad, German propaganda had increasingly 
attempted to portray the Soviet enemy as ‘murdering monsters’.1 Norman Naimark 
maintains that ‘there can be little question that by the end of the war most Germans – 
with the rare exception of those on the Left – had an uncommon fear and hatred of 
the Soviets’.2 A general sense of foreboding at the Red Army’s arrival was also 
heightened by a fear of retribution for the policies which had been carried out by the 
Germans on the Eastern front, while National Socialist propaganda accounts of 
barbaric acts committed against the German population living in the East in the final 
months of the war, ‘framed expectations everywhere of what would happen if and 
when the Russians arrived’.3  
The present thesis argues that the aftermath of the war and the initial months 
which followed Soviet occupation had important implications for subsequent post-
war transitions from Nazism to socialism at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to specifically examine the grassroots responses to the 
Soviet occupation in the immediate post-war period and assess whether there was 
any room for manoeuvre for local Brandenburgers to moderate the impact of these 
punitive measures. This examination of the grassroots dynamic between East 
Germans and the Soviet occupying army has been both informed and inspired by a 
number of recent studies which have addressed different aspects of the early post-
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 Wolfram Wette, ‘Das Russlandbild in der NS-Propaganda. Ein Problemaufriss’, in Volkmann, 
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Germany, p. 71. See also the accounts of some of the desperate acts of filicide and suicide which were 
carried out in Fürstenwalde amongst all age groups in anticipation of the arrival of the Soviet army in 
April 1945:  KALOS F/Stadtverwaltung/2060 ‘Volksgerichtshof 23.5.-6.8.1945’, no pag.   
41 
 
war dynamic between Soviets and East Germans, such as those by Richard Bessel, 
Monica Black, Norman Naimark and Silke Satjukow.  
In order to explore the impact of, and responses to, post-war punitive 
measures by the Soviet army on local Brandenburgers, this chapter uses both 
archival material and oral history evidence. The local archival material provided the 
opportunity to obtain valuable information on contemporaneous grassroots attitudes 
and responses in post-war Brandenburg, whilst the oral history evidence permitted a 
more in-depth insight into some of the experiences and memories of this age cohort 
who were aged between twelve and twenty-four in 1945. However, given that the 
oral history interviewees are social agents who have internalised their own 
experiences as well as wider public discourses, the recollections of their general 
attitudes towards the Soviets after the collapse of the Third Reich are likely to be 
products of a mingling of both personal memory and official discourses. Considering 
the high levels of anti-Soviet propaganda which this interview cohort was exposed to 
prior to 1945, it seems conceivable that this may have somewhat coloured the 
manner in which the interviewees perceived the occupying army. To borrow from 
Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, it may be argued that memories of personal attitudes 
towards the Soviet army in 1945 were formed in relation both to ‘personal 
experience’ and ‘pre-existing cultural templates’.4 Furthermore, it should be noted 
that the recollections may not just be shaped by these ‘pre-existing cultural 
templates’ from the Third Reich, but also by subsequent experiences and discourses 
from the GDR and Germany after 1989. 
This chapter will briefly describe the grassroots experiences of post-war 
chaos before moving on to explore the impact of post-war violence in the form of 
rapes, looting and lawlessness. Whilst this retaliatory violence was not an officially 
sanctioned Soviet policy it nonetheless formed the grassroots reality for many in the 
aftermath of the collapse of Nazism. Subsequently the grassroots impact of the more 
official punitive strategies of dismantlement and displacement will be explored. The 
final part of this chapter then focuses on the post-war memorialisation of war dead in 
order to investigate local responses to revisionist attempts by the Soviets to create a 
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new ‘legitimate memory’ and a revised political discourse in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Third Reich.
5
  
 
2.2 The initial post-war chaos at a grassroots level  
The collapse of the Third Reich and the scars of the extreme violence of the war had 
a dramatic and immediate impact on the lives of ordinary Brandenburgers as the 
political rupture in 1945 was marked by widespread homelessness, hunger, disease 
and death; the losses associated with the war were therefore ‘not only military, 
material, and political but psychological, emotional, and existential’.6 In addition to 
the millions of expellees who had lost their homes and most of their belongings, 
many of those living west of the Oder-Neisse border also experienced dislocation 
within their localities. In Brandenburg/Havel, 10,500 of the 23,817 existing 
apartments had been damaged and 17,000 people had lost their homes, whilst in 
Fürstenwalde 4,200 apartments and 121 houses had been either badly damaged or 
destroyed in the town by May 1945.
7
 This is also reflected amongst the oral history 
cohort where six of those interviewed lost their homes as a result of war damage, 
being reduced to temporarily living in barns and huts in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde. 
Indeed, the most immediate concern at the grassroots level in May 1945 was 
not political but existential, and once the bombing and fighting had ceased, 
Brandenburgers’ paramount occupation turned to food. The contrast between the 
pre- and post-war availability of foodstuffs was stark. For instance, in May 1945 in 
Brandenburg/Havel the main abattoir had dropped to a mere 3% of the output which 
it had had in February 1945.
8
 In order to prevent the starvation of the population, 
soup kitchens were set up in Brandenburg/Havel on 6 May and on 19 May the first 
food ration cards were distributed.  
The situation was similar in Fürstenwalde where in May 1945 the entire 
population of the town was provided with 250g of bread on a daily basis, with an 
extra ration of 1,400g per week for a working adult, while soup kitchens were also 
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set up in order to attempt to provide the local population with one warm meal per 
day.
9
 These rations were linked to the establishment of compulsory work details in 
both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, which were intended both to feed the 
local population and begin the removal of the extensive physical destruction which 
the war had left behind. However, given the widespread dire shortages, even as a 
member of a work detail, food rations were not sufficient and local Brandenburgers, 
just like in other regions of post-war Germany, responded by desperately foraging 
for food and bartering on the black market at exorbitant prices.
10
 These difficulties 
were further compounded by the bad harvest in the autumn of 1945, a consequence 
of war damage such as loss of machinery and animals as well as landmines, resulting 
in an extremely critical shortage of food supplies in the winter of 1945.
11
 
In Fürstenwalde the local administration was so concerned about the shortage 
of food that they feared that if milk and food rations did not increase, ‘all the town’s 
toddlers’ would be dead in three months’ time.12 In the summer of 1945 the average 
death rate in Fürstenwalde from epidemics such as dysentery and colitis stood at one 
per cent, with babies under six months accounting for almost 20 per cent of deaths. 
These difficulties were further compounded by a massive typhoid epidemic which 
hit Fürstenwalde at the end of August 1945.
13
 Brandenburg/Havel experienced a 
similar typhoid epidemic, and by October 1945 up to thirty new cases were being 
diagnosed in the town on a daily basis. Furthermore, the outbreak of typhoid was 
compounded with other epidemics and public health risks such as scarlet fever and 
venereal diseases.
14
  
This prolongation of civilian fatalities beyond the war’s end meant that the 
grassroots landscape in Brandenburg continued to be scarred by the ubiquity of death 
and local administrators struggled to cope as individual funeral ceremonies were 
replaced by mass burials. Throughout the summer of 1945, members of 
Fürstenwalde’s population sent repeated complaints to the town council objecting 
that the dead were merely being wrapped in sacks or blankets and were then lowered 
into the ground unceremoniously, forcing local KPD Mayor Zernicke to concede that 
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it would perhaps be necessary to find a private company ‘who would perform the 
funerals more piously’.15 Indeed, Monica Black’s analysis of death in Berlin has 
revealed that throughout the Third Reich the Nazi leadership had established a clear 
differentiation of burial policy which ‘enacted distinctions that were simultaneously 
moral, cultural, and racial’, maintaining that Berliners felt that ‘ignominy was 
associated with a mass grave, that it was a patently unacceptable breach of custom, 
and that it was therefore only used for racial subordinates and outsiders’. According 
to Black, coffins gained a ‘profound symbolic currency’, as they were ‘more than 
wooden boxes’ in Berlin in 1945, instead epitomising ‘the very order of society, its 
foundations, and its self-conception’. A lack of a coffin to bury the dead therefore 
symbolised ‘the collapse of that society and a way of life’.16 In this manner the high 
civilian death rate and ensuing mass burials experienced in Brandenburg in the wake 
of the collapse of the Third Reich painfully epitomised the utter physical and societal 
breakdown with which the grassroots population was faced in 1945. Moreover, as 
Richard Bessel has argued, the ‘the sudden transition from power to impotence’ was 
devastating, and the ‘chaos, desperation, fear and violence of early 1945 reduced 
people’s horizons and concerns to their own small worlds’.17 It was therefore against 
this backdrop of widespread homelessness, hunger, disease and death during the 
aftermath of the Third Reich that the Brandenburg population would be forced to 
deal with the post-war occupation of the Soviet Army. 
 
2.3 ‘Watches, women, looting and lawlessness’: first encounters with 
the Red Army 
The first Soviet soldiers arrived in Fürstenwalde on 22 April 1945 and in 
Brandenburg/Havel on 30 April 1945, the day Hitler committed suicide. The events 
which ensued in East Germany in effect mirrored aspects of the extreme violence 
which had previously been perpetrated by the Wehrmacht in Eastern occupied 
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territories. This ‘boomerang violence’ which occurred immediately after occupation 
can be described as primarily opportunistic in contrast with the previous more 
centrally coordinated military efforts during the war.
18
 It also took the form of 
interpersonal and individual violence, albeit that it was happening on a large 
collective scale. 
 
Of the twenty oral history interviewees, nineteen claimed to have had a 
negative attitude towards the Russians during the Third Reich and recalled that they 
experienced the build-up of the arrival of the Soviet army with great apprehension.
19
 
For most of the interviewees the very first contact with the Red Army took place 
when Soviet soldiers entered the air-raid shelters where the civilians were hiding. 
The majority described a similar discourse where the first front soldiers arrived 
exhausted looking for German soldiers, while the second wave, who had not fought 
at the front, came looking for booty in the form of ‘watches and women’. These 
recollections highlighted the suddenly inverted power dynamic between both 
nationalities and the forced acquiescence of the German population in this context. 
Former Hitler Youth member Reinhold Rösner, whose sixteenth birthday fell on the 
arrival of the Soviets in Fürstenwalde, recalled his first experience of retaliatory 
violence when a Waffen SS soldier, who had been hiding next to him in a bunker, 
was shot at point blank range by Soviet soldiers.
20
 Wolfgang Fried, a former Hitler 
Youth member who was eighteen in 1945, recalled the arrival of the Red Army in 
the cellar in Brandenburg/Havel: ‘three Russians came into the cellar […] and 
shouted “German soldier, German soldier!”, and then the next ones came and 
shouted “Uhri, Uhri!”’.21 In fact, these imitations of the stereotypes of the Russian 
inability to pronounce the German word for watches were a common theme 
throughout the interviews, in part reflecting perhaps a certain conscious or 
                                                 
18
 Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives, p. 242. 
19
 The exception amongst them was the youngest interviewee, Wolfgang Heinrich, who later became 
an active SED supporter. Interview with Wolfgang Heinrich on 1 September 2009. Although this 
dread of the Soviets existed across all age-groups, it was particularly the younger generation which 
had been most systematically inculcated with National Socialist propaganda, both through youth 
groups and school books. Benjamin Ortmeyer, Indoktrination. Rassismus und Antisemitismus in 
derNazi-Schülerzeitschrift "Hilf mit!" (1933-1944) - Analyse und Dokumente (Weinheim: Juventa 
Verlag, 2013). Also Julie Nicole Deering, The Influence of National Socialism on Children’s School 
Textbooks during the Third Reich 1933-1942 (Dublin: Trinity College; Unpublished Dissertation, 
2005). 
20
 Interview with Reinhold Rösner on 10 September 2009. 
21
 Interview with Wolfgang Fried on 25 June 2009. 
46 
 
unconscious reproduction of elements of the Nazi stereotypes of ‘primitive’ Russians 
amongst some of the interviewees.  
This exposure of the East German population to overt physical violence was 
often also twinned together with psychological violence and rape and in those first 
initial points of contact between Soviets and Germans, several interviewees 
recounted that some women in the air-raid shelters were sexually assaulted.
22
 For 
instance in Fürstenwalde, former Jungmädel Ulla Beck, fourteen at the time, was 
forced to watch how her aunt was taken out of the air-raid shelter by Russian 
soldiers.
23
  The problems became so acute that on 11 July 1945, the week before the 
Potsdam Conference was to commence, Wilhelm Pieck, who had returned from exile 
in Moscow ten days previously along with the Gruppe Ulbricht, went as far as to 
complain to the Soviet military governor Georgy Zhukov about rapes and 
plundering.
24
 Nonetheless, as Naimark has highlighted, it was difficult if not 
impossible for a German woman to bring a Soviet soldier to justice, while, he argues, 
the ‘lack of open recognition by Soviet authorities of the problem of rape 
unquestionably contributed to its persistence’.25  
Given this lack of official channels to deal with the issue, the responses to the 
rapes at a grassroots level varied, as individuals were forced to find their own 
strategies to cope with these Soviet incursions. In the oral history interviews the 
memories ranged from feeling utterly powerless on the one end, to recollections of 
actively devising strategies to avoid sexual assault on the other end of the spectrum. 
Interestingly, it appears as if the male interviewees in this cohort experienced the 
most extreme feelings of complete powerlessness at these developments. For 
instance, Dr Siegfried Reinke, a former Hitler Youth member who was fifteen when 
the Third Reich collapsed, recalled the forced passivity of the population when the 
Soviets arrived in Brandenburg/Havel:  
The Russians, they were brutal in my parent’s house [...] twelve families 
lived there and out of these four women were raped, viciously raped, the 
Russians, always when they were drunk and they were often drunk, they were 
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extremely dangerous [...] it was well-known that after the capturing of a town 
lawlessness was allowed to rule for three days, women were allowed to be 
raped.
26
  
Similarly, Hans Gericke, a twenty-one year old in 1945 who had been a member of 
the Hitler Youth and the NS Studentenbund, claimed to have reacted with resigned 
passivity: ‘It was a spectre [...] but we couldn’t start a new war, we had to put up 
with it”.27 Wilhelm Fiedler, twenty-four at the end of the war, whose fiancé was 
sexually assaulted by Russian soldiers in Brandenburg/Havel recalled that: ‘I was so 
angry at that moment, if I would have had the opportunity […] to take revenge, 
which isn’t Christian […] the human side of me would have probably done it’.28 
Rape has been described as a ‘bio-political strategy’ and can be viewed not only as 
an act of violence against the female body, but also against their male ‘owners’ and 
supposed protectors.
29
 Likewise, these memories reflect the fact that these particular 
interviewees, who were teenagers or young men in 1945, felt powerless to intervene 
against the sexual assault of partners, sisters, mothers, aunts and neighbours after the 
collapse of the Third Reich. This pervasive sense of male impotence and helpless 
rage at the situation may have been further heightened by the asymmetric gender 
balance which resulted from the many men who were missing, captive or dead, with 
the consequence that there were a disproportionate number of females who would 
have needed to be ‘protected’ in the aftermath of the war. In fact, out of a total 
population of just over 2.3 million in the Brandenburg province in December 1945, 
60% were female and 40% were male, while in particular age cohorts the gender 
imbalance was even more pronounced. For instance, in December 1945, 78% of 
eighteen to thirty year olds in Brandenburg were female.
30
 
In contrast to this stand the memories of some of the female interviewees, 
whose retrospective accounts suggest the presence of a strong grassroots community 
in which Brandenburgers rallied together in order to protect particularly the teenage 
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girls from assault. Dr Edith Dorn, a former Jungmädel who was fifteen in 1945 and 
living in Brandenburg/Havel, was hidden in various attics, while Ulla Beck and 
Carmen Jung, a seventeen year old former Jungmädel from Fürstenwalde, both 
recalled being locked into small rooms with other girls with wardrobes being hauled 
in front of the door.
31
 Similarly, former BDM member Erika Schulz, seventeen when 
the war ended, stated that she was hidden in a grocery shop in Fürstenwalde along 
with other local girls, with vegetables stacked up in front of the door as 
camouflage.
32
 Indeed, the manner in which the interviewees describe how a 
collective community spirit served to protect some of the female population in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde is also reflected in some of the secondary 
literature. Naimark has found that in a situation of ‘societal breakdown and the 
fragmentation of the German sense of community and even of family, the threat of 
rape paradoxically provided an important impetus to rebuild village and town 
organisation and to maintain community unity’.33 Similarly, Atina Grossmann 
maintains that in the ‘dark times’ of rape, women ‘also presented themselves as 
resourceful agents’.34 Consistent with this argument, seventeen year old former 
BDM member Gertrud Hirsch proudly recalled: 
I wasn’t afraid because I could run fast […] I ran up to the attic so quickly 
that the Russians didn’t even have a chance to spot me. And then they said to 
my mother ‘where is daughter?’ and she began to cry and said ‘I don’t 
know’. And because she was crying I came back down and cheekily said 
‘here I am!’, but nothing happened. They also tried to look for us at night but 
never found us.
35
 
Arguably this account is a good example of an interviewee attempting to 
retroactively portray herself in a positive light as a resourceful agent who appeared 
to outsmart the primitive Soviet soldiers who could not speak proper German 
(‘where is daughter’) and seem to have been easily outwitted. On the other hand, 
Gertrud Hirsch’s amused laughter while telling this story also suggests that she was 
indeed in the fortunate position to have avoided sexual assault, either as a result of 
her own actions, or due to other exogenous factors. 
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The evidence therefore suggests that the impact of, and responses to, mass 
sexual assault which followed the collapse of the Third Reich took a number of 
forms amongst the interviewees in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. On the one 
hand, the majority of the male interviewees responded with a sense of utter 
impotence and powerlessness, with some privately yearning for revenge against the 
Soviet occupiers. On the other hand, the majority of the female interviewees, who 
appear to have been fortunate enough to avoid experiencing sexual assault 
themselves, paint a picture, sixty years later, of themselves as relatively resourceful 
agents who, together with the support of their communities, managed to outwit the 
Soviet soldiers despite the constraints of occupation. 
However, these oral history interviews cannot be considered to be 
characteristic of the range of responses to Soviet rapes amongst women in 
Brandenburg more generally. Many tens of thousands of East German women were 
exposed to violent sexual experiences on the arrival of the Soviet army in 1945 and 
were sometimes unable to deal with the trauma, instead resorting to extreme 
measures. For instance, in Brandenburg/Havel, Dr Edith Dorn’s aunt and her two 
cousins committed suicide as a result of being raped by Soviet soldiers.
36
 Similarly, 
the Volksgerichtshof files from Fürstenwalde between May and August 1945 depict 
how the arrival of Soviet soldiers was followed by a wave of desperation and 
despair, where a significant number of local women responded to repeated sexual 
assaults by carrying out acts of filicide and suicide.
37
 Thus, in reality the room for 
manoeuvre of local Brandenburgers tended to be extremely restricted in 1945 and in 
fact, combined with the other existential challenges which were facing the 
population at this time, the retaliatory violence carried out by some Soviet soldiers 
created an enormous fear amongst the population, thereby gradually eclipsing 
notions of guilt at the crimes previously committed by Germans on the Eastern 
front.
38
 
The grassroots impact of, and responses to, the occupation of Brandenburg 
by the Soviet army also took other forms and especially in the initial months 
following the collapse of the Third Reich, Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde 
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were marked with looting and lawlessness. As Richard Bessel has highlighted, 
‘liberation meant looting’ and Germans now found themselves ‘transformed from 
practitioners of violence to objects of violence’.39 Local German police forces had 
been established in both towns within a week of occupation, yet in the early post-war 
period the police had severe difficulties in controlling looting Soviet soldiers and 
civilians. These difficulties were compounded by an initial ban on carrying arms as 
well as severe material shortages, which in the case of Fürstenwalde paradoxically 
meant that the local Ordnungspolizei were initially forced to wear dyed former 
Wehrmacht uniforms.
40
 Combined with such shortages, the local police forces in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde were compelled to deal with a high number of 
assaults, larcenies as well as murders by Soviet military patrols, Russian soldiers, 
Russian civilians and Eastern Zwangsarbeiter.
41 
Moreover, German police forces 
were not permitted to use what few weapons they had against Allied soldiers, and the 
archival evidence indicates that beatings and muggings of German police officials by 
Soviet soldiers were not uncommon. In one instance, a local police constable from 
Brandenburg/Havel was badly beaten by Soviet soldiers when he attempted to 
intervene against plundering by Russian civilians, while at the end of June 1945, 
Russian soldiers on patrol in the town were reported to have openly mugged locals 
of watches and leather jackets, despite the presence of German police officials.
42
  
Tensions between the Soviet occupiers and local Germans also flared over 
the use of local waterways in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. In a state such 
as Brandenburg, which consists of over 3,000 lakes and 30,000 kilometres of 
waterways, much of the local infrastructure and commerce had traditionally relied on 
this resource. Especially in the case of Brandenburg/Havel, these issues became 
acute with the realisation that the newly established water police was not in a 
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position to protect either the fish stocks or fishermen from Soviet incursions.
43
 In the 
summer of 1945, Brandenburg/Havel’s magistrate responded by complaining to the 
President of the Provincial administration in Potsdam, using the racially loaded term 
‘umherwildern’ to describe the Russians.44  
Despite the SMA Order no. 35 issued on 29 August 1945, which stated that 
all fisheries were to be removed from military control and returned to their previous 
owners, with the owners in turn being obliged to sell one third of their stock to the 
troops, problems continued to persist. When on 5 October District Mayor Eichler 
organised a meeting with local fishermen in Brandenburg/Havel’s city hall, they 
voiced a large number of complaints, claiming that individual Russian commandos 
were still confiscating entire catches, closing off waterways, and fishing with 
explosives which continued to deplete the dwindling fish stock.
45
 Whilst these 
fishermen did take some action by publicly voicing grievances against the Soviet 
troops in an attempt to safeguard their livelihood, the archival material does not 
provide evidence that they were able to have any direct impact on the immediate 
situation.  
The enormous difficulties encountered by both the terrestrial and water police 
forces in their attempts to negotiate the transition from the Third Reich with local 
Soviet troops in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, suggest that it was not just 
the local population whose  room for manoeuvre was severely curtailed. This lack of 
ability of the local police forces to adequately respond to crimes committed in their 
communities served not only to partially undermine their local legitimacy, but also 
on occasion to heighten anti-Soviet sentiment amongst some members of the newly 
created force. 
Loss of control and the widespread post-war violence and lawlessness in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde was also a salient theme amongst the oral 
history interviewees, many of whom emphasised the unpredictable violation of their 
notions of justice through arbitrary violence. For instance, Dr Edith Dorn recalled 
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that she felt: ‘Fear, fear, fear. They shot indiscriminately; they arbitrarily took men 
or women from the street’.46 In fact, some recounted encounters marked by extreme 
violence. For instance, Karl Schmidt, twenty-four years old in 1945, had the 
experience that ‘the Russians’ burned down his family home in a small village 
outside Brandenburg/Havel.
47
 Former Jungvolk member Arnold Schulze from 
Fürstenwalde experienced a most harrowing personal event when his parents were 
murdered by pillaging Soviet soldiers in the winter of 1945:  
At the end of November, at night, when everything was essentially over, they 
shot my parents [...] when I came home they were both lying on the ground 
and everything had been plundered [...] there I was at fourteen [...] everything 
was gone.
48
 
Traumatic recollections such as these underscore the devastating personal impact of 
this seemingly arbitrary violence and utter sense of powerlessness against some 
members of the Soviet occupation army who both sought revenge and demanded 
access to the possessions and material resources of Brandenburgers in the initial 
post-war period.  
However, although the room for manoeuvre of Brandenburgers against the 
retaliatory Soviet measures in the immediate post-war period was extremely 
restricted, perceptions and attitudes towards the Soviet occupiers were not always 
congruent. For instance, given the severe shortage of commodities and transport in 
the post-war period the stealing of a bicycle by a Russian soldier forcibly reminded 
the local Germans of their powerless position as a defeated and occupied nation and 
oral history interviewees often recalled this threat with fear. Former Jungmädel 
Christine Küster from Fürstenwalde, fourteen in 1945 recalled that ‘one didn’t dare 
to cycle anywhere because the bicycles were being stolen’.49 Similarly, a number of 
other interviewees recalled dangerous encounters with Russian soldiers stealing 
bicycles at gun-point.  
On the other hand, the widespread anecdotal evidence of the Russians’ 
inability to actually cycle seemed to reinforce some aspects of pre-conceived racial 
stereotypes of Russian inferiority from pre-1945 in terms of technological 
backwardness and ineptitude. Dr Siegfried Reinke recalled: ‘they stole my bicycle 
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too, but they of course didn’t know how to cycle and looked terrible [...] they had 
never had bicycles at home’.50 Likewise, Gertrud Hirsch remembered: ‘They really 
were stupid, they couldn’t even cycle and they thought that if the Germans can cycle 
they can take the bicycle and they can do it too’.51 These oral history memories of 
‘stupid Russians’ who ‘had never had bicycles at home’ support Naimark’s 
observations that numerous contemporary commentators noted the persistent 
arrogance of the Germans in face of ‘the backward Russian, whose cultural level was 
supposed to be so much lower’.52 Such sentiments therefore illustrate the complex 
hybrid between German physical powerlessness towards the victors on the one hand, 
and a continued sense of internal superiority on the other hand. Yet although these 
jokes about Russian ineptitude may have offered some small solace to local Germans 
in the face of utter chaos and collapse, the reality was that Brandenburgers’ daily 
lives were not only massively constrained by hunger, homelessness, disease, looting 
and lawlessness during this early post-war period, they also had to simultaneously 
deal with the grassroots impact of the initial Soviet policies of dismantling and 
displacement.  
 
2.4 Punitive Soviet policies at a grassroots level: dismantling and 
displacement 
Already in the summer of 1945, Soviet commanders began dismantling local 
factories and industrial plants in order that they could be transported to the Soviet 
Union as reparation payments. Yet these actions conflicted with the interests of the 
local populations and their German administrators, and frequently led to the 
stratification of post-war society not along political affiliation (Soviets banding with 
German KPD administrators) but along nationalities (Soviet vs. German interests).   
During this period, both case study towns experienced a ‘process of de-
industrialisation’.53 In Fürstenwalde, the local administration expressed 
dissatisfaction in July 1945 at the fact that: ‘in Fürstenwalde and its surrounds not 
one factory survives, regardless if it had had a part to play in the war effort or not’.54 
                                                 
50
 Reinke, 23.06.09. 
51
 Hirsch, 27.08.09. 
52
 Naimark, Russians, pp. 114-15. 
53
 Bessel, Germany, p. 378. 
54
 KALOS F/Stadtverwaltung/994, no pag. 
54 
 
In Brandenburg/Havel, 70% of the town’s industrial facilities had disappeared by 
late 1945 as a result of the effects of the war or due to dismantling.
55
 In fact, local 
German administrators were often at the mercy of the whims of local commanders 
and as a consequence the manner in which administrators were able to respond was 
relatively curtailed, particularly in the first two years after occupation. For instance, 
in January 1946 a barracks in Brandenburg/Havel, which had originally been set 
aside by the local KPD as an orphanage, was being dismantled by Russian soldiers, 
who were now using it as fire-wood.
56
  
Similarly, in Fürstenwalde in September 1945, the town commander had 
given the order that reinforced glass which remained in the local ‘Julius Pintsch’ 
factory should be removed, in order to be made available to the surrounding schools 
and hospitals. Yet the Soviet commander of the ‘Pintsch’ factory required the glass 
for his own purposes and refused to place it at the disposal of the town. The KPD 
mayor of Fürstenwalde, Wilhelm Zernicke, was therefore forced to write to the 
central command in Potsdam for clarification. These grassroots frustrations increased 
and in January 1946 the new KPD mayor, Berthold Wottke, wrote to the SMAD in 
Karlshorst begging them not to dismantle the glass bulb production sector of the 
‘Pintsch’ factory, on the basis that the bulb production could not, he claimed, be 
classified as a ‘part of the Nazi war machine’. His intervention proved unsuccessful 
and by November 1946 local reports indicate that the machinery in the ‘Pintsch’ 
factory had been almost entirely dismantled by the occupying army.
57
  
The sense of powerlessness created by dismantlement in Brandenburg was 
also a common theme in the recollections of some of the oral history interviewees, 
particularly for the male interviewees. For instance, Hans Gericke had been forced to 
work as a dismantling engineer for the steelworks in Brandenburg/Havel, while 
former Hitler Youth member Gunther Dietrich, who was eighteen in 1945, recalled 
watching with dismay how the steelworks in Brandenburg/Havel were dismantled at 
the time: ‘within three weeks the large tank hangar had virtually disappeared’.58 
There was also indignation at the manner in which dismantled equipment was 
handled. Kurt Michel, fourteen in 1945 and a former Jungvolk member, claimed that 
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his cousin had witnessed how expensive machinery in the flagship Adam Opel 
factory in Brandenburg/Havel had been turned into scrap metal in Russia due to 
‘Russian incompetence’.59 Whether or not this was actually the case, such memories 
at the style and the perceived manner in which dismantling was apparently 
conducted are consistent with the complex and often paradoxical hybrid between an 
utter sense of defeat and a concomitant inner sense of technical superiority towards 
the Russians. Whilst these memories may perhaps be consistent with pre-1945 
negative Russian stereotypes of ineptitude, it should also be noted that the salience of 
this theme in the interviews may have also been reinforced by more recent post-
reunification discourses on the discrepancy between West and East German 
industrial achievements and a possible need to underscore the hardships suffered by 
East Germans in the face of Soviet retaliation. 
Tensions between local East Germans and the Soviet occupiers in the 
immediate post-war period were not only heightened by the dismantlement of 
industry, but also as a result of the confiscation and occupation of private property 
for personal use by members of the newly arrived Red Army. This occurred not just 
in Brandenburg, but also in many other towns in the Soviet zone where large 
apartment houses were sequestered by the Soviet authorities for their personnel, and 
whole streets were taken over by the army, their German residents expelled.
60
 Unlike 
the property expropriation of former Nazis, which was carried out as part of 
denazification and will be discussed in chapter four, this confiscation of property for 
use by the Soviet occupation troops was politically indiscriminate. This was 
compounded by the fact that that the displacement of Germans from their homes 
could occur with less than 48 hours’ notice. The range of grassroots responses to this 
particular Soviet incursion varied. In particular, they affected local KPD/SED 
administrators who were forced to attempt to mediate between Soviet actions and 
German citizens as they grew increasingly concerned about the negative impact 
which these practices could have on the political sentiment of the population. A local 
opinion report written from Brandenburg/Havel by the KPD Lord Mayor Lange on 
28 February 1946 illustrates the extreme uncertainty created by this Soviet policy:  
Agitation is being reinforced on a daily basis through the fear of losing one’s 
apartment. In February, as a result of an order by the town’s commanders, 98 
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apartments in the Fouquestraβe had to be forcibly vacated. This was also the 
case for the nursing home in the Magdeburgerstraβe as well as the Pestalozzi 
school [...] After every inspection of new buildings by the Kommandantur, a 
new rumour of course begins that the surveyed house will also now be 
confiscated.
61
  
Whilst this report underscores just how politically indiscriminate these confiscations 
could be, as not only ordinary citizens in the Fouquestraβe, but also the most 
vulnerable in society, elderly residents and young children, were forcibly evicted, it 
also illustrates the potentially destabilising effect which these Soviet actions could 
have on grassroots communities, thereby creating problems for the new German 
administration locally. Given that a quarter of the population in Brandenburg/Havel 
had lost their homes in 1945, grassroots resentment at these evictions was further 
increased when three months later a large number of the confiscated apartments in 
the Fouquestraβe had been partially dismantled.62 Yet despite this continued severe 
housing scarcity for the local population, the local commander’s office announced in 
September 1946 that an additional 135 apartments in the Fouquestraβe were to be 
vacated of German families.  
Such developments worried local SED officials, concerned with the impact it 
could have on grassroots political sentiment, and numerous attempts were therefore 
made at intervention at all levels, from Lord Mayor Lange to the district branch of 
the SED, as well as various other local bodies. For instance, District Mayor Eichler 
responded by writing to Brandenburg/Havel’s commandant on 21 September 1946 
emphasising that the Brandenburg population had proven in the local election on 15 
September 1946 that they were ‘sensible and had a willingness for reconstruction’ 
and warned that ‘we would destroy the previous moral conquests if we are 
unsuccessful at finding a tolerable expedient’.63 It is unclear from the archival 
material whether these interventions were successful. 
Similar patterns of Soviet occupation of property could be observed in 
Fürstenwalde, despite the fact that 45% of the town’s buildings had been extensively 
damaged. By October 1945, the Red Army had occupied 47 properties in the town’s 
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fifth district alone, with a possible 22 more which were planned to be vacated.
 
In 
response, the district warden wrote to the Mayor of Fürstenwalde complaining that 
many of these confiscations were not even being condoned by the Soviet 
commanders, and instead were unauthorised ‘incursions by Russian officers’.64 By 
April 1946, over 50 houses and 112 apartments had been confiscated by the Red 
Army in Fürstenwalde, and by October the following year, out of a total of 12,858 
apartments in Fürstenwalde, not including those which had been damaged or 
destroyed, the Red Army had confiscated 1,096.
65
 Yet those Brandenburgers who 
were displaced, despite the constrained room for manoeuvre available to them given 
the circumstances, nonetheless were not all completely acquiescent. Some were so 
outraged by their treatment that they officially complained to local administrations.
66
 
Others, who were unsuccessful in their protests and were forced to vacate their 
homes, responded by stripping their homes of light switches, wiring, sockets, 
windows and doors before leaving.
67
 Such actions may reflect both the dire post-war 
shortage of commodities, as well as a discernible spitefulness amongst those 
Brandenburgers who were given no other choice but to leave their homes. Therefore, 
similar to some of the other early Soviet punitive activities, the on-going property 
confiscations by the Soviet Army further aggravated post-war difficulties at a 
grassroots level, thereby reinforcing a sense of defeat and victimhood amongst local 
Brandenburgers in relation to the occupying army. 
Many of the oral history interviewees also recalled evictions by the Red 
Army within their localities. For instance, Gertrud Hirsch remembered how a large 
number of her neighbouring houses in Fürstenwalde were confiscated by ‘the 
Russians’. Yet part of this recollection involved ridiculing the Soviet soldiers and 
portraying them as cultural barbarians who did not appear to understand the concept 
of a lavatory: ‘they also occupied a very nice local apartment and they made a hole 
in the ground, in the flooring, and they defecated in there!’68 In contrast, Carmen 
Jung’s retrospective account revealed a strong sense of resignation and defeat: 
‘There were a few villas, which were vacated [...] it wasn’t nice what they did there 
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[...] it was like that, whatever could be taken they took it [...] it wasn’t right, but one 
couldn’t do anything’.69  
Despite the perceived hegemony of the Soviet troops during these 
displacements, the oral history evidence also suggests that a certain room for 
manoeuvre did occasionally exist at a grassroots level and local agents could also 
succeed in carving out a compromise. For instance, former Hitler Youth member 
Fritz Krause, who was fifteen when the war ended, recalled that when Russian 
soldiers occupied his house in Fürstenwalde, his father managed to successfully 
negotiate that the family could live in the basement.
70
 In fact, some encounters of 
Soviets living in German homes appeared to have been quite positive, helping to 
break down some of the barriers between occupied and occupiers. Reinhold Rösner 
recalled that a Russian soldier was assigned living quarters in his family home 
immediately after the end of the war: ‘I had a very friendly relationship with him. He 
wanted to learn a little bit of German’.71  
Local tensions were further reduced when, after it had transpired that 
occupation would be more long term, small remunerations were often negotiated at a 
local level from late 1946 onwards, helping to partially ease at least some of the 
strains at a grassroots level.
72
 In addition, such points of local friction were further 
reduced when, increasingly from the autumn of 1947 onwards, members of the 
Soviet army were moved into newly created isolated settlements, with the effect that 
contact with the German population was steadily restricted.
73
  
 
2.5 Grassroots perceptions of the Soviets in the initial post-war 
period 
Consistent with Richard Bessel’s argument that ‘an appreciation of the importance of 
hatred seems crucial to understanding the post-war transition’ the following section 
will further explore these negative sentiments at the grassroots level in 
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Brandenburg.
74
 Amongst the wider Brandenburg public, the archival evidence 
illustrates that in the initial post-war years, the fear of Soviet lawlessness and 
violence continued to persist amongst wide sections of the population. This fear can 
be seen in some of the panicked rumours which were proliferating at a grassroots 
level. For instance, in early February 1946 the rumour was circulating in 
Brandenburg/Havel that the Russians were to be replaced by the British army, before 
which the Soviets would be able to ‘plunder freely’ between 7 and 9 of February.75 
Rumours such as these were twinned with the spread of satirical anti-Soviet rhymes 
at a grassroots level. This particular poem was discovered by the Brandenburg 
Ministry of the Interior to be circulating in the district of Luckenwalde, south-east of 
Brandenburg/Havel in July 1947: 
Willkommen Befreier, ihr nehmt uns die Eier, die Milch 
und die Butter, das Vieh und sein Futter. 
Auch die Uhren und Ringe und sonstige Dinge, 
befreit uns von allen, Maschinen und Hallen 
nehmt mit auf die Reise, Maschinen und Gleise. 
Von all diesen Wundern habt ihr uns befreit. 
Wir weinen vor Freude, wie helle ihr seid. 
Wie schön ist’s doch heute und gut, 
willkommen ihr hässliche Brut.
76
 
This rhyme aptly illustrates the principal points of conflict which had developed 
between local Brandenburgers and the Soviet ‘liberators’ by 1947 – the grievance 
that the Soviet army was supposedly responsible for the severe food shortages as 
well as the experiences of the often violent seizure of ‘watches and rings and other 
things’, and the palpable anger at the dismantling of ‘machines and hangars’. Whilst 
the ironic uses of ‘liberator’ and ‘liberation’ from Nazism are juxtaposed with the 
‘tears of joy’ at how ‘bright’ the new occupiers are, the final line drops all irony and 
instead denigrates the Russians to a ‘hideous spawn’. This satirical rhyme therefore 
provides an interesting political barometer for the manner in which some elements of 
the grassroots sentiment towards the Soviets were constructed and perceived in 1947. 
Here, the occupiers are portrayed as the active and all powerful party, whilst the 
Germans are clearly presenting themselves as the victims of this process, whose 
actions have been reduced to verbal protest at Soviet incursions. Yet whilst this 
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rhyme emphasises a sense of passivity in these processes, the successful circulation 
of this poem also suggests the existence of unofficial grassroots networks of 
information which were difficult if not impossible for the SMAD or SED to control. 
In this manner then, the illicit dissemination of satirical rhymes such as these appears 
to have provided Brandenburgers with a narrow vent to air some of their frustrations 
in a highly constrained context in which they were otherwise relatively impotent to 
respond to Soviet retaliatory violence and the punitive policies of dismantling and 
displacement.  
Similar negative sentiments at the plethora of grassroots difficulties were also 
reflected in many of the interviewees’ memories of their perceptions of how they 
viewed the Soviets in the immediate post-war period. Thirteen of the interviewees 
claimed that they continued to have a ‘very negative’ attitude towards the ‘Russians’ 
in the months following occupation while four interviewees claimed that they had 
‘quite a negative’ attitude. One aspect of this negative attitude was the interviewees’ 
perceptions of the ‘Russians’ as varyingly barbaric, primitive and inept as has been 
seen above in relation to the retaliatory violence and punitive Soviet measures. Often 
these experiences appear to have affirmed aspects of the National Socialist 
propaganda with which the interview cohort had been bombarded prior to 1945. For 
instance, Arnold Schulze, unsurprisingly given his post-war experiences, recalled 
that he perceived the Red Army as ‘savage, savage, terrible’.77 Another important 
aspect of this negative attitude was the strongly emotive memory that the ‘Russians’ 
were perceived as a victorious enemy in the initial post-war period which illustrated 
associated feelings of defeat and powerlessness created by these constraints. 
Wilhelm Fiedler felt that ‘the Russians were the occupying army which stood at 
every corner and carried out checks, and particularly in the early period would harass 
the people at night and that was often dangerous’.78 Hans Gericke recalled that he 
continued to perceive the Russians as a ‘brutal enemy’ both before and in the months 
which followed occupation.
79
 In some instances such ‘pre-existing cultural 
templates’ of pre-1945 anti-Soviet propaganda, often combined with subsequent 
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severely traumatising experiences, appear to have strongly influenced opinions 
toward the Soviet occupier in the immediate months after German capitulation.
80
 
A further factor which appears to have contributed to these negative attitudes 
towards the Soviets was the dire nutritional situation which continued into the post-
war years. Many of the interviewees recalled that the ration cards provided by the 
authorities were ‘zum Sterben zu viel und zum Leben zu wenig’ and these shortages 
were frequently blamed on the inability of the new policy makers to provide for the 
populace. Indeed, local archival evidence from Brandenburg/Havel indicates that in 
the summer of 1945 panicked rumours frequently erupted that food supplies were 
about to run out, and by August the local public in Brandenburg/Havel responded by 
blaming the shortages on the Red Army.
81
 Furthermore, it appears that this was also 
to have a negative impact on the manner in which not just the Soviet occupiers, but 
also subsequently the SED, were viewed in the years which followed the collapse of 
the Third Reich. 
By mid-1947 food supplies in parts of Brandenburg were still considered to 
be inadequate, with a report from Forst in southern Brandenburg concluding that at 
the local level ‘everything is revolving around food’.82 Similarly, the state police of 
Brandenburg reported the following month that ‘a certain discontent still dominates 
in the population which is a result of the scarcity of foodstuffs and the shortage of 
clothing’.83 Whether this was indeed the main factor affecting the popularity of the 
new political administration or not, a brief glance at a further contemporary satirical 
rhyme permits an insight into how this accusation that the new political elite was 
responsible for much of the post-war privation could manifest itself. This particular 
political poem was found by the Brandenburg government to be circulating in 
Rathenow, thirty kilometres north of Brandenburg/Havel, in May 1947:  
Deutschland, Deutschland ohne alles, 
Ohne Butter, ohne Speck, 
Und das bisschen Marmelade frisst uns die Verwaltung weg. 
Die Preise hoch, die Reihen fest geschlossen, 
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Die Not marschiert mit ruhig festem Schritt. 
Es hungern alle Volksgenossen, 
Die Grossen hungern mehr im Geiste mit. 
Hände falten, Köpfe senken! 
Immer an die Einheit denken! 
Komm, Wilhelm Pieck, sei unser Gast! 
Und gib uns, was Du versprochen hast! 
Doch nicht Rüben oder Kohl, 
Sondern was Du isst und Grotewohl. 
Nichts auf dem Tisch, nichts auf dem Teller! 
Nichts auf dem Boden, nichts im Keller! 
Es gibt nicht mal Klosettpapier! 
Hoch, SED, wir danken Dir! 
84
 
Interestingly the first section of this satirical rhyme parodied the beginning of the 
first verse of the nineteenth century German anthem. Here Germany’s former unity 
was now contrasted with the current shortage of foodstuffs; while the anthem’s 
erstwhile brotherly solidarity in the protection and defence of the nation was 
juxtaposed with the new post-war administration who were allegedly eating all the 
jam. The second stanza then derided the well-known ‘Horst-Wessel-Lied’ which had 
established itself as the second national anthem throughout the Third Reich. Here the 
word ‘prices’ replaced ‘flag’ and the ‘SA’ was substituted with ‘hardship’, while the 
Nazi concept of ‘Volksgenossen’ was used to describe the hungry masses. The final 
section of this rhyme consisted of various versions of German mealtime prayers. 
Interestingly, these had also been previously parodied in the Third Reich, only now 
the ‘Führer’ was replaced with ‘Einheit’. Moreover, the original invitation to Jesus 
Christ to join the table, which had been substituted with Robert Ley during the Third 
Reich, was now extended to Wilhelm Pieck, while Otto Grotewohl displaced 
Hermann Göring within the parody (Göring had previously been rhymed with 
Hering).
85
 This satirical verse was not only limited to western Brandenburg – 
evidence exists that variations of it spread across the post-war Soviet zone.
86
 
The content of this political poem is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Its 
main reference points – the nineteenth century notion of a unified and strong 
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Germany, the militaristic denotations of the Third Reich and the traditional religious 
piety of saying grace – are all aspects of the past which appeared somewhat remote 
for many in the chaos of the post-1945 collapse. The bitterness at the dire nutritional 
and commodity situation is palpable, as is the sense of disillusionment, not only with 
the new leadership, but also at the alleged inequality between ordinary East Germans 
and the socialists now in power who claimed to mark a departure from their Third 
Reich predecessors. Nonetheless, the self-proclamation of the grassroots population 
as ‘Volksgenossen’ suggests a linguistic and conceptual longevity of aspects of 
National Socialism after 1945, despite the destruction which the Third Reich had left 
in its wake. Moreover, the post-war dissemination of such satirical rhymes appears to 
indicate the presence of a seemingly effective grassroots network of communication 
which at the very least reached across Brandenburg and Berlin, despite serious 
infrastructural damage, which the political powers were relatively powerless to 
influence or regulate. Whilst the spread of political parodies of this type indicate 
discernible anger and frustration amongst the grassroots populace, they also suggest 
that this resulted not necessarily in apathy, but rather in a significant level of 
disillusionment and a subsequent reticence to engage constructively with the new 
political system and its socialist leadership. It therefore appears that the dire post-war 
nutritional and commodity situation, as well as the manner in which both the Soviet 
and German administrators were perceived to be dealing with these challenges, 
created a limiting factor for the new authorities in their attempts to cement their 
political legitimacy at a grassroots level in post-war Brandenburg. 
However, whilst these negative attitudes towards the Soviet occupier were a 
predominant theme across both the oral history interviews and the archival material, 
evidence also emerged that for some interviewees an apparent shift from a 
predominantly negative pre-1945 attitude to a more differentiated or positive 
perception of the Russians took place in the early post-war period. For instance, 
Gertrud Hirsch, who had felt that ‘the fear of the Russians was tremendous’ before 
May 1945, recalled that her attitude in the immediate post-war period was ‘of course 
negative’; nevertheless, she also maintained that there were some soldiers who also 
protected the Germans.
87
 In fact, three of those interviewed in Brandenburg/Havel 
and Fürstenwalde claimed to have had a predominantly positive attitude towards the 
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Russians in 1945, while especially the younger interviewees conceded that the 
soldiers exhibited kindness to children. Wolfgang Heinrich, twelve years old in 1945 
and the youngest of the interviewees, recalled: ‘I have to say as children we only had 
good experiences, whenever we came somewhere where there were Russian soldiers 
they always gave us something to eat’.88 Even Karl Schmidt, whose family home had 
been set alight by Soviet soldiers in 1945, emphasised how positive the Russian 
soldiers behaved towards children, which for him offered glimpses of their 
humanity: ‘The Russians had respect for children, one has to say that honestly [...] I 
said that one could see that they weren’t the worst people’.89  
Other interviewees also recalled positive personal interactions with Soviet 
soldiers in the months which followed occupation. For instance, Erika Schulz 
remembered how a Russian soldier helped them repair windows in her house.
90
 
Similarly, Fritz Krause recalled that his aunt had bandaged a Russian soldier who in 
return wrote a message above the front door, which kept the women in the house 
safe.
91
 The retrospective perceptions of some of the other interviewees presented the 
Soviets as liberators from ‘fascism’. Alfred Wegewitz, who was eighteen at the end 
of the war and returned to Fürstenwalde after a period of time as a POW in England, 
recalled that: ‘I had no hostile feelings but rather I assumed that they had liberated us 
from Hitler and that the Russians had played a substantial part and made big 
sacrifices’.92 Whilst these particular interviewees claimed that this shift was a result 
of experiences of positive personal encounters in the period which followed 
occupation, a more parsimonious explanation may be that these memories have also 
been shaped by forty years of pro-Soviet rhetoric in the GDR. 
In sum, in the majority of cases pre-1945 anti-Soviet convictions and fears 
appear to have persisted. Interestingly, however, a number of the interviewees also 
claimed that whilst they generally had a negative opinion in the months following 
occupation, they also recalled personal anecdotes of positive encounters with 
individual Soviet soldiers. This spectrum of both stagnant and gradually shifting 
attitudes towards the Soviets underscores the complex nature of the Soviet-German 
dynamic after the immediate collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 and will be further 
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explored in relation to subsequent patterns of political transition in part two of this 
thesis. 
 
2.6 Sites of contested memory: official and unofficial 
commemoration of war dead 
The reverberations of the collapse of National Socialism, and the ensuing Soviet 
occupation, also had another impact at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. In their 
attempts to punish the ‘fascist’ soldiers of the Third Reich and revise their legacy by 
rewriting the recent past and creating a new officially sanctioned and imposed 
historical discourse, the SMAD and later the SED aimed to not only limit the 
influence of National Socialism in the immediate post-war period, but also to 
legitimise the new political elite. Memory and power are closely linked, and as Irina 
Sherbakova has highlighted ‘for the Soviet regime, memory itself was intrinsically a 
serious threat’.93 Similarly, Aleida and Jan Assmann maintain that ‘Herrschaft 
braucht Herkunft’ (rulers need roots) and thus rulers attempt to legitimize 
themselves retrospectively, and immortalize themselves prospectively, by producing 
their own version of past events and dominating official memory.
94
 In this context, 
the construction of monuments, particularly those which honoured war dead, 
provided an opportunity not only to redefine and reshape the memory landscape, but 
also to transmit an entirely new official political discourse of Soviet victory and 
sacrifice in order to facilitate the transition from Nazism to socialism. As John 
Bodnar argues, ‘official culture relies on “dogmatic formalism” and the restatement 
of reality in ideal rather than complex or ambiguous terms’, while these memorials, 
Silke Satjukow contends, were intended to ‘simultaneously symbolise both 
mourning and triumph’.95  
During the Third Reich the German war dead had been placed on a heroic 
pedestal of bravery and sacrifice for the collective good of the German nation.
96
 In 
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this context, the newly prescribed policies were to perform a dual function. Not only 
were the new monuments to perform a didactic function for local East Germans; by 
removing German war dead from the official discourse and utilising Soviet built 
monuments as sites of officially sanctioned memory and annual rituals, it was 
intended to construct an entirely new metanarrative of the Third Reich by creating 
physical symbols of socialism’s victory over ‘fascism’ (and of course Soviet 
hegemony).
97
 As a result, various forms of Soviet war memorials sprung up all over 
East Germany in the immediate post-war period. In total, roughly 850 Soviet 
memorials and cemeteries, commemorating the lives of more than 420,000 Soviet 
citizens, continue to be scattered across most towns and villages of the former GDR, 
the most well-known of which is the elaborate Soviet war memorial in ‘Treptower 
Park’ in Berlin built in 1949.98 The following section explores the grassroots 
responses to this revised form of war commemoration in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde in the immediate post-war period, amongst an interview cohort in 
which an average of two family members had been conscripted to the German 
military between 1939 and 1945, half of them to the Eastern front.
99
  
In Brandenburg/Havel, a cenotaph was erected at the ‘Steintor’ bridge in May 
1945, next to which over 200 fallen Soviet soldiers were interred. It consisted of a 
ten metre high obelisk surrounded by four bronze statues representing the infantry, 
artillery, air force and tank drivers of the Red Army. Yet already by March 1946, the 
Russian town commander, Colonel P.A. Wolkow, complained to the local German 
town administration that the Red Army memorial was in a state of disarray and 
demanded that a local gardener be hired on a full time basis in order to ensure that 
the complex be kept to a ‘high standard’.100 By the summer of 1946, the wooden 
markers and memorials were made more permanent and replaced with marble and 
strong cement, and on 20 May 1949 the SMA officially handed over the Soviet 
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memorial and cemetery to the town of Brandenburg.
101
  Subsequently, in honour of 
the first annual ‘Day of Liberation’ on 8 May 1950, a rally was organised in 
Brandenburg/Havel which was attended by 12,000 people, after which a ceremony 
of wreath-laying took place at the Soviet memorial.
102
 The anniversary of 8 May 
subsequently became anchored in the newly founded GDR, following the political 
pattern of the Soviet’s victory celebrations, and until 1989 the local Soviet memorial 
was utilised as a site of ritualised remembrance and performance.
103
 Such rituals, as 
Jan Assmann has shown, intended to ‘dramatize the interplay of the symbolic with 
the corporeal’.104 
The memories surrounding the presence and impact of this highly visible 
Soviet memorial and cemetery in the centre of Brandenburg/Havel ranged from 
positive to neutral to negative. Hans Gericke felt that it was justified that the Soviets 
erected a war memorial because ‘those soldiers had also lost their lives’.105 Former 
Hitler Youth member Paul Gärtner, who was fourteen in 1945 and later became an 
ardent SED member, also stated that he viewed the memorial as positive and was 
grateful to all the young Soviet soldiers who had given their lives to free Germany 
from National Socialism: ‘It was emotional for me to honour the people who fell in 
Brandenburg/Havel [...] we Germans weren’t in the position to shake off the fascist 
yoke’.106 
Others perceived the presence of the cenotaph with mixed emotions, 
emphasising the asymmetric commemoration in the official discourse of the time. 
Kurt Michel felt ‘that they could honour the Russian dead but one can’t forget that 
ours need to be honoured too’.107 Similarly, Berol Kaiser-Reka, who had been in the 
Jungvolk and was fifteen at the end of the war, also felt that the Russian soldiers had 
the right to be honoured, but would have found it fairer to have a joint German-
Soviet graveyard: ‘I mean every person has the right to be interred decently, and then 
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to be denied that just because he was on the wrong side which wasn’t his fault’.108 
Wilhelm Fiedler, whose half-brother had been killed in the war, was also ambivalent, 
sympathising with the Russian soldiers who were buried in foreign soil, comparing it 
to the similar fate of ‘so many German soldiers’, while at the same time still feeling 
strong resentment towards ‘the enemy army which had destroyed 
Brandenburg/Havel’.109  
The Soviet monument was also highly disputed amongst some interviewees 
in Brandenburg/Havel who deplored the attempted imposition of an official narrative 
which denigrated German soldiers as criminals. Gunther Dietrich viewed the Soviet 
war memorial as negative because he could not reconcile his own image of his 
father, who had been drafted into the Volkssturm, with the official Soviet doctrine 
and as a result he adamantly refused to attend the ceremonies at the local memorial:  
My father wasn’t a criminal, he was a poor sod who was driven to his death, 
just like the Russian soldiers too [...] unfortunately the Russian was always 
elevated [...] of course it’s the Russian style to build such memorials, but to 
erect it in the town centre, we didn’t think that was so nice.110  
Dr Edith Dorn, whose cousin had been killed in the war, recalled the sense of 
passivity of the local German population when it came to the Soviet memorial in 
Brandenburg/Havel and the feeling of resentment that their own war dead were not 
being honoured:  
People said ‘they built a memorial for their own fallen and what about ours?’ 
[...] Every year on the Day of Liberation all the factories had to march to the 
memorial and lay wreaths [...] thank God it didn’t take long and one could 
quickly go home again [...] the tenor was as follows: it was tolerated, because 
one couldn’t do anything about it.111  
These retrospective accounts thus illustrate a range of responses in relation to the 
erection of the cenotaph at the ‘Steintor’ bridge. In contrast to some of the above 
interviewees who claimed to have welcomed, or at least tolerated, the official 
celebration of Soviet sacrifices, the emphasis here is on the perceived impotence 
(‘one couldn’t do anything about it’) and the frustration that their own relatives were 
vilified in the official doctrine and discourse (‘my father wasn’t a criminal’).  
Similar patterns of memory politics could also be observed in Fürstenwalde. 
Here a Soviet cemetery and war memorial was established in a large central square 
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in October 1949; roughly one hectare in size, there was an eight metre monument in 
the middle. The town of Fürstenwalde was to pay for the annual upkeep of the 
cemetery.
112
 This particular square had a long and varied history of memorials, 
illustrating the plasticity of monuments, meaning and memory across ideological 
epochs, in which monuments were to function as ‘ideological signifiers’, with the 
intention of coercing viewers ‘to adopt the normative belief system’ they stood 
for.
113
 In the nineteenth century, this Fürstenwalde square had briefly been known as 
‘Kaiserplatz’ due to the unveiling of the busts of Wilhelm I and Friedrich III in 1883. 
A short time later, war memorials were erected in honour of the wars of 1864, 1866 
and 1870-71 and the square was subsequently renamed ‘Denkmalsplatz’. From the 
years 1919 to 1933, the square was known as ‘Platz der Republik’, during which 
time an additional monument was added for the First World War. During the Third 
Reich, its previous name of ‘Denkmalsplatz’ was restored and it regularly became 
the site of National Socialist mass gatherings.
114
 
After 1945, when 366 fallen Soviet soldiers were interred in the western 
section of the square, the cemetery was used regularly for celebrations, especially on 
‘Liberation Day’ in May, and the anniversaries of the October Revolution in 
November, when mass gatherings took place. The nineteenth century war memorial 
was torn down, while the spiry monument from the First World War received a new 
inscription honouring the victims of the Third Reich, with the square receiving the 
new name of ‘Platz der Opfer des Faschismus’.115 The square was later renamed 
‘Ottomar-Geschke-Platz’ after the Fürstenwalde born communist.  
Here too, similar to Brandenburg/Havel, the reaction to the visible presence 
of a difficult past was tangible in the interviews. Some, such as Ulla Beck and Erika 
Schulz, recalled the monument and cemetery in neutral terms, while Carmen Jung 
was also neutral, remarking ‘one passed by it’.116 Others, such as Alfred Wegewitz, 
recalled how he had mixed feelings on the monument, seeing it as ‘part of the power 
dynamic of a dictatorship’ and ‘tacky’, while at the same time acknowledging that 
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the Russian war dead deserved to be remembered.
117
 Others entirely rejected the 
official state discourse and perceived the symbolic meaning of the monument as 
problematic. Gertrud Hirsch felt that the Russian soldiers were unimportant for the 
local Fürstenwalde population.
118
 Christine Küster felt it was wrong that graves for 
the Second World War soldiers did not exist and how it was a ‘disgrace’ that the new 
Soviet graveyard was placed where the old war dead monument from the Kaiser 
period had stood claiming that: ‘I must say that even the comrades didn’t think it was 
good’.119 In contrast, Wolfgang Heinrich, later an ardent SED supporter, felt that it 
was events post-1990 which were negative and stated that he was frustrated that the 
German graveyards and monuments were now getting ‘all the attention’, while the 
Russian monuments were being neglected: ‘That of course is the exact opposite of 
what prevailed in the GDR’.120  
Thus, with the clear exception of Wolfgang Heinrich, the predominant 
sentiment in the oral history interviews from Fürstenwalde was one of relative 
emotional detachment toward the Soviet soldiers themselves, whilst the manner in 
which they were commemorated garnered a stronger emotional reaction. Particularly 
in Fürstenwalde, where by knocking down one monument and altering the 
inscription on another, the new Soviet memorial had, quite literally, usurped the 
previous German commemorative site for those who had died in the Prussian wars 
against Denmark, Austria and France as well as those who lost their lives in the First 
World War, the resentment of some respondents was palpable. Moreover, a number 
of the interviewees claimed that the fallen German soldiers from the Kaiser period, 
some of whom had been buried at the memorial site, had been publicly disinterred by 
the local Soviet troops before interring the Soviet war dead in their place. By doing 
so, the occupiers were perceived to be not only neglecting the memory of German 
soldiers of the Second World War like in Brandenburg/Havel, but also to be deeply 
disrespecting the burial site of some of Fürstenwalde’s ancestors. As Monica Black 
has shown, ‘the practices of death are embedded within a complex web of values, 
attitudes, and sensibilities’ that ‘allow individuals to know, almost unconsciously, 
what to do and what not to do where the dead are concerned’.121 Here, the new 
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Soviet memorial was clearly perceived by many of the respondents to be crossing the 
line of ‘what not to do’ with German war dead, thereby alienating a proportion of 
locals and preventing them from personally engaging with the tragic fate 
simultaneously suffered by so many young Soviet soldiers. 
Likewise, the archival evidence suggests that the controversial nature of the 
Soviet monuments, as well as the associated ritualised memory practices and 
ceremonies, reinforced a sense of contested victimhood amongst elements of the East 
German population. For instance, a report from the Brandenburg Ministry for 
Information to the Brandenburg Minister President from 23 February 1950 on the 
‘Day of the Soviet Army’ noted that during the laying of wreaths ‘there were once 
again people who were of the opinion that one should also honour the German war 
dead’.122 Similarly, in May 1950 in the Saxon village of Friedersdorf, wreaths which 
had been laid in the local Soviet ‘heroes-cemetery’ had been removed at night and 
strewn across the road, reflecting Alf Lüdtke’s observation that ‘commemorations at 
the same time stimulate and conceal anti-commemoration’.123 Similarly, Jan 
Assmann argues that politicised forms of remembering often transcend into 
‘irreconcilable, mutually opposed memories of the winners and losers’.124 This was 
particularly palpable in post-war East Germany where the socialist army were 
victorious and honourable, while the ‘fascist’ army were clearly defeated and their 
soldiers were thereby politically and morally discredited. 
Yet, given that twelve of the interviewees had lost relatives in the war, and 
the remainder knew friends or neighbours who had fallen, how did they respond to 
the omission of German war dead from the officially prescribed commemorative 
politics in post-war East Germany? In fact, the retrospective accounts indicate that 
there was a wide range of reactions to the elimination of German war dead from the 
official discourse. Some respondents who later enthusiastically supported the new 
dominant ideology in the GDR claimed that the issue was no longer salient after 
1945. Paul Gärtner, despite the fact that his father had fought on the Eastern front, 
proudly recalled how in Brandenburg/Havel ‘we had antifascist days of 
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remembrance, of the liberation from fascism in 1945’, stating that ‘no-one occupied 
themselves’ with German war dead.125 Likewise, in Fürstenwalde, Wolfgang 
Heinrich, whose father had also fought in the war, now felt that ‘there were no 
monuments erected for the soldiers who took part in the fascist war against other 
nations [...] and it did not engender any resistance amongst the population’.126 This 
retrospective evidence suggests that at times the official Soviet and SED doctrine 
may have been successful in influencing and shaping attitudes at grassroots level. 
In other instances, interviewees described how they and their families 
acquiesced to the officially prescribed norms, either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Wolfgang Fried, whose father had died on the Eastern front, recalled that his mother 
did not inscribe his father’s name on the family gravestone because he was a soldier, 
thereby essentially eliminating him from official family history.
127
 In other cases, it 
was the state authorities that physically eliminated the graves. Gunther Dietrich, 
whose father had been killed in the Volkssturm in Brandenburg/Havel, remembered 
how for ten years after the war ended he and his mother would visit his father’s final 
resting place in a mass grave in a Lazarett cemetery where his name had been 
marked on a wooden cross: ‘and then one day everything was gone – my mother was 
shocked’.128  
These actions were in line with general state policy throughout the GDR 
which continually attempted to minimise any form of public commemoration of 
German war dead. It was only in the Halbe cemetery in Brandenburg, which was 
established in the early 1950s at the site of a bloody battle at the end of the war and 
which would remain the only German military cemetery within the GDR, where a 
commemorative compromise was reached.
129
 Yet Alf Lüdtke has shown that even in 
Halbe public acts of mourning were tightly regulated, as right until the late 1980s the 
laying of wreaths at individual graves was banned.
130
 These policies illustrate the 
long-term persistence of a simplified official victim-perpetrator dichotomy not just in 
the immediate post-war period, but also throughout the lifetime of the GDR. 
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However, the oral history material provides evidence that this official 
discourse did not necessarily successfully penetrate all aspects of society in 
Brandenburg, as grassroots strategies and responses developed which served to 
somewhat moderate and shape the impact of Soviet policy on individual lives. It 
appears that particularly for a generation which had been exposed to high levels of 
various forms of violence both before and after 1945, that the question of honouring 
their own dead developed as a deeply emotive issue for many of the interviewees, 
despite, or perhaps also because of, the fact that it was not sanctioned in the post-war 
political context. As a result, various forms of what Ashplant, Dawson and Roper 
have termed ‘arenas of articulation’ existed which in some cases appear to have 
included the wider community and groups of friends, whilst in other cases these 
arenas of articulation seem to have been restricted to family networks.
131
  
In this context, one quarter of the interviewees felt that one could openly talk 
about the German war dead within their localities in the post-war period and many of 
the interviewees painted a picture of a strong and supportive community spirit which 
appears to have provided an arena for the articulation of unofficial memories of the 
German war-dead. For instance, Gertrud Hirsch recalled how the widows and the 
orphans of those soldiers who had died were treated with sympathy, ‘just like after 
the First World War’ and were supported by the local community.132 Likewise, this 
support also appears to have extended to the families of those soldiers who remained 
missing after 1945. Christine Küster recalled that people openly spoke about what 
may have happened to those men who had not returned, including the unknown 
whereabouts of her own missing grandfather.
133
  Furthermore, the evidence also 
suggests that when men were missing in action, unofficial group rituals developed at 
a grassroots level in which grieving relatives sought support from fortune tellers and 
the occult world. For instance, Ulla Beck remembered how both of her aunts, similar 
to many other local women, used superstitious tricks and tarot cards to discover 
whether their husbands were still alive. They were advised to: 
[...] place down a photo of him, tear out a strand of hair and dangle their 
wedding ring over the photo, and if the ring would start to oscillate that 
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would mean that he is still alive [...] One also went to the fortune-teller quite 
often […] the times were like that […] one still wanted to somehow have 
hope.
134
  
Such unofficial ritual acts of turning to the occult to receive news to fill the vacuum 
created by a lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of family members appear to 
have been popular throughout the Soviet sector, and ran counter to the official 
attempts to establish newly prescribed public rituals which were to remember the 
Soviet, and not the German war dead, in local Brandenburg communities.
135
  
This preoccupation with the German war dead appears to have also been 
manifest in the unofficial tending of German soldiers’ graves in the locality, thereby 
indirectly defying the norms prescribed in the new official discourse. For instance, 
Wilhelm Fiedler claimed that despite the lack of officially sanctioned war graves, 
private war graves existed in the cemetery in Brandenburg/Havel which were cared 
for by families.
136
 Similarly, in Fürstenwalde, Alfred Wegewitz maintained that there 
were German war graves in a cemetery in the north of the town in which Walter 
Ulbricht’s brother was said to have been buried. According to Wegewitz, on one 
occasion even Ulbricht himself came personally to pay his respects.
137
 In addition to 
the unofficial tending of German soldiers’ graves in the locality, it appears that in 
some cases relatives exhibited a strong tenacity to discover the graves of their loved 
ones. For instance, Reinhold Rösner recalled that for many years his mother 
attempted, via the French church, to get information on her fallen son, finally 
managing to receive photographs of her son’s grave in the 1960s.138 These 
retrospective memories appear to support Frank Biess’s findings that a collective 
sense of identification with missing soldiers, ‘prevented many ordinary East 
Germans from cutting emotional ties’.139 Similarly, these particular interviewees 
claimed that a collective sense of identification and connection to the dead and 
missing German soldiers remained extremely salient within communities for many 
years and could be openly talked about, despite the fact that the GDR state attempted 
to enforce an official discourse which elevated Soviet sacrifice. 
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In contrast to these perceptions of the degree of latitude which existed within 
communities to mourn their dead despite the new official discourse, half of the 
interviewees instead emphasised recollections of the strong political constraints 
which developed in the post-war period in this regard. This group of interviewees 
claimed instead that grieving for their war dead was restricted to the arena of 
articulation of the familial and personal sphere. Dr Edith Dorn, who had lost one of 
her four conscripted cousins in the war, felt that people only cried in private, with the 
dead soldiers being viewed as victims, not perpetrators: ‘I have to be honest we did 
not view them as war criminals, we saw them as victims and that they had been 
lured’.140 Similarly, Arnold Schulze, who had lost two uncles and three cousins in 
the war, also recalled that they continued to be mourned within families, while 
Alfred Wegewitz also agreed that mourning was a private affair which took place all 
the time: ‘That mourning took place within the family and that the fallen soldiers 
were spoken about, that was always the case’.141 Likewise, Carmen Jung, who had 
lost her father and three cousins in the war, also recalled that the issue of German 
war dead was addressed ‘in a conscious way in the family’.142  
The fact that the memory of the dead was kept alive in families, particularly 
those who had lost loved ones in the war, is not all that surprising. However, in 
doing so, as Frank Biess has argued, ‘many East Germans flouted the official 
boundaries between “citizens” and “criminals”’.143 Therefore, the evidence from the 
oral history interviews suggest that counteraction to the officially imposed historical 
discourse of Soviet suffering and sacrifice created unofficial counter-memories at a 
grassroots level, which, even if they were pushed into an increasingly personal 
sphere, still remained salient to the present day. Likewise, Ashplant, Dawson and 
Roper maintain that ‘even where there is direct and pervasive control of war 
commemoration from above in authoritarian societies, this may serve to preserve 
private memory as a counter-force’.144 As the East German Jewish sociologist Irene 
Runge recalled in 2000:  
The relatives of my childhood friends, and even teachers in the early 1950s 
would chat now and again about the ‘good old days and about experiences as 
a soldier’. ‘My adults’ responded in a sensitive manner, and I was only to 
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play with people of my kind. It was not befitting to be in other people’s 
apartments where photos of men in uniforms graced the sideboards.
145
 
In fact, Jewish cemeteries were also neglected in favour of Soviet victims of Third 
Reich violence.
146
 In Fürstenwalde, where 195 Jewish residents had still lived in 
1933 and where a Jewish cemetery had existed since 1829, some initial attempts at 
renovation had taken place in 1947.
147
 Yet it was only in 1988, to commemorate the 
fiftieth anniversary of the November pogrom, that an official plaque was finally 
erected which remembered the Jewish victims of Nazism.
148
 In Brandenburg/Havel, 
where 401 Jewish residents had lived in 1933, some local initiatives could also be 
observed to commemorate the Jewish victims of Nazism, but in general such 
attempts remained reserved.
149
 The memory of Jews was not just largely neglected 
for many decades in official state discourse; it was also secondary to many people at 
a grassroots level in these years. As Richard Bessel has argued: ‘However tragic the 
plight of the Jews, it was rather marginal to the concerns of most Germans in 1945, 
particularly those who themselves were uprooted and who remained preoccupied 
with their own problems’.150  
This lack of commemoration of Jewish victims is also reflected in the oral 
history interviews where the majority considered themselves to have been removed 
from, and passive, in local anti-Semitic developments prior to 1945. Carmen Jung 
recalled that ‘this whole Jewish thing here, I didn’t really realise it [...] I was still too 
small’.151 Likewise, Gunther Dietrich recalled ‘the night of terror against the Jews 
we did experience that, but more at the periphery’.152 In the wake of the violence and 
mass death experienced by so many millions of people as a result of the actions of 
the Third Reich, it appears that many individuals in Brandenburg were so concerned 
                                                 
145
 Irene Runge, ‘Sind Einsichten Ansichtssache? Oder: Das Verkennen der jüdischen Frage’, in 
Rassismus, Faschismus, Antifaschismus- Forschungen und Betrachtungen: Gewidmet Kurt Pätzold 
zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. by Manfred Weiβbecker and Reinhard Kühnl (Köln: PapyRossa Verlag, 
2000), p. 358. 
146
 On the history of Jewish cemeteries in the GDR see Michael Brocke, Eckehart Ruthenberg and Kai 
Uwe Schulenburg, Stein und Name: die jüdischen Friedhöfe in Ostdeutschland (neue 
Bundesländer/DDR und Berlin) (Berlin: Inst. Kirche und Judentum, 1994). 
147
 On 11 November 1947 the mayor of Fürstenwalde wrote to local former ‘active’ NSDAP members 
informing them that the Fürstenwalde town council had unanimously decided that the local active 
Nazis would carry the financial cost to fix and tidy up the Jewish cemetery in the Frankfurterstraβe.  
A sum of money was named which was to be paid in two weeks. The payment was said to be seen as 
a ‘voluntary reparation’. See KALOS F/Stadtverwaltung/106, ‘Entnazifizierung 1945’, no pag. 
148
 Scheer, Denkmälern, p. 61. 
149
 Demps, Die Provinz Brandenburg, p. 625. 
150
 Bessel, Germany, p. 270. 
151
 Jung, 09.09.09. 
152
 Dietrich, 11.06.09. 
77 
 
with their own immediate personal plight, that it left little room for a wider 
confrontation with notions of collective guilt at the crimes committed by the 
Wehrmacht in the east (and the west), as well as the horrific proportions of the 
Holocaust.  
As a consequence, it seems that the utilisation of soldiers’ monuments as a 
mnemonic tool to create a revised historical discourse in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde often had limited success amongst individuals of this particular age 
cohort, who were old enough to have made their own personal and emotional 
experiences. The Soviet policy on this matter diverged so radically from the  needs at 
the grassroots level to mourn their loved ones that the administration’s attempt to 
impose a new, officially sanctioned metanarrative of heroes and villains served to 
instead alienate a substantial proportion of individuals, forcing many of these issues 
into the personal sphere where they continued to remain salient. Nonetheless, despite 
the fact that some of these issues may have remained salient at a grassroots level in 
Brandenburg, the local population was ultimately unable to alter the imposition of 
these monuments and associated official discourse in the public sphere. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The initial wave of Soviet retaliatory violence and punitive measures which greeted 
the majority of the grassroots population in Brandenburg in 1945 marked the first 
stage of the post-war political transition. The existential threat of starvation and 
homelessness, combined with the freshly inverted power dynamic between occupiers 
and occupied, meant that the room for manoeuvre available to the grassroots 
population to respond to Soviet incursions was extremely restricted and generally 
elicited feelings of passivity and victimhood. The impact of these experiences of 
forced subordination and loss of control in turn often led to the eclipsing of German 
crimes under National Socialism as people themselves now struggled to survive. 
Whilst grassroots attempts were made to somewhat moderate the immediate impact 
of punitive Soviet measures on their lives, particularly as people desperately 
struggled to survive and defend their own interests, they were nonetheless unable to 
successfully challenge the manner in which Soviet punitive measures were 
implemented in the immediate post-war period. However, whilst the grassroots 
populace could not change the manner in which these particular punitive policies 
78 
 
were implemented, the persistence of anti-Soviet attitudes and counter-memories of 
war and defeat had implications for the SED’s attempt to politically integrate 
grassroots Brandenburgers in subsequent years.
153
 These will be explored in further 
detail in part two of this study.  
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Chapter III: Grassroots responses to NKVD activities in the 
post-war period 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In addition to the punitive Soviet measures explored in the previous chapter, in 1945 
the Soviet secret police, ‘The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs’ (NKVD), 
rapidly established a network of special camps and operative prisons across East 
Germany in order to remove ‘fascist elements’ from the public sphere. This chapter 
examines the local impact and the ways in which grassroots responses to these 
Soviet policies attempted to challenge the imposition of these punitive measures by 
the NKVD.  
Since the first autobiographical texts of former NKVD prisoners appeared in 
West Germany in the 1950s, this genre has held a prominent position within this 
research field, and as a consequence has often been rather emotive and politicised.
1
 
In the last two decades, much of the historiographical literature has emphasised the 
structural aspects of NKVD operations focusing particularly on the internal workings 
of the special camps. For instance, in the well-known anthology by Mironenko, 
Niethammer and Plato the contributors used a combination of Soviet documents and 
eye-witness accounts to reconstruct internal camp life and to explore the network of 
NKVD activity across the Soviet zone.
2
 Furthermore, much of the emphasis to date 
has been on the former NKVD operations in Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and to a 
lesser extent Bautzen, and the treatment, or lack thereof, of the competing memory 
of these prisoners in GDR commemorative policies.  
Rather than examining the more well-known NKVD camps, this chapter 
focuses on NKVD institutions in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. Some local 
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studies have already appeared, yet to date these have focused on the internal 
workings of the camps and prisons and have neglected the impact of these operations 
on the surrounding communities as well as local responses.
3
 This chapter also 
utilises eye-witness accounts from three of the oral history interviewees who were 
themselves imprisoned by the NKVD. In addition, it also aims to adopt a different 
perspective by exploring the interactions between these institutions and their local 
surroundings in Brandenburg and highlighting the grassroots responses of bystanders 
to the camps and prisons. In doing so, it attempts to build on some of the studies of 
the Third Reich which have explored the issue of bystanders in relation to 
concentration camps, but which have thus far been largely unexplored in similar 
studies of post-1945 East Germany.
4
 Yet in focusing the attention on bystanders, this 
chapter does not aspire to provide a comprehensive account of the infrastructural and 
practical links between the NKVD institutions and surrounding communities on a 
daily basis.  
The first part of this chapter explores the impact of the physical presence of 
these NKVD institutions as well as the repercussions of arrests amongst bystanders. 
It then considers some of the experiences and memories of the three local 
Fürstenwalde interviewees who were themselves arrested by the NKVD in 1945 and 
assesses the insights which these provide about how the camp interacted with its 
locality. Following this, grassroots public responses to this punitive Soviet measure 
will be examined and the room for manoeuvre available to actors in this context will 
be explored. Lastly, the chapter addresses the issue of the integration of internees 
into East German society post release as well as the role and the legacy of the NKVD 
institutions both in the GDR and in the present day in order to illustrate some of the 
current political discourses which may have had a potential impact on the manner in 
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which the oral history interviewees may recall and represent their memories in the 
present day. 
 
3.2 Background of NKVD internment camps and operative prisons 
in post-war East Germany 
While the occupation of East Germany by the Soviet Army was proceeding, 
Lavrenty Beria, the head of the NKVD, established a network of special camps and 
operative prisons through Order no. 315 on 18 April 1945.
5
 With this order a 
separate administration, ‘The Department of NKVD Special Camps of the USSR in 
Germany’, was established, which was under the direct control of the Soviet 
Ministry of the Interior.
6
 This NKVD network consisted of an extensive series of 
small operative prisons, a number of bigger special prisons and ten large special 
camps numbered 1-10: Mühlberg, Buchenwald, Hohenschönhausen (Berlin), 
Bautzen, Ketschendorf (Fürstenwalde), Jamlitz (Lieberose), Sachsenhausen-
Oranienburg, Torgau, Neubrandenburg and Werneuchen (Weesow). These 
institutions were in operation for almost five years with the last camps dissolved in 
March 1950. Yet they were not formally acknowledged until 1990 and were to 
become a ‘blank spot’ in the official discourse and history writing in the GDR.7 
The NKVD institutions had been established with the official intention of 
interning NSDAP and state functionaries as well as others deemed a threat to the 
occupying forces, and, according to Bettina Greiner, functioned as a form of 
‘political prophylaxis’, or collective punishment which was justified on the basis of 
both real and perceived security risks.
8
 There is substantial evidence which suggests 
that a proportion of the resulting prisoners had indeed been low-ranking NSDAP 
                                                 
5
 Under Lavrenty Beria, the NKVD established offices in the Soviet zone that operated independently 
of the military government. Naimark, Russians, p. 25. In March 1946 the Soviet government was 
restructured and the People's Commissariats were re-designated as Ministries. Accordingly, the 
NKVD of the USSR was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). As the special camps kept 
the name of their original founders, they are referred to as NKVD special camps in this study. On the 
post-war activities of Soviet secret service organs, including a large number of translated documents 
from Russian archives, see also Jan Foitzik and Nikita W. Petrow, Die sowjetischen Geheimdienste in 
der SBZ/DDR von 1945 bis 1953 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009). 
6
 Eva Ochs, “Heute kann ich das ja sagen”: Lagererfahrungen von Insassen sowjetischer 
Speziallager in der SBZ/DDR (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2006), pp. 3-4. 
7
 ‘Blank spot’ is in reference to the colloquial German phrase ‘Ein weiβer Fleck auf der Landkarte’, a 
metaphor for an area which has not been investigated or explored. This term is often used by both 
former prisoners as well as historians in reference to the history of NKVD camps in East Germany. 
8
 Greiner, Verdrängter Terror, p. 85. 
82 
 
functionaries. However, there were also other reasons why local East Germans were 
interned by the NKVD. In particular, the legacy of Goebbels’ idealised propaganda 
on a partisan Werwolf movement had an effect on the patterns of the waves of arrests 
of youths in 1945.
9
 Indeed, a large number of youths, predominantly innocent of 
partisan activities, were interned by the NKVD on this basis in 1945 and 1946. From 
1946 onwards the internees also increasingly included perceived political opponents 
such as Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals, while Dieter Pohl 
contends that from 1947 onwards even certain SED members were not immune to 
arrest by the NKVD.
10
 Denunciations, as well as a significant level of arbitrary 
arrests, could also result in internment in an NKVD special camp, yet only a very 
small proportion of those imprisoned ever appeared in front of a Soviet military 
tribunal or were officially charged and tried. This lack of judicial transparency has 
led some observers such as Ulrich Herbert and Olaf Groehler to claim that the 
Soviets ‘instrumentalised denazification’, while Michael Klonovsky and Jan von 
Flocken maintain that this form of denazification was utilised in order to discredit 
thousands of opponents of Stalinism – the best way to discredit people in 1945 was 
‘to make Nazis out of them’.11  
These NKVD attempts to remove the Nazi political legacy, as well as other 
potential political opponents had the consequence that between 122,000 and 158,000 
Germans were interned from May 1945 to March 1950.
12
 Hermann Weber, utilising 
Soviet archival documents, concludes that 14,202 of these prisoners were later 
handed over to the GDR Ministry of the Interior, 12,770 people were brought to the 
USSR, a further 6,680 people were transferred to POW camps, 756 people were 
sentenced to death by military tribunals, 212 prisoners escaped and a total of 42,889 
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prisoners died during this period.
13
 Similarly, Alexander von Plato has found that 
approximately 35% of the German internees did not survive imprisonment in the 
camps.
14
 In the context of Brandenburg, Dieter Pohl has found that the extent and 
scale of Soviet arrests has not yet been fully researched, but nonetheless contends 
that the number of Brandenburgers interned is certain to be in the tens of 
thousands.
15
  
The post-war Brandenburg province was home to special camps no. 5 
Ketschendorf, no. 6 Jamlitz, and no. 7 Weesow/Sachsenhausen, as well as a large 
number of smaller operative prisons. In the case of Fürstenwalde, the special camp 
no. 5 Ketschendorf was in operation from the end of April 1945 until early 1947. 
Established within a former housing complex for industrial workers of the ‘Deutsche 
Kabelwerke’ (DEKA), the camp lay at the outskirts of Fürstenwalde with the main 
Berlin to Frankfurt/Oder Autobahn running to its south. The perimeter of the 
makeshift camp consisted of guard towers as well as 2.5 metre high wooden and 
barbed wire fences. The internees ranged in age from 12 to 72 years. During the time 
that it was in operation, 4,620, or 44%, of the approximately 10,400 inmates died.
16
  
Brandenburg/Havel had become notorious for its prison Zuchthaus 
Brandenburg-Görden both pre- and post-1945. During the Third Reich the large 
prison had housed political, religious and racial opponents, and over 2,500 prisoners 
were executed here.
17
 In addition to Erich Honecker, Fritz Lange, the future Lord 
Mayor of Brandenburg/Havel, was amongst the prisoners who were freed on the 
arrival of the Soviet Army in late April 1945. The prison was subsequently utilised 
by the NKVD and the Soviet military authorities to imprison suspected National 
Socialists and collaborators (predominantly from the Russian Liberation Army) until 
the late 1940s and executions as a result of rulings by the Soviet Military Tribunal 
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were carried out here.
18
 In addition, an NKVD operative prison had also been 
established in a villa in Brandenburg/Havel’s Neuendorfer Straβe 89 in 1945.19 
Known locally as the ‘GPU Keller’, after the Soviet secret police agency, it was here 
that local Brandenburgers who had been arrested were often interrogated for days or 
weeks before being sent to one of the NKVD special camps. In fact, although the 
name GPU existed only from 1922 until 1934, after which it was renamed NKVD, 
the continued popularity of the term ‘GPU Keller’ in the post-war period can 
perhaps be attributed to the 1942 propaganda film from the Nazi period with the 
same name.
20
 
 
3.3 Experiences and memories of the impact of post-war NKVD 
operations in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde 
The immediate physical presence of NKVD operations in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde raises the question of how bystanders on the ground perceived and 
responded to this punitive measure. The large majority of the interviewees claimed 
to have known about the existence of NKVD camps and operative prisons at the 
time. In fact, a substantial number claimed to have known someone personally who 
was imprisoned by the NKVD in the post-war period, and many personal 
recollections of these waves of arrests in Fürstenwalde and Brandenburg/Havel still 
exist, with the memories taking a number of forms.  
The interviewees all emphasised the perceived arbitrary nature of the waves 
of arrest during which friends, classmates, neighbours, community members and 
relatives randomly disappeared and the resulting impotence of local bystanders. For 
instance, Arnold Schulze recalled of his schoolmates in Fürstenwalde: ‘it was often 
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the case that someone was missing in the mornings: ‘Where is he gone?’ and 
someone would answer: ‘they arrested him at night’.21 Similarly, in 
Brandenburg/Havel, Dr Edith Dorn recalled that two girls from her class were 
arrested, as well as her best friend’s father, who never returned.22 In addition, many 
interviewees recalled not just the arrest of their own peers, but also local adult 
community members. For instance, Kurt Michel recalled that in the vicinity around 
Brandenburg/Havel many people were brought to camps, including the local teacher, 
headmaster, tailor and pig dealer:  
They were picked up off the street. And sometimes you really had the feeling 
that the Russian commander said that he needed twelve more people and that 
then they could only find ten people […] and then they just picked up two 
others to take their place.
23
  
In other cases, the arrests by the NKVD had an even more direct personal impact on 
families. Two of the interviewees, Kurt Michel and Dr Siegfried Reinke, had uncles 
who were imprisoned in Sachsenhausen after the war, while Gunther Dietrich and 
Arnold Schulze had cousins who were imprisoned by the NKVD.  
In addition, both the oral history and local archival material provides 
evidence of the unsettling impact which the physical presence of NKVD institutions 
had at a grassroots level. In Fürstenwalde, the presence of NKVD special camp no. 5 
had a significant impact on the surrounding community. For instance, Alfred 
Wegewitz recalled that its presence acted as a warning within the community: ‘the 
threat that you yourself could end up in the camp constantly hung over people’.24 
Carmen Jung recalled feeling utterly powerless in the face of NKVD operations, 
believing that there was little point in going to take a look ‘because one couldn’t help 
anyway’.25  
In Brandenburg/Havel, interestingly, no clear memory appeared to exist for 
the Zuchthaus in Brandenburg/Havel amongst the oral history interviewees. Gunther 
Dietrich only recalled the Zuchthaus playing an active role during the Third Reich, 
while Wilhelm Fiedler recalled that there was little known about what went on 
behind the walls in Görden after 1945.
26
 Instead, it was the NKVD interrogative 
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prison in the Neuendorfer Straβe which emerged as a much more salient memory 
throughout the interviews.  
This was most likely a consequence of the fact that the operative prison in the 
Neuendorfer Straβe had a more visible presence near the town centre as well as 
housing predominantly local Brandenburg prisoners, therefore having a more 
immediate impact on the population.  For instance, Wolfgang Fried, whose own 
home was directly behind the notorious street, recalled the occupation of the 
Neuendorfer Straβe by the NKVD.  He remembered how the building beside his 
home was boarded up and that his family was henceforth forbidden from opening 
their windows which were all made opaque with white paint.
27
 Similarly, Dr 
Siegfried Reinke recalled that the windows of the building had been covered with 
bars:  
I knew that the NKVD had their cellar in the Neuendorfer Straβe and when I 
walked home from my girlfriend’s house in the evenings, I deliberately made 
a big circle around the Neuendorfer Straβe, because you didn’t want to run 
into the drunken NKVD officers.
28
 
The oral history recollections of uncertainty created by punitive Soviet policies are 
also reflected in local archival material found across Brandenburg. An opinion report 
by the SED Lord Mayor Lange on 9 February 1946 noted that one of the persistent 
rumours circulating around Brandenburg/Havel was that ‘all young people aged 
between 18-25 years were being transported to Siberia’.29 Furthermore, in a different 
opinion report on 28 February 1946 on local popular opinion, Lange noted with 
concern:  
Last week the NKVD has ordered the vacating of a number of the best houses 
in the town in the Neuendorfer Straβe. The entire population, including the 
antifascists, are appalled by what is now being done with the buildings. The 
window frames are being ripped out, the windows are being bricked up, walls 
are being built and a Russian military prison is being created in the middle of 
the town.
30
  
This report by the SED Lord Mayor is telling of just how negatively both the 
population and even ‘the antifascists’ perceived these punitive Soviet policies to be 
at a grassroots level, while at the same time both the oral history and archival 
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evidence underscore the impotence of both the populace as well as the new 
administration in the face of these developments.  
This uneasy atmosphere caused some people to take action. For instance, in 
early 1946, in response to the rumour that the Red Army intended to arrest local 
youths, the mayor of Fürstenwalde’s neighbouring town of Hangelsberg, Fritz R., 
had gathered together a number of local youngsters and transported them to the 
English and American zones in Berlin.
31
 Similarly, Dieter Pohl has found that the 
arrests by the Soviet occupation forces ‘constituted the most severe intrusion into 
Brandenburg’s political and social order after 1945’.32 In the case of 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, this intrusion was most starkly felt through 
the daily uncertainty created by the arrest of family members, school-friends and 
neighbours as well as through the confrontation with the physical presence of NKVD 
institutions within local communities. As a result, both the retrospective oral history 
accounts and the archival material suggest that the grassroots climate in the 
immediate post-war period amongst these bystanders in Brandenburg was marked by 
extreme unpredictability in which the range of possible responses to these punitive 
Soviet measures was extremely limited. 
 
3.4 On the wrong side of the fence: local memories of NKVD 
imprisonment 
Of the twenty individuals interviewed, three from Fürstenwalde had personally been 
imprisoned in various NKVD camps, experiencing the impact of Soviet punitive 
policies in a different manner to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the 
fence. All three interviewees emphasised the absolute shock experienced on their 
arrests in 1945. Erika Schulz was arrested on 27 June 1945 when she was seventeen 
years old, for refusing to fraternise with the local Russian Lieutenant in 
Fürstenwalde, and was interned in Ketschendorf, Jamlitz and Mühlberg special 
camps until July 1948:  
I never thought that the Russian lieutenant would send me to the camp, he 
had so many women who were throwing themselves at him […] and even if I 
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had known that I would be sent to the camp, I still would have not gone to 
bed with that man.
33
  
Fritz Krause was also arrested in the summer of 1945 when he was fifteen years old 
and was imprisoned in Ketschendorf, Jamlitz and Buchenwald special camps until 19 
January 1950: 
They thought that we were partisans, for the Werwolf [...] I had been warned 
by an uncle in advance [...] but I said I wasn’t a Hitler Youth leader [...] then 
it happened in the night from Sunday to Monday, and fourteen days in the 
GPU cellar [...] I was terribly scared, I had never been away from home 
before.
34
  
Reinhold Rösner was arrested on 13 June 1945 when he was sixteen, accused of 
blowing up a motorway bridge, and was interned in Ketschendorf and 
Neubrandenburg camps until 1948:  
I had of course already heard from friends that arrests had taken place [...] 
and people were saying if you can get away, or hide [...] but I thought, hey its 
already June, the main wave of arrests after the war are finished [...] one 
already felt a little safer [...] and then one afternoon an open truck with three 
soldiers and an officer came.
35
 
All three interviewees were subsequently taken to the nearby Ketschendorf special 
camp where they were greeted by abysmal hygienic and living conditions as a result 
of extreme overcrowding. Despite the poor living conditions, the number of camp 
prisoners nonetheless continued to grow rapidly, increasing from 4,646 in August to 
over 8,600 in October 1945.
36
 The interviewees recalled that food rations were 
minimal and that no additional clothing was provided. For instance, Reinhold Rösner 
recalled that:  
The way I was arrested, with my short trousers, my short-sleeved shirt and 
my sandals […] I lived like that in the camp in the winter also […] for a time 
I wore my friend’s underwear, he had been arrested on the same day as me 
and had died of pneumonia in the camp […] his were in slightly better 
condition than mine because he had already been in the infirmary for such a 
long time.
37
 
Illness and death as a result of disease were ubiquitous in Ketschendorf. In 1945 
alone, the number of prisoners in the infirmary increased from 620 in July, to over 
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4,000 in November 1945.
38
 Memories of disease and death are also strongly reflected 
in the oral history interviews. Fritz Krause recalled that: 
From the window I could look over the camp fence and could see how the 
dead were buried. A huge hole was dug in the ground and then a truck full of 
approximately 50 to 55 to 60 corpses [...] every day burials took place.
39
 
The vividness of these recollections underscores the extent of the trauma 
experienced by the interviewees and the sense of utter helplessness in the face of 
imminent and persistent existential threats. 
For those who managed to avoid the infirmary, life in the camp was 
monotonous, as the internees did not undergo any political re-education programmes 
nor were they permitted, with some rare exceptions, to work. NKVD regulations 
indicate that they instead intended to utilize the special camps to ‘completely isolate’ 
the prisoners from developments in the outside world.
40
 Reinhold Rösner recalled 
that ‘one wasn’t allowed to do anything in the camp – one wasn’t allowed to write or 
read, there was nothing to do’.41 Erika Schulz also recalled: ‘Nothing! Nothing! That 
is the absurd thing, for all intents and purposes, one should have tried to somehow 
denazify the people’.42 Whilst such recollections suggest a sense of total 
bewilderment and frustration at the lack of any consistent denazification strategy on 
behalf of the Soviets, they perhaps also reflect and reinforce post-1989 debates on 
the arbitrary nature of arrests and Soviet internment which will be further discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Despite emphasising the arbitrary nature of their own arrests the three former 
internees did acknowledge that there were other prisoners who had indeed been 
active in the National Socialist regime. In fact, according to the Soviet 
administration, out of the 5,125 internees in Ketschendorf in October 1946, 2,313 
had been NSDAP functionaries.
43
 For instance, Reinhold Rösner remembered that: 
‘of course there were also NSDAP members in the camp […] we had chairmen of 
local farmer’s associations, we had factory managers, we also had journalists and 
detectives, but they were all small functionaries [...] there were no big Nazis’.44 This 
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claim that it was only the ‘small Nazis’ who were exposed to the Soviet punitive 
policies in the camp is also supported by some historians such as Klonovsky and 
Flocken, who maintain that there were ‘rarely really important Nazis’ in these East 
German camps.
45
  
The sense of arbitrary justice, which was a consequence of the fact that a 
significant number of those imprisoned were either innocent prisoners or supposedly 
‘only small Nazis’, was further heightened by the lack of transparency within the 
camp system. Communications with the wider world were also patchy and variable. 
Lutz Prieß maintains that family members fundamentally did not receive any 
notification from the NKVD as to the whereabouts of their loved ones, while 
Manfred Wille makes anecdotal reference to the utterance of a former resistance 
fighter, and SED member, who stated that ‘even with the Nazis at least his wife had 
known which KZ he was in’.46 Similarly, Fritz Krause claimed that his parents, who 
lived less than three kilometres away in Fürstenwalde, knew nothing about the 
whereabouts of their son for three years.
47
  
In contrast, despite Soviet attempts to hermetically seal the prisoners away 
from the outside world, the two other interned interviewees claimed that they both 
made differing attempts to contact their parents, only a few kilometres away, from 
the other side of the Ketschendorf fence. Reinhold Rösner was able to secretly drop a 
written message from the truck during his transport to Ketschendorf: ‘the slip of 
paper was found, and because of that my mother knew where I was’. Consequently, 
in the initial weeks of his imprisonment, Reinhold Rösner claimed to have used an 
uncovered window to signal to his mother who, along with other relatives, would 
walk up and down the road outside of the camp trying to catch a glimpse of her son. 
Yet he was soon caught and henceforth the window was covered up.
48
 This suggests 
that the actions of prisoners such as Reinhold Rösner forced the Soviet guards to 
respond by literally closing off ‘windows’ into the camp of which they had 
previously been unaware. Meanwhile, Erika Schulz attempted, along with other 
internees in Ketschendorf, to smuggle out messages in the false base of a waste 
bucket which was brought outside the camp. The operation, although it had 
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apparently been successful in the past, was intercepted, and Erika Schulz, along with 
the others, was punished with thirty days in ‘the scratcher’.49  
Whilst Fritz Krause represented himself as an entirely passive prisoner in this 
regard, Reinhold Rösner’s and Erika Schulz’s testimonies suggest that some 
prisoners attempted to utilise any weakness, such as the uncovered window or the 
waste bucket, in the camp’s security system to their advantage. Even if their 
successes were only short-lived, it appears that these actions may have ensured that 
at least some information was transported to the bystanders in the surrounding 
community. However, the claim to have challenged Soviet authority may have also 
been a reflection of the interviewees’ attempts to present themselves in a more 
powerful role as NKVD prisoners than may actually have been the case and 
therefore needs to be interpreted with great caution. 
 
3.5 Windows into the NKVD camp in Ketschendorf 
Interestingly, despite attempts to officially screen the camps from the public eye, the 
oral history evidence from the bystanders also suggests that, especially in the early 
stages of the Ketschendorf camp, there were indeed some fleeting points of contact 
between the camp’s internal world and its external surroundings. In the case of 
Ketschendorf, particularly those living locally in Fürstenwalde appeared to have had 
a significant advantage over people from other regions when it came to getting 
information, however sparse. In fact, the oral history interviews provide evidence 
that in the case of Ketschendorf there were three main windows into the NKVD 
special camp no. 5 which existed between 1945 and 1947: the proximity of 
neighbouring houses, the mass burial ground and the occasional work details. 
The first window into the camp was provided by the neighbouring houses 
close to the perimeter fence. Arnold Schulze recalled that his uncle lived close to the 
Ketschendorf camp ‘in the second last house in the old cable settlement’ and was 
therefore frequently able to identify his interned son through the ‘family whistle’ on 
the other side of the fence.
50
 Christine Küster remembered how the garden of her 
friend, whose own father was interned, was very close to the Ketschendorf camp and 
was used as a meeting point for people to try to see into the camp and to get 
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information.
51
 The fact that groups such as these appear to have regularly 
congregated together to gather and disseminate information reflects perhaps both the 
desperation and resultant resourcefulness on behalf of some locals in their attempts 
to glean what knowledge they could about missing loved ones. 
The second window into the camp, and incidentally also out of the camp, was 
provided by the burials which took place outside of the camp’s perimeter. In 
Ketschendorf, the dead were buried in a small wooded area between the camp and 
the Autobahn which on occasion provided some of the locals in Fürstenwalde with a 
glimpse of what was happening on the other side of the fence. Christine Küster 
recalled in her interview:  
The camp was fenced in with these watchtowers […] one event which I 
experienced personally: it was talked about that many people had died there 
[…] my parents and I went by bicycle, it was actually quite illegal […] there 
was still a path which locals used when they wanted to cross the motorway, 
and there was a small wood there that one had to pass through, it was already 
a little overgrown, and we went along the path […] and there we saw a group 
of people who were digging, and we were really quiet […] and then some 
people came and they were carrying stretchers […] and they dropped the 
dead bodies into these pits.
52
  
Here the interviewee represents herself and her parents as brave and inquisitive 
actors. Despite having claimed to have heard that ‘many people died there’ and that 
their actions were ‘illegal’, they nonetheless ventured to the camp’s perimeter in 
order to try and catch a glimpse of what went on inside. Whilst this retrospective 
account is perhaps somewhat idealised, this notion that some bystanders witnessed 
mass burials is also corroborated by the imprisoned Reinhold Rösner, who described 
how the burials provided a window in as well as out of the camp:  
I was a member of the burial detail, I had to bury the dead out there in the 
wood […] the motorway was nearby […] and the barber that I had gone to 
before 1945 lived in the next village and he would walk to Ketschendorf 
early in the morning, around six or half six, and he would often see me early 
in the morning at the burials […] he recognised me and went to my house 
[…] and because of this my mother knew that I was still alive.53  
These brief encounters provided the prisoner with a glimpse into his life before 1945, 
while it also presented bystanders, in this case the barber, with information which 
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they could pass on to others in the vicinity, thereby somewhat undermining the 
official taboo surrounding NKVD operations. 
The third window into special camp no. 5 was provided by occasional 
prisoner work details. Given that her previous attempt at smuggling out a message 
had failed, Erika Schulz’s parents believed that she had been taken to Siberia in the 
summer of 1945 and were unaware that she was in fact interned in the Ketschendorf 
camp, just three kilometres from her home. It was only in 1946 that they discovered 
by chance that their daughter was alive. She had been briefly allowed to leave the 
camp under armed guard with a group of other women to harvest potatoes and 
happened to be spotted by her aunt and her friends as she walked along the 
motorway behind the camp:  
And I jumped out of the line and I shouted to her at the top of my voice 
‘Aunt Marie!!’ The women all stopped and a Russian guard held a machine 
gun to my back, but my aunt had already recognised me and she turned 
around and went to find my parents; and after about an hour my father and 
mother appeared on bicycles. My mother spoke to the guards in Russian and 
bribed each of them with a bottle of schnapps and so they were content to let 
us sit down in the forest beside the camp and talk [....] And then on the 
second day we went out of the camp again to harvest potatoes, and you 
wouldn’t believe what had happened within those twenty-four hours. That 
second morning there were everything from small cars to a large truck 
stopped on the side of the motorway, and they all appeared to have flat tyres. 
We thought this was all rather strange, but as we walked past the cars, people 
began whispering names to us from within the cars. One man searching for 
information about his sister whispered to us: ‘Hildchen Schulze, Hildchen 
Schulze’ and I said ‘yes, she is in the camp, she is there and she is in good 
health’. Word had spread so quickly! Everyone was there and they had all 
pretended to get flat tyres – and no one could do anything to stop this. But 
there was a snitch in our group; and this particular woman reported 
everything to the Russians, and on the third day I was no longer allowed to 
leave the camp.
54
 
In retrospectively presenting the protagonist as a young and fearless agent who took 
action despite being threatened at gunpoint, while the Russian guards are portrayed 
as stereotypes who were content to be bribed with a bottle of spirits, the story 
exhibits certain clichés. Yet it also provides an insight into how rapidly information 
could apparently be spread in 1946, despite severe infrastructural difficulties and 
material shortages. The effectiveness of an informal network of communication in 
grassroots Brandenburg appears to be evidenced by the fact that already the 
                                                 
54
 Schulz, 28.08.09. 
94 
 
following day a large number of individuals supposedly managed to stage a 
collective break-down which the authorities were powerless to stop. 
These informal channels of communication about NKVD prisoners also took 
others forms. Erika Schulz claimed that after this potato harvesting incident, the local 
bar which her parents owned in Fürstenwalde became a centre point for other parents 
whose children were also imprisoned, organically developing into an unofficial 
meeting place where they would discuss their worries as well as share information. 
Furthermore, she described how her father had contacts with the local rail workers in 
the town and appeared to manage to disseminate information to others about prisoner 
transports in cattle cars to other camps from 1947 onwards: ‘Because of this my 
father became increasingly well-known and became a bit of a hero in everyone’s 
eyes’.55 Whilst Erika Schulz’s retroactive accounts of her capable and resourceful 
father who subverted the desired taboo surrounding NKVD operations in 
Fürstenwalde are no doubt somewhat idealised, they nonetheless describe effective 
local networks of information which are also reflected by the reporting of the West 
Berlin ‘Radio Broadcasting in the American Sector’ (RIAS) and ‘Combat Group 
against Inhumanity’ (KgU) in the early post-war period. 
At this time, the media in the Western zone had gradually begun to deal with 
the issue of internment camps in the Soviet zone. Yet given the early Cold War 
context, this reporting was tightly linked with its own political agenda.
56
 According 
to Wolfram von Scheliha, in general there were very few reports in West German 
newspapers in the immediate post-war years on special camps due to a combination 
of foreign policy considerations, a general lack of information, as well as the fact 
that the Western allies themselves had camps in the former concentration camps of 
Dachau, Esterwegen and Neuengamme after 1945. Nevertheless, Scheliha maintains 
that with the establishment of the anti-communist KgU in West Berlin in 1948, the 
system of information surrounding the camps was professionalised.
57
 The KgU was 
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not only anti-Soviet and anti-communist, but was also fiercely critical of the special 
camps and it chiefly highlighted the apparently arbitrary nature of arrests in the 
Soviet zone, with the intention of destabilising the political system in East 
Germany.
58
 In addition, the RIAS station played an important role in the 
dissemination of information about NKVD operations, as it worked in close 
cooperation with the KgU at this time.
59
  
In those areas of the Eastern zone where RIAS could be received, the oral 
history evidence suggests that its broadcasts appeared to provide information on 
missing people and were actively used as a method of communication. These 
windows into NKVD operations proved particularly valuable for those people who 
did not live in the immediate vicinity of the camps and did not have the same regular 
glimpse into camp life as the bystanders appear to have had in Fürstenwalde. Dr 
Siegfried Reinke from Brandenburg/Havel recalled the role of Western media in 
relation to his uncle imprisoned in Sachsenhausen:  
Every night on the radio at 12 a.m. the ‘Combat Group against Inhumanity’ 
announced the names of those people who had died in Sachsenhausen […] 
and one night my uncle’s name was read out and I was the one who was able 
to give my relatives in Pomerania the news that he had died […] it was me 
who always had to listen at 12 a.m. because we could receive West Berlin 
radio, while my relatives could not.
60
  
The evidence suggests that these small windows in and out of the NKVD operations 
were utilised to the fullest extent possible at a grassroots level in order to acquire as 
well as redistribute information. Although these networks were by definition 
informal, they provide evidence of effective grassroots mobilisation and network 
creation and highlight the small room for manoeuvre available to certain local East 
Germans within a political process which was intended to pacify, intimidate and 
disempower. 
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3.6 Written complaints to the authorities 
The manner in which some locals in Brandenburg responded to NKVD incursions 
also took other forms. Despite official denials in the East German media in August 
1946 at Western accounts of protesting parents on the arrest of local youths in the 
Brandenburg Spreewald region, the archival evidence illustrates that a significant 
number of relatives chose to actively complain to the East German authorities about 
the arrest of their family members by the NKVD.
61
 One of the most frequent 
addressees of these grassroots appeals was Dr Karl Steinhoff, the Brandenburg 
Minister President from 1946-1949.
62
 It is likely that the combination of his legal 
credentials as well as his long-time SPD background, and the assumption that his 
judicial rationality and political moderation could be counted on, made him appear to 
be a suitably sympathetic figure to whom one could address acts of perceived 
injustice and arbitrariness. One such complainant from Brandenburg was Max H., a 
KPD member prior to 1933 and an SED member after the war, who wrote to Dr 
Steinhoff on 26 February 1948 protesting about the arrest of his son by the NKVD:  
On 5 November 1945 my son was arrested in Luckau by the Russian police 
without a reason, and to this day I have received no news about his fate [...] 
You will be aware of the fact that thousands of innocent boys and girls are 
being held captive! In our town alone it is ten boys, all from working class 
families. The parents are afraid to do something for their children, because 
they fear that they will be arrested themselves. A result of the Nazi 
dictatorship! But all this will not stop me from continuing to appeal for the 
release of my son.
63
 
In this emotional appeal, the petitioner attempts to legitimise himself to Dr Steinhoff 
through his left-wing political credentials and emphasises the politically 
indiscriminate nature of Soviet actions by highlighting the unjust arrest not only of 
his own son but also of other ‘working class’ youths. Yet, in addition to the palpable 
desperation of this father the tone towards the Brandenburg Minister President is 
also accusatory – rather than asking, he assumes that Dr Steinhoff is aware of these 
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developments. Yet he does, however, shirk from explicitly blaming the widespread 
fear on the new administration in the Soviet zone, and instead his recriminations are 
carefully directed towards the ‘Nazi dictatorship’. This particular appeal also 
suggests that this petitioner’s complaint is perhaps not reflective of the majority of 
affected parents who, according to the petitioner, felt so constrained and fearful by 
the circumstances that they felt powerless to act. 
Whilst these complaints to authorities may not be representative of the 
responses of all relatives affected by NKVD measures, the archival evidence 
nonetheless suggests that a significant proportion did choose to react in this manner. 
In fact, not all appeals were by individual authors and some petitions to Dr Steinhoff 
were written by groups. For instance, on 15 March 1948 a group of parents from 
Jacobsdorf, twenty kilometres east of Fürstenwalde, wrote: 
Where are our children who were arrested in 1945? Are they in a camp in the 
state of Brandenburg, or were the boys and girls brought to Russia? [...] Is it 
possible, Herr Minister President, to find out something about the 
whereabouts and fates of our children? They are not criminals.
64
  
This appeal employs rather similar strategies to those of the petitioner in the previous 
example. The parents also assume that Dr Steinhoff has knowledge about the 
whereabouts of the interned youths, even if in this case the appeal is somewhat more 
deferential, perhaps a reflection of the fact that the parents did not have the same 
political credentials as the previous petitioner.
65
 Moreover, both parental appeals 
emphasise how young these prisoners are through repeated usage of references such 
as ‘boys and girls’ and ‘children’, while also clearly asserting their innocence. 
Moreover, it was not just parents who officially complained about Soviet arrests, but 
also the children of internees. One such petitioner was a girl from the small town of 
Lindow, who wrote to the President of the Brandenburg legislative assembly on 26 
February 1948 enquiring about the whereabouts of her father who had been arrested 
in March 1946. In this case the daughter emphasised the innocence of her father by 
claiming that he had merely been a ‘nominal’ NSDAP member, and that the arrest 
was therefore unjustified.
66
 Whilst such appeals from family members constituted an 
important group of petitioners, they were by no means the only people who 
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responded to incursions by the NKVD by officially complaining to the newly 
established East German authorities.  
It was also common that solicitors, local groups, work colleagues, local 
mayors, local party functionaries and local branches of mass organisations from 
across Brandenburg submitted complaints to the authorities challenging the Soviet 
internment of a certain individual or group.
67
 The central committee of the SED 
managed many of these complaints, both at an individual and at a party level.  In 
turn, top ranking SED members then petitioned the SMAD in order to attempt to 
secure the release of specific individuals from NKVD imprisonment, providing 
evidence that these grassroots complaints could in fact have some cumulative 
impact. For instance, SED requests sent to the SMAD in 1947 contained lists of 
individuals that had been amalgamated from petitions from local and regional SED 
branches, as well as containing complaints from private individuals who had 
contacted the SED headquarters looking for disappeared family members and 
friends.
68
 Yet a communiqué sent to Walter Ulbricht on 4
 
June 1947 by the 
Department of Security Issues in the Central Committee of the SED informed him 
that that these petitions by the SED to the SMAD were only enjoying a limited 
success. Furthermore, it stressed the detrimental impact which these arrests were 
having at a grassroots level, as well as the wider negative repercussions they were 
having on the SED across East Germany: 
The arrests appear to be causing much concern to our local branches […] The 
lack of any possibility for communication between the prisoners and their 
families is also problematic. The strain on the Party that has occurred as a 
result of the arrests of youths in particular is in part extraordinarily large, 
especially since in many cases members of our Party have been directly 
affected. It would be greatly welcomed if the Soviet occupation force could 
be compelled to ease their current practices.
69
  
This internal report illustrates the extraordinary pressure which local SED branches, 
and in turn the SED central committee, came under in their attempts to win support 
and legitimacy, in a political climate in which the SMAD and NKVD were 
frequently carrying out what were perceived as arbitrary arrests. Yet despite these 
behind-the-scenes attempts by the senior echelons of the SED to campaign for the 
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release of certain individuals, their overall influence over the decision-making of the 
SMAD was limited. This relative powerlessness of the SED is also reflected in some 
of the responses which petitioners received. In March 1948, for example, the 
Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior wrote to Arthur G. in response to his complaint 
about the arrest of his son, stating that: ‘because the internment was carried out by 
the occupying forces, I regret to inform you that the German authorities have 
absolutely no influence over his release’.70 Max H., the SED member who had sent 
the aforementioned appeal to Dr Steinhoff the previous month, received a similar 
response from the Brandenburg authorities in March 1948.
71
  
This relative impotence of the SED in relation to NKVD activities is also 
reflected in the oral history evidence. Erika Schulz recalled that during her 
internment in Ketschendorf her father joined the SED and personally wrote to 
Wilhelm Pieck to complain against the imprisonment of his daughter and other local 
youths in Fürstenwalde:  
Wilhelm Pieck wrote back, that he was a comrade and that he knew about the 
things that had occurred in 1945 and that he felt especially sorry for the 
young people […] but that he had no influence over the occupation force.72  
Appealing to Wilhelm Pieck was not unusual, as he represented a sympathetic 
paternal figure for some East Germans. Furthermore, his supposed frank admission 
‘that he had no influence over the occupation force’, corresponds with the archival 
evidence that, similar to some of the Soviet incursions described in the previous 
chapter, the SED was relatively powerless in the early post-war period to mediate the 
impact which Soviet punitive policies were having at a grassroots level.  
However, the mass and arbitrary nature of the arrests did not go uncontested 
even within the SMAD. Yet Dieter Pohl maintains that it was not the arrests 
themselves which were deplored, but the reactions among the public and the 
resulting difficulties this created in the political climate.
73
 Moreover, given the 
increasing grassroots pressure, the SED progressively appealed to the Soviets to 
soften their strategy and on 26 March 1948 Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl 
finally spoke to Stalin on the issue of NKVD arrests. The decree by the Council of 
Ministers which followed on 31 March 1948, ‘clearly articulated the wishes of the 
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SED’.74  This suggests that whilst individual grassroots complaints may not have 
been successful, their cumulative impact may have been arguably one of the 
contributing factors in pushing the SED to negotiate a more moderate policy with the 
Soviet leadership.  
Nonetheless, Scheliha emphasises that the subsequent publicity campaign 
surrounding the promised liberalisation and future transparency of the special camps 
was, in part, a failure. By the time prisoners were released from the camps in the late 
summer of 1948, the Berlin blockade was already underway and the Western press 
now began to publicly denounce the special camps as ‘Soviet KZs’.75 As a 
consequence of this international backlash combined with the fact that the Soviet 
policies were clearly unpopular in the Soviet zone, the East German authorities now 
attempted to erase this contentious and potentially damaging legacy of special camps 
from future public discourse in order to facilitate the successful transition from 
Nazism to socialism. Nevertheless, the legacies of these NKVD institutions were to 
develop their own dynamic at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. 
 
3.7 The grassroots legacy of NKVD institutions from the late 1940s 
onwards 
Given the extremely negative grassroots opinion of NKVD punitive measures by 
1948, the SMAD and the SED attempted to avoid any further detrimental sentiments 
which could potentially destabilise the process of political transition in East 
Germany. Thus, those prisoners who were gradually released quietly back into the 
Soviet zone were sworn to secrecy as part of the attempt to erase the legacy of 
NKVD institutions from public discourse. On his release from Neubrandenburg 
special camp in the summer of 1948, Reinhold Rösner was given a military coat 
from the Luftwaffe by the Soviet authorities in which he was to travel home 
incognito. He recalled that:  ‘we were instructed not to speak about our time in the 
camp, and if we were to talk about it we would end up back there’, claiming that 
despite the curiosity of friends and neighbours once he had returned to Fürstenwalde, 
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he kept his silence.
76
 Similarly, Erika Schulz recalled that after she had returned 
home in the summer of 1948 she went to the local dance hall where the disc jockey 
suddenly stopped the music and announced:  
‘We welcome the daughter of the house who has returned home from a 
Russian camp’. Everyone clapped, everyone was delighted, and I ran out, I 
was afraid that they were going to arrest me again [...] that’s the way it was, 
always that huge fear breathing down your neck.
77
 
Alfred Wegewitz also maintained that when former internees started to return home 
to Fürstenwalde it quickly became known for the bystanders in the locality that the 
former prisoners had been ‘bound to secrecy’.78 However, although the memory of 
the camps was not kept publicly alive after 1948 by former prisoners themselves, the 
memories which existed amongst their relatives and within local communities began 
to take new forms after the closure of the camps.  
Local archival evidence, combined with some of the accounts which emerged 
in the oral history interviews conducted, suggests that this grassroots memory 
creation not only had an impact on local knowledge of the NKVD camps and prisons 
in later years, but also persistently challenged the officially imposed historical 
discourse, which strenuously denied the camps’ existence.  
Similar to the two anti-Soviet poems discussed in the previous chapter, one 
manner in which these counter-memories of NKVD activity in the post-war period 
manifested themselves was through satirical rhymes. To borrow from Monica Black, 
it may be argued that these rhymes were ‘subterranean and impossible to police’, and 
were therefore much more ‘potentially subversive’ than other forms of protest.79 The 
following political poem was circulating in Brandenburg in late 1949 and parodied 
the well-known nineteenth century children’s verse.80  
Zehn Berliner fuhren in den Ostsektor, Und wollten sich erfreu’n,  
Der eine hat keinen Ausweis mit, Da waren ’s nur noch neun. 
Die neune war’n im Kino dann, Und haben laut gelacht,  
Als sie den ‘Augenzeugen’ sahen, waren ’s nur noch acht. 
Die achte haben heimlich still, Gar eifrig aufgeschrieben,  
Den neusten Witz von Hennecke, Da war’n es nur noch sieben. 
Die sieben spielten darauf Skat, Und dachten an nichts schlechtes, 
Der eine rief, der Pieck muss raus, Da waren ’s nur noch sechs. 
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Die sechs hatten Westgeld mit, Und steckten ’s in die Strümpf; 
Der eine wird dabei erwischt, Da waren ’s nur noch fünf. 
Die fünf gingen ins Lokal, Und tranken Schnaps und Bier 
Und sangen dann das Deutschlandlied, Da waren ’s nur noch vier. 
Die viere fuhr’n zum Hamstern raus, Recht fröhlich, frisch und frei. 
Der eine las den Telegraf, Da waren ’s nur noch drei. 
Die drei drehten leise dann, An einem Radio 
Und stellten auch den RIAS an, Da waren ’s nur noch zwo. 
Die zwei dachten sich alsdann, Die Arbeit hat keinen Zweck, 
Da wird doch alles demontiert, Da war noch einer weg. 
Der letzte fuhr nun nach Karlshorst, Wollt’ nach den andern seh’n. 
Man bracht’ ihn nach Oranienburg, Da waren ’s wieder zehn! 81 
The mention here of ‘Berliner’ and ‘Westgeld’ suggests that this rhyme may have 
originated in West Berlin. However, had this rhyme’s message not also reflected 
aspects of the daily reality in Brandenburg at the time, it is unlikely that it would 
have been disseminated across the region to the point where the authorities took 
notice; its contents thus permit an insight into the range of reference points which 
appear to have been salient for some Brandenburgers in 1949. Its mention of ‘den 
‘Augenzeugen” refers to the news bulletin, Der Augenzeuge - die Wochenschau 
which began to be shown in cinemas across the Soviet zone from spring 1946 
onwards. This ‘loud laughter’ at the manner in which the news was portrayed 
appears to be a critique of the lack of credibility of official news reporting. Similarly, 
the ironic mentions of Wilhelm Pieck and Adolf Hennecke, the miner who the 
previous year had sparked off the ‘Hennecke movement’ through the ambitious 
fulfilment of his quota, suggests a certain cynical contempt for these new socialist 
celebrities. Moreover, the satirical portrayal of the forbidden ‘Deutschlandlied’ (by 
this stage the new GDR anthem ‘Auferstanden aus Ruinen’ had already been 
introduced) indicates perhaps a certain reticence about rejecting all aspects of 
Germany’s recent past. Yet it is the final two lines which most strongly emphasise 
the perceived ubiquity of Soviet punishment, as all of the ten characters are 
eventually interned by the Soviets (who were headquartered in Berlin-‘Karlshorst’) 
in special camp no. 7 Sachsenhausen in Oranienburg which was in operation until 
1950. Not only does this attest to the notorious reputation which the NKVD 
operations had established in West Berlin, Brandenburg, and in all likelihood across 
the Soviet zone by 1949, it also supports the previous oral history evidence which 
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indicates the persistent nature of grassroots networks of information and counter-
memories, despite top-down attempts to remove the special camp issue from public 
discourse. 
Similarly, the oral history interviews in Brandenburg/Havel indicate that the 
grassroots memories of NKVD activities could not be suppressed in the public 
sphere as quickly or as effectively as would have been desirable, as public references 
to the post-war ‘GPU Keller’ continued well into the 1950s. Yet it was the grassroots 
actions in Fürstenwalde, where a plot of mass graves had remained behind after the 
Ketschendorf camp was dissolved in 1947, which posed a much greater threat to 
official discourse and the desired smooth political transition in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. After the closing of the Ketschendorf camp in February 1947, flowers 
and wreaths began to appear at the site of the mass graves which had been left 
behind, laid down by family members and friends who guessed that this was where 
their loved one was buried.
82
 Reinhold Rösner recalled:  
When I came home in 1948 and I sometimes walked there, I saw that 
sometimes flowers lay there, and then I found out that the police always 
cleared them away, and that many people came from Berlin and beyond that 
brought flowers, because word had spread that the dead had been buried 
there.
83
  
As Monica Black has shown in her illuminating study of death in Berlin, care for the 
dead in the immediate post-war period was expressed in deeds – the marking of a 
grave as a grave with plants or stones or flowers. ‘The absence of these social rituals 
was “wrong” and caused anxiety’.84 This form of commemoration of the dead 
German prisoners in Ketschendorf therefore represented an intrinsic cultural and 
personal need of people to publicly display their sorrow and, to borrow from Alf 
Lüdtke, to appropriate ‘sites and rites of mourning’, in order to reclaim at least some 
of what had been taken from them.
85
 Yet the fact that these flowers and wreaths were 
constantly removed indicates that such acts of public commemoration could be 
perceived by the authorities, who were concerned with the de-stabilising effect such 
grassroots action could have on the emergent German socialist state, as political. 
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One interesting archival case study, which highlights both the interplay 
between individuals and the authorities as well as the impact which the grassroots 
issue of the burial site of the former Ketschendorf camp could have at a local, 
regional and national level in the late 1940s and early 1950s, is that of Mr Konrad 
H., whose teenage son was imprisoned and died in the Ketschendorf camp. On 11 
September 1949, one month before the official founding of the GDR, the Registrar’s 
Office in Ketschendorf received a letter from Konrad H. from the Brandenburg town 
of Cottbus, who enquired whether those who had died in the camp had now been re-
buried in local municipal cemeteries.
86
 On 20 September the mayor of the Municipal 
Council in Ketschendorf forwarded on Konrad H.’s query to the District Council of 
Beeskow-Storkow, requesting that they deal with the matter.
87
 The District Council 
in turn wrote to Konrad H. on 13 October stating that they would like to assist him in 
finding his relatives and invited him to appear personally for a face to face 
conversation ‘in the hope that he would not respond to this letter’.88 Nonetheless, 
Konrad H. replied to the District Council of Beeskow-Storkow on 25 October 
stating:  
In response to my enquiry last year, the parish of Ketschendorf has already 
informed me that no records exist of those who died in the camp. My 
investigation did not lead to a positive result. It has come to my attention 
however, that the graves of the dead have been levelled out and that now 
settlers are even cultivating the land over these graves, an impiety which 
doubtlessly cannot be surpassed.
89
  
Konrad H.’s retort illustrates how he resourcefully and persistently employed 
multiple avenues and sources in order to find out where his son had died and was 
buried. Yet his tone is one of outrage at the District Council, who he felt had failed 
to prevent the current irreverent treatment of the graves in Ketschendorf.  At this 
point, rather than responding themselves, the District Council took the decision to 
forward the case to the Minister of the Interior of the State of Brandenburg on 17 
November requesting ‘a decision and notification on how we should react, so that we 
can respond to other possible future enquiries’.90 By December 1949 the District 
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Council had still not yet received a response from the Brandenburg Minister of the 
Interior, and sent a second letter on Christmas Eve which repeated its request for 
instructions on how to proceed in this matter.
91
 Konrad H., also growing impatient, 
wrote to the authorities again on 26 January 1950.
92
 During this time, however, the 
case of Konrad H. had travelled beyond the regional level to the highest echelons of 
the GDR government. On 14 March 1950, the GDR Ministry of the Interior sent a 
clear written statement to the Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior: ‘What decision 
should be taken by us? After all this is a local matter which falls under your 
jurisdiction’, requesting nonetheless that they be given further information on the 
issue of camp graves in Ketschendorf.
93
 
As a result, the case was catapulted straight back down to the grassroots level 
and an investigation was initiated. The District Council instructed the SED mayor of 
Fürstenwalde, Paul Papke, to compile a report on the Ketschendorf issue, which he 
submitted on 21 July 1950:  
Individual relatives of the dead must have found out about the burial place 
from near-by residents. As a result, small individual mounds appeared which 
were decorated with wreaths. By order of special authorities the mounds had 
to be flattened and the wreaths removed [...] We are now in the difficult 
position that we are in no way able to satisfactorily answer the many 
enquiries from relatives of the deceased and at any rate, as a result of orders 
from above, the existence of a burial place always had to be denied.
94
   
This local report not only supports the bystanders’ accounts in the oral history 
interviews of previous windows into camp life which permitted them to know where 
the dead were buried, it also illustrates how this information was then successfully 
passed on to others who came from further afield. Moreover, its reference to ‘the 
many enquiries from relatives’ indicates that Konrad H.’s petitions were not an 
isolated case, despite the official denial of the existence of mass graves as a 
consequence of ‘orders from above’. This evidence suggests that despite the political 
and structural constraints, individuals nonetheless exhibited a certain Eigensinn 
which manifested itself in the illegal commemoration of the dead in Ketschendorf. 
Yet this flouting of the taboos surrounding the existence and the whereabouts of 
mass graves at a grassroots level in Fürstenwalde was considered to have the 
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potential to destabilise the political transition for the population in the newly 
established East German state.  
In their own additional report on the issue of the Ketschendorf graves on 24 
July, the District Council of Beeskow-Storkow noted with unease that ‘the burial 
ground is directly beside the motorway and the decorated graves continually provide 
conversation matter for people driving past’.95 Similarly, six months later on 6 
February 1951, in response to the continuing stream of enquiries by relatives, the 
Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior finally sent their own inspectors to examine the 
site of the former Soviet camp in Ketschendorf. They noted with concern:  
Relatives of the deceased have come from all over the GDR, from West 
Berlin and West Germany and have constructed haphazard mounds which 
they continually decorate with wreaths and flowers on anniversaries [...] The 
area is accessible to everyone and can be seen from the nearby motorway. 
Due to the current state of affairs, the image and prestige of our antifascist, 
democratic system is being seriously damaged.
96
  
What is quite remarkable here is just how effective unofficial networks of 
communication were in reaching across both East and West Germany, although by 
1951 these rumours were also no doubt strengthened by Western media, which by 
now had begun to use eye-witness accounts from former prisoners for Cold War 
propaganda purposes. Yet given the impact that these individual and collective acts 
of grassroots commemoration of the dead were having on the newly-born GDR state, 
by the early 1950s the authorities were forced to find a strategy to put an end to the 
last public reminders of the punitive post-war Soviet policies in Fürstenwalde. 
In 1952 building work on new apartment blocks took place on the former 
grounds of the Ketschendorf camp. Many of the interviewees contend that the new 
housing settlement had been deliberately planned in order to end the private attempts 
at remembrance of the deceased with wreaths and flowers. Yet during these 
excavations, the local builders came across a surprisingly large number of human 
remains, and building work had to be temporarily halted. Between December 1952 
and October 1953, under the watchful eye of the MfS, 4,499 of these bodies were re-
interred anonymously in the military cemetery in Halbe.
97
 Recollections of these 
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attempts to remove the legacy of NKVD operations from the official public sphere 
are also found in some of the oral history interviews. In the early 1950s Christine 
Küster had worked as a typist in a local building company in Fürstenwalde which 
had been commissioned to carry out the building work in Ketschendorf: 
Back there, behind the camp, new houses were being built in order to cover 
the whole thing up [...] and the first houses were being built and the workers 
came and said ‘we are stopping work – we have found human bones’. Then 
the whole thing was tidied up [...] and one of the apartment blocks was never 
built, I still know today where that is, there is a gap between the buildings, 
there must have been a great number of dead there [...] and then they dug up 
the remains, they were brought to Halbe, and only then did they continue to 
build [...] we talked about it, people knew about it [...] but not the extent [...] 
it was never spoken about officially.
98
 
Similarly, Arnold Schulze, who, in the early 1950s, had been employed as a gardener 
for a Fürstenwalde landscaping company at the Ketschendorf site, recalled how the 
building work was suddenly interrupted when the employees stumbled upon the 
mass graves.
99
 Thus, the oral history evidence suggests that despite attempts by the 
authorities to cover up the graves, the gaps in the buildings acted as an enduring and 
persistent reminder of the impact of post-war NKVD operations for some of the 
bystanders in Fürstenwalde. In addition to erasing the physical traces of the past, 
attempts were also made to remove linguistic references to Ketschendorf.  Whilst the 
incorporation of Ketschendorf into Fürstenwalde in 1950, subsequently being 
renamed Fürstenwalde-South, was publicly justified on the basis of more general 
administrative reforms, the prevailing consensus amongst the interviewees was that 
Ketschendorf’s notorious image was to be henceforth removed from public discourse 
and therefore the district had to be given a new name. 
Yet although attempts were made to remove these traces from the official 
state narrative, the remaining physical remnants of these institutions continued to 
have an impact on those former prisoners who chose to stay living in the surrounding 
area, even until the present day. Erika Schulz, who remained in Fürstenwalde, 
recalled that she sometimes came into direct contact with the former Ketschendorf 
camp grounds in later years:  
I sometimes had to go to there as part of my job. There was a bunker in the 
tyre factory in Ketschendorf, one could drive down there and there was a big 
garage and our trading organization was allocated a large garage there […] 
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and I felt it was awful that I had to go there […] I avoided the tyre factory 
complex.
100
  
Similarly, Reinhold Rösner recalled that in later years there was a restaurant in the 
former NKVD prison at the train station in Bad Saarow where he had been 
imprisoned before being brought to the Ketschendorf camp in 1945: ‘The restaurant 
is still there today […] three years ago I was at a function there and I had to go down 
to the beer cellar and I saw the cell where I had been imprisoned’.101  
Notwithstanding the continued physical presence of former NKVD 
institutions, many ex-prisoners made the decision to remain in the GDR and rebuild 
a life for themselves in the new political context. Yet the oral history evidence 
suggests that some could only achieve this transition by remaining silent about their 
experiences; this silence amongst former prisoners permeated not just the public 
sphere of work colleagues, but often also the personal sphere of families. For 
instance, Fritz Krause recalled that he did not tell his children about his internment in 
the camp until they were teenagers, in order to not bring them into conflict ‘with 
what they were learning about German-Soviet friendship in school’.102 This 
corresponds with what Ashplant, Dawson and Roper have found in relation to war 
memories. They argue that when an authoritarian state seeks to enforce a dominant 
narrative, ‘the intensity of repression may reach down to disrupt even the habitual 
mechanisms for transmission of memory between generations within the family’.103 
It also suggests the extent to which Fritz Krause may have believed that the 
boundaries between the public and private sphere in his family had become diffuse 
in the GDR. Similarly, Reinhold Rösner claimed not to have spoken about his 
experiences in special camps until 1990. He recalled that during his working life in 
the GDR: ‘Whenever you applied for a job, you had to fill out a questionnaire and 
there were always those missing three years […] and these cadre heads, they had 
obviously been informed that these camps had existed […] they registered it silently 
but didn’t talk about it’.104 It is thus apparent that some of the former internees 
somehow succeeded in living with the contradiction between their personal 
experiences and the official state narrative.  
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Yet despite this silence of some former NKVD prisoners, as well as the 
‘cadre heads’ in the SED, the oral evidence of some of the bystanders indicates that 
networks of information (and gossip) in relation to the NKVD internees continued to 
persist throughout the GDR, suggesting that in some instances the subject matter 
may not have been as taboo at a grassroots level as was desired by the SED. For 
instance, Ulla Beck recalled that she ‘had been told’ that her boss in the department 
store had also been in ‘one of those camps, but she never spoke about it [...] instead 
she made an effort to do what was expected of her [...] I don’t know what goes on in 
the minds of those kind of people in those circumstances’.105 This bewilderment at 
the transformation of some locals in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde from 
NKVD prisoner to subsequent carrier of the GDR regime was also expressed in 
some of the other interviews. Gertrud Hirsch remarked about an acquaintance who 
had been interned in a camp: ‘how those people who they arrested then go into the 
Party [SED] is beyond me’, while Arnold Schulze recalled that ‘I knew someone 
who was imprisoned there and when he was released he went to the Volksarmee and 
became a big officer’.106 Such instances from the oral evidence suggest that the 
existence of official taboos on the NKVD institutions throughout the GDR should be 
perceived in a differentiated manner. In some cases, it forced a proportion of former 
prisoners into silence, even within families, as no public discourse, or arena of 
articulation, existed within which they were able to articulate and frame their 
experiences and memories. This may have been for a number of reasons, including 
the fear of possible reprisals against them, or perhaps also a private sense of shame. 
There is also the question of whether memories of traumatic events were simply too 
painful. On the other hand, those who were less personally affected by a camp 
experience, and analogously are likely to have felt less fear, did not just erase their 
personal memories of the presence of NKVD institutions from the post-war period – 
information swapping and curious gossip could not be entirely stamped out.  
Nonetheless, when it came to the legacy of the NKVD at a grassroots level, 
essentially the room for manoeuvre, both for former prisoners as well as local 
bystanders, was minimal. Overall, the evidence suggests that from the early 1950s at 
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the latest, public references to these institutions were no longer at all tolerated in 
official GDR public discourse, whilst the possibility to communicate privately about 
memories and experiences was greatly diminished. Nevertheless, as Lynn Abrams 
has highlighted, ‘dominant interpretations of the past shift and alter as formerly 
marginalised voices are heard and incorporated’, and as we shall see, once the wall 
collapsed in 1989, these marginalised voices were quick to resurface, suggesting that 
they had been lurking below the surface all the while.
107
  
 
3.8 Post-unification grassroots initiatives for memorialisation of 
post-war NKVD institutions in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde 
After the fall of the wall, the official taboos surrounding NKVD activity in post-war 
East Germany were finally lifted and grassroots attempts at memorialising the 
victims started afresh. In Brandenburg/Havel, as a result of an initiative by the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger politischer Häftlinge (AEPH), a commemorative 
plaque was erected at the Neuendorfer Straβe 89 in October 1992.108 In Fürstenwalde 
moves to commemorate the former NKVD prisoners began even before the official 
end of the GDR. In March 1990 the Initiativgruppe Internierungslager Ketschendorf 
e.V. was established by former internees of the special camp and on 8 May 1990 the 
first public memorial service took place in Ketschendorf with approximately two 
thousand participants. Since this time they have been active in erecting memorials 
and commemorative plaques, both in Ketschendorf and Halbe, with partial financial 
assistance from the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e. V. and the state of 
Brandenburg. They have also played an important role in researching the names and 
burial places of the dead as well as in supporting former victims and their families. 
To this day they continue to organise an annual memorial event.
109
  
Two of the three interviewees who had been interned by the NKVD, Erika 
Schulz and Reinhold Rösner, became active in this local group after 1990. Their 
involvement appears to have had an influence on how they view Soviet policies of 
the time today. Similar to Reinhold Rösner, Erika Schulz maintained that she 
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harboured no hatred against the ‘Russians’ and instead blamed the contemporary 
political framework: ‘we didn’t have any hate towards the normal Russians, because 
they hadn’t done anything to us […] it was Stalinism which did us harm’.110 In 
contrast, Fritz Krause, who did not join any victim groups, still felt strongly bitter 
and resentful at his fate:  
I savoured German-Soviet friendship, from behind barbed wire! [...] That was 
the entire purpose of the whole thing, that we should be killed, it was purely a 
method of revenge on the part of the Russians, because so many had died at 
the hands of the Wehrmacht.
111
  
A more in-depth study of stagnating and shifting attitudes amongst former prisoners 
would be required in order to determine to what extent involvement in these victim 
groups may have facilitated a more differentiated view on personal post-war 
experiences with the NKVD. Without wanting to descend too far into speculation, it 
would appear that on the part of these two interviewees at least, involvement in 
victim groups since 1990 have allowed at least a partial healing process to take 
place. 
On the other hand, however, these commemorations have not gone 
unchallenged at a grassroots level. In 1991 the Ketschendorf memorial was 
vandalised, while on the night before Christmas Eve in 1994 crosses were knocked 
over and flowers were strewn about.
112
 This reluctance to memorialise NKVD 
prisoners is also reflected in the interviews, particularly amongst those who had 
become avid supporters of the GDR state in later years and who continue to justify 
NKVD punitive policies, even in the present day. Paul Gärtner maintained that: 
‘Stalin was an idol for the Russians until 1953 […] if people drew a moustache on 
Stalin then that was an act of provocation to the nation which had twice placed itself 
at the frontline to destroy fascism’.113 Similarly, Wolfgang Heinrich argued that 
some aspects of the camp system may have been regrettable, but that they were 
understandable and justifiable errors in the context of the crimes which had been 
previously committed by Germans against the Soviet Union: ‘That some people 
slipped into the camps who actually did not belong there, where does that not 
happen, where is it any different? It’s always like that […] with such a large 
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operation […] everything is chaotic’.114 Yet he maintains that the large majority of 
NKVD prisoners were ‘big Nazis and functionaries’ who had supported the 
aggressive and expansionist policies of the Third Reich and had been justifiably 
punished. 
In the decades since unification, former prisoners of NKVD institutions have 
often continued to exist in a state of competing victimhood between Nazi and 
Stalinist crimes. On the one hand, victims of Nazism are concerned that National 
Socialist criminals and functionaries amongst the NKVD victims could be honoured, 
and therefore not held to account. On the other hand, those persecuted by Stalinism 
often perceive themselves to be ‘second-class victims’ and exist in a ‘diffuse grey 
zone’.115 Similarly, Alexander von Plato maintains that while former NKVD 
prisoners were perceived as welcome witnesses against the Soviet Union in the Cold 
War context in West Germany in the 1950s, he contends that from the 1970s 
onwards, with a growing shift towards emphasising the victims of the Holocaust, 
NKVD prisoners began to view themselves as being ‘second-class victims’.116   
This contested victimhood is also apparent in the interviews with the former 
internees. Although National Socialist concentration camps had fundamentally 
differed from Soviet NKVD camps, in both their conception and execution, the 
comparison between both punitive systems emerged as an important and salient 
reference point.
117
 The three former prisoners interviewed all perceived 
Ketschendorf to be one of the worst of the special camps because of the absence of 
even the most basic of physical provisions. Fritz Krause recalled his transfer from 
Ketschendorf to Jamlitz camp: ‘We lived a bit more civilised in Jamlitz. The 
Germans had built wooden bunks for the Jews in the concentration camp [...] at least 
we could lie on bare wooden boards there’.118 Reinhold Rösner also contended that 
in comparison with the other special camps, Ketschendorf had the direst living 
conditions and highest death rate, as, unlike the others, it was not a purpose built 
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camp from the Third Reich: ‘we all slept on the floor in Ketschendorf, like sardines 
[…] that’s why Ketschendorf had the highest death rate’.119  
These diverse representations of the NKVD past contribute to the fact that the 
contested victimhood surrounding East German internees of the Stalinist period still 
remains an emotional and contentious topic, playing a significant role in the post-
1990 legacy of NKVD institutions at a public and personal level and in this light the 
oral history evidence must be interpreted with great caution.
120
 As Eric 
Langenbacher has observed, ‘Today, multiple histories and collective memories – of 
German crimes, German suffering and German communism – circulate and vie for 
inﬂuence’.121 Yet notwithstanding these debates, amongst contemporary grassroots 
populations, the impact of these contested memories of the Ketschendorf camp 
appear to be gradually disappearing within the consciousness of a younger, 
unburdened Fürstenwalde generation. Today, local maps listing landmarks in the 
town illustrate the location of the ‘McDonalds’ restaurant, but not the site of the 
former NKVD special camp. The bungalows of the old industrial housing settlement, 
which once functioned as prisoner barracks for the NKVD, are now inhabited by 
new generations of Fürstenwalde residents. The streets on which they live are called 
‘Ring der Freundschaft’ and ‘Straβe der Einheit’, while only discreet signs point to 
the modest memorial marking the plot where the dead were buried behind the houses 
and apartments. It appears therefore that, two decades after the Wende, much of the 
memory politics surrounding this camp are increasingly being conducted in a realm 
that is often far removed from a younger Fürstenwalde generation, on whom the 
post-war NKVD operations had no personal impact.  
  
3.9 Conclusion 
In light of some of the post-1989 discourses which have been explored in the 
previous section, the oral history evidence on the grassroots responses to post-war 
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NKVD measures needs to be interpreted with great caution. However, the combined 
use of oral history interviews with archival material revealed a strong convergence of 
findings between these two sources. The findings suggest that the NKVD activities 
had a severely disruptive impact at a grassroots level in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde. Local people’s fear was compounded by what was perceived as the 
arbitrary nature of many of the arrests and the sense that the ‘small Nazis’ were 
being punished in the place of the ‘important Nazis’ who had fled. This was 
especially the case with Ketschendorf, where grassroots opinion found it difficult to 
equate the arrest of seemingly innocent youths with an effective and just 
denazification process. Unsurprisingly, this sentiment was strongest amongst those 
youths who themselves had been interned in Ketschendorf, without perceiving 
themselves to have been guilty of a crime. This negative sentiment in turn appears to 
have reinforced a sense of German victimhood and, similar to issues discussed in the 
previous chapter, solidified the notion of East Germans banding together against the 
perceived arbitrary injustice of the Soviet occupation.  
Whilst the internees literally had no room for manoeuvre in the face of 
immediate existential threats, the concern of the bystanders and relatives from all 
over Brandenburg for their loved ones elicited a range of grassroots responses and 
actions despite the severe practical and political constraints. These grassroots 
responses manifested themselves as informal networks of communication, support 
groups and written complaints to authorities. However, these acts of Eigensinn 
cannot be overstated and may also be a function of the limits of the authorities to 
exercise control in the immediate post-war years. These grassroots complaints 
crossed regional and party lines with some SED functionaries, both at local and state 
levels, intervening on behalf of other East Germans thereby inadvertently blurring 
the loyalty which was demanded of them in the official political rhetoric. These 
grassroots responses were not in themselves effective in altering the manner in which 
these punitive Soviet policies were carried out. Nevertheless, the findings suggest 
that both the NKVD arrests and the cumulative protests by some East Germans 
placed the SED leadership under a certain amount of pressure and, notwithstanding 
other domestic and foreign policy considerations, arguably acted as one possible 
contributing factor in compelling the Soviet authorities to change course from the 
late 1940s onwards. 
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It seems that only after the establishment of the GDR when the last special 
camps were closed, where East Germany’s antifascist future was more firmly in 
German hands, was there a concerted effort by the SED to remove the potentially 
threatening legacy of the NKVD institutions at a grassroots level. The evidence 
suggests, however, that this went against the emotional needs of relatives. In the case 
of Fürstenwalde, these counter-memories physically manifested themselves in 
persistent unofficial commemoration with wreaths and flowers. Whilst these acts of 
Eigensinn were not necessarily intended to be political, the unofficial grassroots 
commemoration of the dead in camps and informal networks of communication 
constituted a threat to the official legitimising narrative of German-Soviet friendship 
and liberation of the emerging socialist dictatorship. Correspondingly the authorities 
developed new strategies in order to clamp down on unofficial discourses and 
eventually succeeded in removing the issue of post-war NKVD activities in 
Brandenburg from the official public sphere by the mid-1950s. 
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Chapter IV: Grassroots responses to attempts to remove 
the physical, political, economic and social legacy of the 
Third Reich  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the Reichstag elections of March 1933, 52.4% of the population in the 
Brandenburg province had voted for the National Socialists and when the war ended 
in 1945, there were still roughly 1.5 million NSDAP members in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone, whilst many more had actively or passively participated in one of 
its many organs.
1
 By the time the Third Reich collapsed, East Germans had therefore 
experienced a wide variation of political socialisation depending on a variety of 
factors such as age, gender, class, religion and urban-rural divides, and the new 
administrations were now confronted with attempting to denazify the post-war 
society of the Soviet zone.   
For many decades, much of the historiography on denazification has adopted 
a top-down focus which emphasised the instrumentalisation of denazification in 
order to assert Stalinist hegemony.
2
 Analogously it was also frequently assumed that 
political cleansing was carried out in a more thorough fashion in the East than in the 
western sectors of post-war Germany.
3
 Such assumptions had been propagated by 
East German historians themselves, such as Wolfgang Meinicke, who declared in 
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1984 that a ‘rigorous denazification’ had taken place in the GDR.4 Similar 
conclusions have also been drawn by some western historians such as John H. Herz, 
who argued that because such a large proportion of the prominent Nazis had ‘left for 
the West anyhow’, denazification and the hunting down of war criminals ‘were 
hardly problems in the East’.5 Likewise, Ulrich Herbert and Olaf Groehler maintain 
that denazification was ‘markedly more thorough in the East than it was in the 
West’.6  
Recently, however, a number of empirical studies have appeared which have 
explicitly or implicitly challenged such polarised simplifications by providing a 
more differentiated analysis of the realisation of denazification in East Germany. 
Helga Welsh maintains that one of the main features of denazification in the Soviet 
zone was its selective handling, whilst Thomas Widera has emphasised the ‘double 
character of denazification’ in the Soviet sector.7 Other studies have focused the lens 
on particular professional groups. Joachim Petzold has examined the denazification 
of teachers in Saxony, while more recently Charles Lansing explored the process of 
political transition for teachers in Brandenburg/Havel.
8
 Such studies have helped to 
illustrate that denazification practices in 1945 varied considerably in different 
regions.
9
 For instance, Damian van Melis has shown that denazification in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern was ‘particularly rigorous’ and due to the post-war 
absence of large landowners and a lack of unions and large private industry in the 
north, it was possible for the authorities to enforce control ‘particularly quickly and 
successfully’.10 Somewhat different conclusions have been drawn by Timothy Vogt 
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in relation to Brandenburg who has challenged notions of a successful ‘monolithic 
plan’ and instead emphasises the ‘confusion and indecisiveness’ as well as the 
‘limited nature of SED control’ on the denazification process in the province.11  
In this context, this chapter intends to examine the responses to various 
denazification measures and whether these grassroots responses, combined with a 
multitude of other factors, had any effect on the manner in which denazification 
policies were implemented in Brandenburg after 1945. These denazification 
measures took the form of attempting to erase National Socialist and military 
references from the public sphere, removing former National Socialists from their 
jobs as well as sequestering property belonging to former National Socialists.  
By exploring denazification commissions at a local level, this study intends 
to build on Vogt’s previous approach on Brandenburg. It also further contributes to 
the historical literature by investigating other aspects of the denazification process 
which have thus far frequently been neglected in historical research. Whilst Vogt has 
focused on the importance of local commissions in the denazification process, he 
failed to explore the wider grassroots impact of these developments as well as the 
responses of those affected by the ruling of a commission and the influence which 
regional commissions had on local decision making. Therefore, in order to attempt to 
bridge this gap in the historical research, I created a database of individuals using 
information found in both local and regional archives from both case study towns. 
Whilst this data is not representative of local Brandenburgers more generally, it does 
permit an insight into the fate of over four hundred locals in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde who were denazified, as well as over one hundred local individuals 
whose property was sequestered. 
Moreover, although some studies have explored the expropriation process in 
Brandenburg towns, to date none have examined the grassroots responses to these 
policies amongst local communities and this chapter therefore intends to provide an 
insight into some of these processes at a grassroots level. Furthermore, this chapter 
also addresses some of the responses to attempts to remove the physical reminders of 
Nazism from the public domain in Brandenburg that have often been overlooked in 
previous research.  
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4.2 Attempts to remove the physical reminders of Nazism  
Given the terms agreed by the Allies at the Yalta conference, one of the primary and 
most urgent tasks of the new administration in the Soviet zone was the removal of 
the physical legacy of National Socialism. At a grassroots level in Brandenburg in 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Third Reich, this took the form of 
attempting to destroy the physical traces of the regime in the form of National 
Socialist literature, toys, memorabilia and placards as well as renaming streets and 
eliminating the militarism which had been closely linked with the previous regime. 
In fact, these attempts at political revisionism constituted an effort to destruct and 
subsequently reconstruct ‘sites of memory’ across East Germany. This concept of 
sites of memory is based on an expanded notion of Pierre Nora’s lieux de mémoire 
which Etienne François and Hagen Schulze subsequently developed in relation to 
Germany’s ‘Erinnerungsorte’.12 Based on this conception, today German sites of 
memory include classic material sites such as buildings and monuments, as well as 
incorporating things such as objects, books and ideas. It is the grassroots responses 
to attempts of reconfiguring the physical political landscape in Brandenburg by 
removing National Socialist sites of memory which will be explored in the following 
section. 
Immediately after the war, local Soviet commanders across Brandenburg 
began to issue top-down commands in order to commence with the removal of the 
physical reminders of the National Socialist regime. The eradication and monopoly 
of media forms such as literature was made an important priority. Following SMAD 
Order no. 39 on 8 September 1945 on the confiscation of Nazi and military literature, 
Order no. 7 was issued by the local commandant Captain Schekurow in 
Fürstenwalde on 22 September 1945. He dictated that in order to ‘swiftly root out 
Nazi and militarist ideas’ all owners of private libraries or book shops, as well as 
private individuals, were to immediately hand in all ‘fascist, anti-Soviet and 
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Wehrmacht-literature’.13 These top-down orders were followed by further directives 
by the military governor of the Soviet zone Marshal Georgy Zhukov, with threats of 
punishment for non-compliance.
14
 Over the following months hundreds of now 
prohibited book titles were confiscated in Fürstenwalde.
15
 From May 1946 onwards 
these orders were framed within the Allied Control Council’s Order no. 4, and 
efforts to remove offending literature at a grassroots level were subsequently 
intensified, with the SMAD publishing a list of prohibited Nazi literature that same 
month.
16
 Following Order no. 109 by the SMA in Brandenburg on 22 May 1946 
which ordered an audit on the progress of confiscation of Nazi literature, in July 
1946 the Brandenburg military commander, Colonel Isakow, demanded that the Lord 
Mayor of Brandenburg/Havel utilise the ‘best antifascists’ as well as the police 
apparatus to confiscate all remaining Nazi literature by 20 August 1946.
17
  
In Fürstenwalde, the continued widespread retention of illegal ‘fascist and 
military literature’ in August 1946 resulted in the public punishment of offending 
locals with large monetary fines, with the intention not only to publicly humiliate, 
but also to act as a deterrent.
18
 Yet the archival material indicates that these attempts 
to remove literary sites of memory from the Third Reich at a grassroots level proved 
to be slow and tedious, as the continued unearthing of offending National Socialist 
material beyond the officially imposed deadlines suggests. For instance, in 
Brandenburg/Havel in October 1946 over 1,500 copies of ‘fascist’ and military 
books, as well as a large number of newspapers from the Hitler period were reported 
to have been found in Brandenburg/Havel’s local museum, while the local School of 
Arts was found to be harbouring over a thousand copies of ‘fascist’ and military 
literature and many other objects of ‘Hitler propaganda’.19 This sluggish outcome 
can be attributed to a combination of practical challenges, including the recruitment 
of sufficient manpower to carry out such book cleansings, as well as a lack of public 
support and cooperation. These continued difficulties in executing such top-down 
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demands for the removal of Nazi literature from the grassroots public sphere are 
illustrated by the fact that even by spring 1948 various local libraries in 
Brandenburg/Havel continued to be in possession of a significant number of 
prohibited book titles.
20
  
These efforts to purge political literature were also carried out in conjunction 
with attempts to remove German militarism from the civilian sphere. At the end of 
August the Allied Control Council ordered a ban on uniforms and military emblems. 
However, archival evidence from Fürstenwalde indicates that at a grassroots level 
this practice nonetheless continued throughout late 1945, particularly as the weather 
grew colder.
21
 In fact, as warnings in public notices issued by the Fürstenwalde 
mayor Paul Schmidtchen in spring 1947 highlight, the customs of wearing uniforms 
and uttering military greetings had not disappeared entirely from local public life.
22
 
Part of this continued hangover from the Third Reich was simply due to the practical 
issue of post-war material shortages. Both in Fürstenwalde and in 
Brandenburg/Havel the ban on National Socialist uniforms was often circumvented 
by dyeing the fabric a politically non-offensive colour. Similarly, Konrad Jarausch 
has found that this ban, which was intended to ‘break the defeated population’s 
emotional bond to the military’, was difficult to implement and the saying ‘dye or 
die’ (‘färben oder sterben’) spread quickly in the vernacular.23 However, the 
continued public use of military greetings from the Third Reich indicates how 
challenging it was to alter some of the established linguistic and cultural habits at a 
grassroots level in Brandenburg.  
These attempts to eradicate Third Reich militarism in the wider civilian 
sphere were intended not only to prevent potential partisan activity but also to 
cement the rule of the new administrations, and the possession of weapons and Nazi 
memorabilia of any kind was therefore also strictly forbidden. The archival evidence 
from Brandenburg indicates that both the local Soviet and German authorities were 
greatly concerned about the prevalence of munitions ownership and subsequent 
grassroots punishments for non-compliance were frequently severe. For instance in 
Fürstenwalde, a local resident, Max H., was publicly sentenced to death in August 
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1945 for the possession of weapons in his basement.
24
 This harsh sentence was 
intended to coerce the local population into handing in remaining munitions to the 
occupying forces. Nonetheless, capital punishment appears in some cases to have 
been an insufficient deterrent, as reports of persistent non-compliance amongst some 
sections of the Fürstenwalde population in January 1946 indicate.
25
 Similarly, in 
Brandenburg/Havel a large group of youths were arrested for possession of 
numerous weapons in December 1945.
26
 Throughout the late 1940s the police across 
Brandenburg were continually faced with confiscating both weaponry and 
memorabilia which had been hidden away after the collapse of the Third Reich.
27
 
These instances underscore the difficulties not only of implementing change in the 
public sphere, but also of removing remnants of the Nazi past in the personal sphere. 
As part of the attempts to remove all physical remnants of the Third Reich 
and militarism across East German society the purges also simultaneously focussed 
on the previous inculcation of militarism among children, and the Allied Control 
Council’s Order no. 4 included a prohibition on the sale of military style children’s 
toys. Non-compliance was threatened with a military court appearance and possible 
death sentence. Yet despite such threats, throughout 1946 the Brandenburg 
government was faced with continued non-compliance in a niche which was difficult 
to monitor and regulate.
28
 Moreover, given that many children had been exposed to 
combat and violence in the final phase of the war, as well as being currently in the 
presence of an occupying army, grassroots civilian life was still strongly marked by 
militarism in 1946, and the attempted prohibition of military toys in post-war 
Brandenburg appears to have been a drop in the ocean at a time when remnants of 
the war were still ubiquitous. 
The difficulties encountered by the East German administration to rid 
Brandenburg of National Socialist sites of memory and memorabilia are also evident 
in the oral history interviews. Twelve of those interviewed in Brandenburg/Havel 
and Fürstenwalde described how they had kept banned objects from that period, 
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throughout the GDR years and even to the present day. Many stated that they still 
had photos of themselves in Hitler Youth and BDM uniforms, while others kept 
literature and other memorabilia from the Third Reich. Wilhelm Fiedler kept several 
magazines as well as some medals which he had been awarded in the war, while 
Gertrud Hirsch also kept some books as well as all of her father’s military medals 
and insignia.
29
  
In fact, some interviewees claimed to have gone to great lengths to disguise 
and hide their National Socialist memorabilia after 1945. Gunther Dietrich declared 
that he had deliberately kept all his books and magazines from the Luftwaffe, 
colouring in the swastika on the planes with a black pen after the Third Reich had 
collapsed. He recalled that in early 1948, after a tip-off, his house was ransacked by 
special police looking for incriminating Nazi literature, but he proudly stated that he 
had hidden all of this in a metal box, under some straw, in his shed.
30
 Some of the 
other interviewees also claimed to have taken significant risks by retaining their 
memorabilia, apparently due to a strong emotional need to retain personal sites of 
memory irrespective of changed political parameters. Hans Gericke admitted that he 
still had a sabre from the Hitler Youth hanging in his study today, as well as various 
pictures and a book by Goebbels which he had hidden in his basement. He recalled 
that: ‘It was of course dangerous if one merely had a stamp with the swastika and 
some politician or Russian came and said “you Nazi, you Nazi”’.31 Kurt Michel 
proudly claimed that he had kept everything from this period: ‘I didn’t throw away 
anything […] Wehrmacht books and all those kinds of things, odds and ends, 
scrapbooks that one used to have’, jokingly adding ‘I was a proper German, a 
German collects everything’.32 These vivid recollections suggest that memorabilia 
from the Third Reich were still very salient and treasured objects for these 
interviewees despite their exposure to the memory politics and official political 
discourse of the GDR for forty years.  
In contrast, others such as Wolfgang Heinrich claimed to have destroyed 
everything due to political conviction, illustrating what Konrad Jarausch has termed 
‘self-denazification’.33 However, Jarausch’s notion of self-denazification did not 
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always occur as a result of political conversion, as the interviews illustrate. 
Wolfgang Fried did recall tearing up some of the most incriminating Nazi books 
which he had in his possession in 1945, but not, he claimed, out of personal political 
conviction but simply ‘so that the Russians would not find them’.34 Nonetheless, the 
continued presence of these Nazi lieux de mémoire in the personal sphere amongst a 
proportion of the interviewees, suggest a salience of personal positive memories of 
the Third Reich amongst this interview cohort which managed to transcend two 
twentieth century political transitions. These developments support the above 
archival findings and suggest that the difficulty in implementing change was not just 
salient in the post-war period, but in some cases continued for many years to come. 
There were, however, areas of public life and sites of memory which lent 
themselves more easily to political revision. National Socialist monuments and 
museums were to be liquidated under Allied Control Council Directive no. 30 from 
13. May 1946.
35
 Likewise, street names and inscriptions in shops, newspapers and 
public buildings were also to be altered to remove all traces of ‘fascism’. The 
renaming of streets which had reflected National Socialist maxims constituted an 
attempt to erase the Third Reich from official public memory as well as a 
prescription of new, politically sanctioned, reference points. As Maoz Azaryahu
 
has 
argued, in order for a particular version of the past to be part of the social realm, it 
must operate in the ‘semiosphere’, and he maintains that street names, which serve 
as a ‘vehicle for commemorating heroes and glorious events’, are a ‘conventional 
mechanism for inserting the official version of the past into the semiosphere’.36 
Likewise, archival evidence from Fürstenwalde reveals a radical revision of National 
Socialist street names. For instance, in spring 1946 the ‘Sudetendeutscher Platz’ was 
changed to ‘Moskauer Platz’ and ‘Leo-Schlageter-Straβe’, which had 
commemorated the Freikorps martyr, was renamed ‘Karl-Liebknecht-Straβe’.37 This 
form of revisionism reflects what Rainer Pöppinghege describes as the ‘partial 
amputation of collective conceptions of history’ in public spaces.38 However, Maoz 
                                                 
34
 Fried, 25.06.09. 
35
 SAB RdS/OB, 2.0.2.87/87, p. 123. 
36
 By operating in the semiosphere he means ‘to be part of the mechanisms of generating and 
distributing meanings that are constantly at work in the networks of social communication’. Maoz 
Azaryahu, ‘Renaming the Past: Changes in "City Text" in Germany and Austria, 1945-1947’, History 
and Memory, 2 (1990), 32-53 (p. 33). 
37
 KALOS F/Stadtverwaltung/2083, no pag. 
38
 Rainer Pöppinghege, Wege des Erinnerns: Was Straβennamen über das deutsche 
Geschichtsbewusstsein aussagen (Münster: agenda Verlag, 2007), p. 13. 
125 
 
Azaryahu maintains that part of the success of choosing this medium to alter sites of 
memory is that through changed street names the new version of the past becomes 
‘omnipresent’ and is interwoven with daily life, thus gaining the ‘appearance of 
naturalness’.39 This form of revision of National Socialist street names continued in 
both Fürstenwalde and Brandenburg/Havel, and was additionally expanded by the 
Politbüro of the SED in the early 1950s to further remove street names which were 
by then considered to be ‘no longer palatable’.40  
In sum, an examination of the attempts to eliminate the physical legacy of the 
Third Reich in the immediate post-war period in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde illustrates the generally difficult nature of this task. The removal and 
revision in areas such as literature, uniforms, weaponry and toys as well as the 
renaming of streets did have some success.
41
 Nonetheless, on the basis of both the 
archival and the oral history evidence it appears that these policies found it harder to 
permeate the personal sphere and that a significant number of individuals either 
ignored or adapted only somewhat to the newly prescribed political parameters. 
Some appear to have done so as a result of post-war commodity shortages and 
practical considerations, whilst others out of emotional need which is evidenced by 
the fact that this memorabilia from the Third Reich appear to still be salient today. 
These developments in turn suggest the existence of limited opportunities for 
grassroots action which permitted some actors to exercise Eigensinn by flouting the 
new officially prescribed norms despite the new political constraints and thereby 
illustrate some of the challenges encountered in the implementation of these top-
down policies at a local level. 
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4.3 Early vetting attempts: the first and second periods of 
denazification from 1945-1946 
In addition to the attempts to remove the physical remnants and sites of memory of 
the Third Reich in East Germany, in line with the Potsdam Agreement legislation 
was also passed to vet former adherents of National Socialism in order to lessen their 
economic, political and social influence after 1945. This legislation consisted of four 
relatively distinct phases, each of which had a differing impact on former National 
Socialists living in the Soviet sector.
42
 The first period of denazification 
demonstrated severity towards former National Socialists. In Brandenburg, the first 
vice-president of the provincial administration, Bernhard Bechler, was principally 
responsible for denazification in the province.
43
 At a meeting of district 
administrators and Lord Mayors from across Brandenburg which took place in 
Brandenburg/Havel on 17 July 1945, Bechler demanded that all former NSDAP 
members, irrespective of whether they had been active or nominal, should be 
removed from local administrations.
44
 This was followed by the announcement of 
Order no. 42 on 27 August 1945, which envisaged a general and thorough 
denazification in the Soviet zone, whilst newspaper articles from autumn 1945 
promised ‘severe punishment for the Nazi criminals’, as it was considered that 
individuals who had been ‘politically and morally infected by fascist ideology’ could 
in many cases ‘never be won back, and certainly not in a matter of weeks or 
months’.45 Denazification commissions were established in an attempt to process the 
large number of National Socialist members and functionaries, and by April 1946 
commissions in Brandenburg had examined 46,759 public servants – 10,714 of 
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whom were classified as former NSDAP members and fired.
46
 However, until mid-
1946 the majority of these denazification rulings were merely decided on the basis of 
written documents. Moreover, former adherents of National Socialism were not 
completely removed from economic life; instead the relevant employment centre was 
subsequently deployed to assist those who had been made redundant to find jobs in 
‘material production’ as manual labourers.47 It was considered that here they would 
have less influence and power in the workplace, as well as simultaneously 
contributing to the physical rebuilding of the Soviet zone.  
In contrast, the second denazification phase in the summer of 1946 consisted 
of a relatively conciliatory approach. One primary reason for this change of attitude 
were the upcoming municipal elections to be held in autumn 1946, as a result of 
which the leadership intensified its efforts to win the support of former Nazi Party 
members.
48
  At the end of June 1946, the Brandenburg Provincial Administration 
stated that all former NSDAP members currently working in the public state 
administration had ‘proven through their actions’ that they had contributed to the 
rebuilding of Germany, and were thus considered to be rehabilitated.
49
 At a 
grassroots level in Brandenburg/Havel local dynamics and initiatives played an 
important role in this rehabilitation process. In September 1946, the local electoral 
committee found that numerous residents had apparently been ‘mistakenly accused’ 
of being active in the NSDAP and SS and were subsequently exonerated by local 
officials, in some cases even re-labelled as ‘antifascist’ and were thereby permitted 
to partake in the upcoming local and regional elections.
50
 Thus, until the autumn of 
1946, the vetting procedures against National Socialists were generally haphazard, 
while the attempts by all the political parties to win over former NSDAP members 
for the elections, had by the end of 1946 given the impression that denazification 
was coming to an end. 
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4.4 The third period of denazification: the implementation and 
impact of Directive no. 24 at a grassroots level 
The third denazification phase began with a delayed implementation of the common 
directives of the Allied Control Council on denazification, Directive no. 24, which 
had already been agreed upon on 12 January 1946, but which only came into official 
effect in the Soviet zone on 9 December 1946 due to foreign policy considerations.
51
 
The main objective of Directive no. 24 was to be the ‘removal from office and from 
positions of responsibility of Nazis and of persons hostile to Allied purposes’. 
According to Article 2, persons to be targeted were those who had held any office or 
been active in the NSDAP or affiliated organisations as well as those who were 
‘avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds’. Article 10 then 
included an extensive list of those who should be immediately removed.
52
 The 
SMAD perceived this new wave of denazification as an opportunity to unify the 
various denazification attempts of the provinces in the Soviet zone. This wave of 
denazification was intended to vet entire ministries, institutions and offices in the 
public service, and the individual provinces were ordered that numerous nominal 
NSDAP members, who had previously been reinstated in their jobs, were to be re-
examined.  
 During the harsh winter of 1946-47 a central provincial denazification 
commission for Brandenburg was established in Potsdam and thirty local district 
commissions were created across the region by early 1947. In Fürstenwalde cases 
were to be examined by the ‘Commission for Directive no. 24’ in the administrative 
district office in Seelow, thirty kilometres north-east of the town, while 
Brandenburg/Havel was to have its own town denazification commission. These 
commissions were to consist of a panel of five members: the chair was to be held by 
either the district administrator or the Lord Mayor, while the other four 
commissioners were to be recruited from the SED, CDU, LDP and FDGB. 
Examination of the archival material reveals that roughly one fifth of those who were 
summoned in front of the local denazification commissions responsible for 
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Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde throughout spring 1947 were fired right away 
in accordance with Article 10.
53
 A different picture emerges, however, if we shift the 
focus to the fates of the remaining large majority who appeared in front of the 
commissions and the manner in which Directive no. 24 was interpreted and applied 
on the ground. 
 In exploring the grassroots responses to this third wave of denazification it 
becomes clear that a combination of the vague wording of the Allied Control 
Directive, combined with varying local factors, provided wide latitude for 
interpretation and application, resulting in an inconsistent application of Directive 
no. 24 at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. Disciplinary action varied greatly, and 
these rulings were rationalised using a broad spectrum of justifications, which were 
often based on local subjective interpretations of Directive no. 24. Building on 
Vogt’s study of Brandenburg in which he maintains that district commissions were 
essentially the ‘theatre stages’ of local denazification and that their importance ‘in 
the purge cannot be overemphasised’, this section also explores the importance of 
specific local knowledge and factors in these proceedings in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde.
54
 Building on Vogt’s work, this chapter seeks to integrate two 
additional aspects: the potential impact which individual grassroots complaints and 
petitions could have on the outcome of the local vetting process as well as the role 
which the regional commissions could play in this dynamic. 
Opportunities for latitude in the interpretation of Directive no. 24 by the local 
commissions were provided particularly by Article 2e of the Directive which stated 
that some individuals who had been removed from public or semi-public office could 
on occasion be granted a license to continue in private employment in a subordinate 
role. Such leniency was often rooted in rising uneasiness about the high levels of 
redundancies of qualified experts and the consequences this would have for the 
running of the towns. In fact, Article 8 of the Directive actually permitted the 
retention of National Socialists in the public service, provided they had an essential 
role during the post-war shortage and were merely nominal and not ‘hostile to Allied 
purposes’.  
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However, the archival evidence indicates that the subjective nature of the 
interpretation of what constituted nominal membership was often stretched by the 
commissions responsible for Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. This concern 
over a shortage of skilled labour was most pronounced in the vetting of specific 
specialised branches, and perhaps unsurprisingly, given the contemporary public 
health problems, this tendency was particularly palpable in the medical profession 
and the hospital systems in both Fürstenwalde and Brandenburg/Havel. In contrast to 
the Western zone, where the ratio of available doctors stood at 1:800 members of the 
population, across East Germany the doctor-patient ratio averaged at 1:1,400 by 
autumn 1946.
55
 Brandenburg/Havel had 55 medical doctors at the end of 1945, a 
ratio of roughly one physician for 1,355 members of the population.
56
 An even 
greater shortage existed in Fürstenwalde where the central hospital had been bombed 
on 16 April 1945, and the town had access to only nine medical doctors, a ratio of 
1:2,218 of the population.
57
  
The impact of these local shortages can be seen in the form of frequent 
leniency in the denazification of the medical profession at a grassroots level in both 
towns. In one such example from Fürstenwalde the commission ruled that Dr Kurt 
A., a neurological specialist with his own practice in Fürstenwalde, was considered 
to be ‘irreplaceable in the current situation’. His memberships of the NSDAP and the 
SA since 1933 were excused by the commission on the grounds that they had been 
out of economic and not political considerations.
58
 This was also the case for various 
other Fürstenwalde and Brandenburg/Havel doctors, nurses and hospital workers 
who received the sanction of their local commissions to remain in their posts, despite 
their memberships in the NSDAP and other various associated organs.
59
  
These reprieves did not just have a short term implications. Helga Welsh has 
found that across East Germany those employed in the medical sector were permitted 
to remain in their jobs in large numbers, while Anna-Sabine Ernst maintains that the 
medical profession remained extraordinarily resilient with respect to their social and 
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professional standing.
60
 In fact, by 1949, there were still a total of 13,222 doctors in 
the Soviet zone, or seven doctors for every 10,000 inhabitants, almost the identical 
doctor-patient ratio which had existed before denazification.
61
 
 The concern over a severe shortage of qualified labour in Brandenburg/Havel 
also spread to other sectors such as veterinarians and local engineers, many of whom 
were treated with leniency by the local denazification commission, despite falling 
under Directive no. 24.
62
 In fact, an archival examination of the decision making by 
the local commission from January to late March 1947 indicates that of those Nazis 
who clearly fell under Directive no. 24 in Brandenburg/Havel, only 40% were 
actually fired, while in Fürstenwalde this figure is even lower. It is probably not all 
that surprising that these local commissions showed great leniency in areas where 
technical qualifications were most scarce in their towns. Yet this development is 
interesting for two reasons. Firstly it somewhat challenges assumptions of a 
thorough East German denazification process, when in actuality a large number of 
qualified former Nazis were able to slip through the net and continue their 
professional trajectories. Secondly these frequent benign rulings illustrate that in 
certain instances, former NSDAP members did not need to exert much effort to 
retain their professional positions. In these cases, the post-war dynamic, defined by 
severe shortages, ensured the continuation of their secure positions and this leniency 
had the effect of partially ameliorating the possible destabilising impact which 
denazification could potentially have within communities. 
Moreover, the archival evidence on denazification cases in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde indicate that commissions could opt to retain 
former Nazis in employment without utilising the exemption clause no. 8, which was 
reserved for specialists in short supply. The commissions could instead base their 
judgement on Article 6 on ‘discretionary removal and exclusion’ which was intended 
to address the large number of individuals who were neither clearly active and 
devout Nazis nor completely lethargic members. In some cases this allowed the 
commissions to defend their leniency, particularly if the individual in question had 
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presented themselves as actively engaging with the new political parameters.
63
 
Similarly, those individuals who claimed that they had proven their willingness to 
make themselves immediately available to the re-building of the town in 1945 often 
received favourable treatment. This was the case for numerous employees in 
Fürstenwalde’s town administration and various local organs such as the forestry 
department and cemetery workers as well as electricians, carpenters, locksmiths, 
pipe-fitters and engineers, who were all said to have ‘made themselves available as  
workers after the collapse in 1945’.64 Likewise, perceived co-operation with the Red 
Army on their arrival in 1945 was also rewarded by the local denazification 
commissions. For instance, some of the engineers and skilled tradesmen working in 
Fürstenwalde’s power station and water supply works were permitted to remain in 
their posts, despite long-term NSDAP memberships, because they were said to have 
defied orders at the end of the war to destroy the infrastructure under their control.
65
 
Such examples illustrate the wide latitude available to grassroots commissions 
through the ability to decide on discretionary removal, which in turn somewhat 
moderated the impact of the actual implementation of Directive no. 24 in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. 
Yet there were also numerous additional factors which influenced the vetting 
process at a local level beyond mere economic considerations as the effect which 
local, grassroots knowledge often had on the outcome of some of the commission’s 
deliberations is striking. Often, especially in the case of Brandenburg/Havel, where 
the commission was made up entirely of local individuals, memories and perceptions 
from before 1945 greatly influenced the commission’s decisions. One such 
individual was Heinrich D., an engineer and member of the NSDAP since 1933, who 
was allowed to keep his trading license as the local commission felt that he had 
retained a ‘positive political stance’ throughout the Hitler period.66 Yet, local 
knowledge could also work against individuals who appeared in front of local 
commissions. Gottfried R., the owner of a retail firm which dealt in textiles and 
                                                 
63
 See, for instance, cases where an attempt to join the SED was evaluated favourably: BLHA, Rep. 
203/584, ‘Sitzungsprotokolle des Ausschusses bei der Provinzial-Landesregierung zur Durchführung 
der Direktive 24 (7. Januar-20. März 1947)’, pp. 367, 551. 
64
 BLHA, Rep. 203/585, ‘Sitzungsprotokolle des Ausschusses bei der Provinzial-Landesregierung zur 
Durchführung der Direktive 24 (21. März-11. April 1947)’, pp. 266,316, 354-359. 
65
 These local rulings were endorsed a short time later by the regional commission. Ibid., pp. 313, 
315. 
66
 SAB RdS/OB, 2.0.2.27/27, pp.  9-10, 49. 
133 
 
wallpaper in Brandenburg/Havel, appeared in front of the local commission in 
February 1947, who reminded him that during the war the shop windows of his 
business had been utilised for National Socialist propaganda by exhibiting war 
images such as maps with miniature flags and soldiers.
67
 Particularly in the case of 
Brandenburg/Havel, Lord Mayor Lange frequently pursued individual local cases, 
often with an explicit personal vendetta, in some cases even leading to official 
complaints against him personally at a regional level.
68
 Yet given that local 
knowledge and memories could often negatively impact the outcome of a person’s 
hearing, the opposite was sometimes also the case, especially when it came to 
expellees from the former Eastern German territories. Here, it was often difficult or 
impossible to receive incriminating information on persons originating from these 
regions, resulting in numerous favourable rulings at a local level for some expellees 
whose political background could not be verified in 1947.
69
   
Timothy Vogt’s study has found that ‘policies handed down from the centre 
were frequently implemented in the towns and villages in ways that were unforeseen 
by the policy makers’. He claims that ‘by giving decision-making power to local 
commissions staffed by long-time local residents and by encouraging these 
commissions to work in a bipartisan manner, the central authorities had created a 
system impervious to central control’.70 Although the findings above from 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde are consistent with some of Vogt’s 
conclusions on the importance of grassroots factors and actors on the outcome of 
denazification under Directive no. 24, this thesis also challenges Vogt’s notion that 
the local commissions were ‘impervious to central control’ by examining the 
treatment of some of these local cases at a regional level and providing evidence that 
grassroots Brandenburgers attempted to bypass local commissions in order to receive 
a more favourable outcome from the regional commission in Potsdam. A fully 
systematic comparison of all the individual cases vetted in both towns is beyond the 
scope of this study; nonetheless, using the aforementioned database, a preliminary 
comparison between the local and regional archival material suggests that the local 
commissions were not as immune to outside influence as Vogt maintains. In fact, a 
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substantial number of local rulings were subsequently re-examined by the central 
provincial commission in Potsdam, under whose jurisdiction the district 
denazification commissions fell. Without a full comparative study of the thousands 
of denazification cases in Brandenburg it is unclear how many cases underwent this 
reassessment at regional level; however, the evidence from Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde suggests that a significant proportion were re-examined, both as a 
routine procedure and as a result of complaints from members of the local population 
who challenged a negative outcome by the local commissions.  
In the case of Fürstenwalde, the regional Brandenburg commission reviewed 
over 70 cases in 15 sittings between late February and late March 1947. In a 
substantial number of instances, the regional commission upheld the decisions made 
by the local commission, but they also overruled other cases, judging them to be 
either too lenient or too harsh.
71
 Similarly, half of the 23 cases from 
Brandenburg/Havel which appeared in front of the regional commission on 16 April 
1947 were rescinded.
72
  When on 22 February 1947 the case of Walter J., a local 
businessman and long-time member of the NSDAP, had come in front of the 
commission in Brandenburg/Havel, the SED representative on the commission 
testified from personal experience that his sons had ‘belonged to the most vicious of 
SA thugs’ and the town commission therefore unanimously ruled to revoke his 
trading license.
73
 But interestingly, when the case was appealed before the 
Brandenburg state commission two months later, which was staffed by individuals 
who were not personally acquainted with the defendant, the local evidence was 
disregarded, and it was instead decided that Walter J. was in fact permitted to 
continue working.
74
 This also happened in the case of Gustav B., the owner of a 
nursery, who was considered by the local commission in Brandenburg/Havel, many 
of whom knew him personally, to be ‘highly anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist’.75  
Nevertheless, two months later the regional commission overturned two previous 
local decisions and permitted Gustav B. to continue working.
76
 Similar patterns 
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could also be observed with other local individuals, such as opticians, engineers and 
textile and furniture dealers, where local negative judgements were overruled with 
leniency at a regional level.
77
 Such rulings suggest that local grassroots actors were 
able to successfully bypass a negative ruling by the local denazification commission 
by complaining to the district commission in Potsdam. 
However, there were also cases where local party functionaries were 
unsuccessful in protecting members of their community from a negative ruling by 
the regional commission. Frequently such party interventions came from either the 
CDU or LDP, yet it was also not uncommon for local SED functionaries to act as 
exonerating witnesses. This was, for instance, the case of a local doctor in 
Fürstenwalde during whose denazification process the SED mayor, as well as 
numerous locals and politicians, attempted in vain to prevent his removal from the 
Fürstenwalde hospital, as their petitions were rejected at a regional level.
78
  
In fact, these differences and discrepancies of opposing rulings made by 
commissions at local and regional level sometimes manifested themselves as 
outright tension. This was particularly evident in the case of Lord Mayor Lange who 
explicitly challenged verdicts by the provincial Brandenburg government, as well as 
personally vehemently defending some of the decisions which had been made by his 
own local denazification committee in Brandenburg/Havel.
79
 Such developments 
illustrate not only the grey area between top-down initiatives and their reception and 
implementation at a local level but also that the post-war rifts did often not always 
manifest themselves as the SED versus the people, but instead as local resentment at 
interference from central organs. 
There were also a further group of actors who should be considered when 
addressing the grassroots impact of the implementation of this third phase of 
denazification at a grassroots level: the responses of those who themselves were 
denazified. In fact, the archival material from Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde 
indicates that many of those who were fired from their jobs by the two local 
commissions petitioned against the local verdicts, while others appealed for 
clemency directly from top SED members.
80
  Some of these complaints proved 
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fruitless. For instance, Ernst W., a labourer in Fürstenwalde’s treasury office had two 
appeals rejected by the district commission in February 1947, despite his attempts to 
argue and prove through witness statements that his memberships of the NSDAP and 
the SS had been as a result of ‘political pressure’.81 Likewise, Erich W., a clerk in 
Fürstenwalde’s social welfare office who had belonged to the NSDAP and SA, also 
had two appeals rejected by the district commission in the same month. Similar 
complaints were also lodged unsuccessfully by other members of Fürstenwalde’s 
administrative organs.
82
 In Brandenburg/Havel some individuals also tried to 
challenge local verdicts without success, while others sought out legal guidance in 
order to dispute the ruling of the local commission in vain.
83
  
Conversely, others had more success with their complaints to the 
denazification commissions. In February 1947 Max B, a tax accountant in 
Fürstenwalde’s town administration and NSDAP member since 1937, successfully 
appealed the local commission’s first negative ruling, convincing them at his second 
hearing that he was merely nominal and had made himself ‘available for active duty’ 
in the administration since 1945. Similarly, Herman R., a caretaker in a Fürstenwalde 
school, who was also an NSDAP member since 1937, persuaded the commission to 
overturn their first negative ruling on the basis that he had only been a nominal Nazi 
and was now a member of the FDGB.
84
 Such instances provide evidence that 
grassroots Brandenburgers, when faced with the immediate existential threat of 
losing their jobs, could on occasion successfully challenge local and regional rulings 
of denazification commissions, thereby somewhat affecting the manner in which 
Directive no. 24 was ultimately implemented at a grassroots level. 
The implementation of Directive no. 24 should have been completed by 28 
February 1947 and the government exerted pressure on the local and regional 
commissions to submit a final report by 15 March 1947.
85
 Yet, by the summer of 
1947 dissatisfaction in the population was constantly increasing, compounded by the 
fact that governmental bodies were flooded with applications for appeal, with which 
the administrations could no longer cope. Moreover, the implementation of Directive 
no. 24 did very little to address the issue of the many National Socialist functionaries 
                                                 
81
 KALOS F/RdS/79, no pag. 
82
 Ibid., no pag. 
83
 See for instance: SAB RdS/OB, 2.0.2.27/27, pp. 9-19, 56-58. 
84
 Other similar cases were also recorded in February 1947: KALOS F/RdS/79, no pag. 
85
 Ibid., no pag. 
137 
 
who had failed to return to their previous hometowns after May 1945. By 1947, sixty 
prominent local Nazis had not yet returned to Fürstenwalde.
86
  
Nonetheless, between January and early autumn 1947 the 21 district 
commissions and 9 town commissions in Brandenburg had recorded 15,539 people 
who were considered to fall under Directive no. 24.
87
 Yet, the archival evidence 
suggests that the implementation of, and responses to, the third denazification phase 
in both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde in the form of Directive no. 24 appears 
to have been influenced by a plethora of factors and considerations which went well 
beyond a mere consideration of an individual’s political background. Interestingly, it 
was not merely economic determinants, such as the need for qualified experts and a 
shortage of skilled labour, which played a role in the vetting of former National 
Socialists at a grassroots level; rewards and punishments for past behaviour were 
also dispensed by the local commissions. Discordances between local and regional 
rulings were also notably present, highlighting the often subjective and lax 
interpretation of Directive no. 24. As a consequence of these differing interpretations 
of Directive no. 24, combined with extreme post-war shortages, it appears that a 
certain room for manoeuvre existed in which grassroots Brandenburgers could 
challenge the outcome of rulings both at a local and regional level. Furthermore, the 
large number of complaints and appeals contributed to a delay in the implementation 
of the vetting procedure in Brandenburg throughout 1947. 
 
4.5 The fourth period of denazification: the implementation of 
Order no. 201 at a grassroots level 
The fourth and final denazification period was carried out within the framework of 
SMAD Order no. 201 between August 1947 and February 1948. This SMAD order 
from 16 August 1947 was to replace the implementation of Directive no. 24, and 
now attempted to make a clear differentiation between active and nominal Party 
members. The accompanying handbook issued on Order no. 201 stated that:  
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A general judicial arraignment of all former nominal, non-active members of 
the Nazi Party would only harm the democratic rebuilding of Germany and 
contribute to the strengthening of remnants of fascist, military reactionism.
88
  
The former commissions for Directive no. 24 were therefore to be replaced with new 
denazification commissions which were to be established in the Brandenburg state 
government, as well as in all towns and administrative districts.
89
 These 
commissions were to have the same political constellation as the previous 
commissions with the addition of representatives from mass organisations such as 
the DFB, FDJ and VVN.  
The judiciary was also to play an important role in the execution of Order no. 
201 as it was envisaged that investigations into National Socialist crimes would be 
intensified and subsequently be transferred to German courts for processing.
90
 Order 
no. 201 was also to affect the police bodies in the Soviet zone, and by September 
1947 moves were underway to establish investigative organs in which the K5 
(forerunner to the MfS) squads and commissariats were to play a central role.
91
 In 
fact, Order no. 201 was to serve as a significant weapon for politicising the police 
and the K5, while it also considerably strengthened the Ministry of the Interior who 
had the right to be informed about all proceedings.
92
 In this manner, the 
implementation of Order no. 201 was to play an important role in the post-war 
political transition process. 
In Brandenburg, a state denazification commission was established on 25 
September 1947. It had its seat in Potsdam and consisted of ten people, eight of 
whom were members of the SED and ranged from Minister Bernhard Bechler, who 
was by now the Minister of the Interior, to ordinary workers.
93
 In 
Brandenburg/Havel members were also recruited from the various parties and 
antifascist organisations. Suitability to sit on the commission was decided on the 
candidate’s demonstration of their ‘democratic views’ and whether it was deemed 
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that they were ‘morally and politically capable of making the right decisions’.94 Yet 
subjective interpretations of what constituted adequate ‘moral and political’ 
competencies led to conflicts in Brandenburg/Havel when the CDU candidate, who 
had been approved by the SMA and state government in Brandenburg, was vetoed 
by Lord Mayor Lange at a local level.
95
 Despite these tensions, by 30 September 
1947 commission building in Brandenburg/Havel had been completed and consisted 
of eight people, six of whom were SED members, the other two representing the 
CDU and the LDP.
96
 Here the first public hearing took place on 14 October 1947.
 
Public notices had been previously hung up in the town on official notification 
boards requesting that the population provide political background information on 
those on the denazification list.
97
 In the district of Lebus, which was responsible for 
Fürstenwalde, the denazification commission consisted of seven people by the end of 
September 1947. Five members were in the SED, including the district administrator 
Berthold Wottke who had previously been the mayor of Fürstenwalde in late 1945 
and 1946, while the others included ordinary workers and a housewife.
98
  
By mid-October 1947 the Brandenburg state denazification commission had 
carried out ten sittings in which they examined 141 cases; yet the progress of the 
various denazification commissions at a local level varied considerably.
99
 By early 
November 1947, some commissions in the state of Brandenburg were reported to be 
handling only eight or ten cases a week, prompting the Minister of the Interior, 
Bechler, to voice concern at the ‘lack of antifascist consciousness’ of some 
commissions.
100
 In contrast, the work carried out by the Brandenburg/Havel 
commission was considered by the Ministry of the Interior of Brandenburg to be 
‘good’ by late 1947.101 Here, the commission continued to be headed by Lord Mayor 
Lange and hearings took place on a regular basis. Nonetheless, even here, the local 
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commission was forced to deal with difficulties such as the frequent unreliability of 
witness statements, as well as false written declarations on biographical forms in 
which certain events and previous political allegiances were often re-written or left 
out altogether.
102
 It is therefore conceivable that in other local commissions which 
were less well-organised and efficient, that these problems were even more 
pronounced. 
In Fürstenwalde, numerous citizens were also called to appear in front of 
both the district commission in Lebus, as well as the Brandenburg state 
denazification commission.
103
 Fürstenwalde mayor Paul Schmidtchen, a former SPD 
member and successor to Berthold Wottke, erected public notices containing lists of 
the locals due to be denazified, and encouraged the general Fürstenwalde population 
to participate at these hearings, either as audience members or as prosecuting and 
exonerating witnesses.
104
  
However, the establishment of these local denazification commissions 
appears to have had little impact on the memories of the oral history interviews, the 
majority whom felt that the denazification commissions had played only a minor role 
or no role at all at a local level. For instance, Ulla Beck recalled: ‘That didn’t happen 
in Fürstenwalde, if it did, then it took place in Berlin or something – I don’t know 
anything about such a campaign’.105 Indeed, most of the interviewees claimed that 
they were much more interested in other personal matters rather than the vetting of 
former Nazis, as Gunther Dietrich recalled: ‘We didn’t run into town to look at 
notice boards, we had our own problems’.106 Whilst this supposed lack of interest 
may be attributable to the young age of the interviewees, the archival evidence also 
suggests that the wider Brandenburg population, provided they were not personally 
affected, generally responded to this denazification wave with apathy and lack of 
interest. 
Reports from the Ministry of the Interior from across Brandenburg in the 
winter of 1947 emphasised concern that the participation of the population in the 
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denazification process was considered to be ‘very weak’.107 Often the audience 
members at the hearings were almost entirely made up of friends and relatives of the 
accused, as well as former National Socialists themselves who were surveying 
developments in advance of their own upcoming hearings. The files of the central 
criminal police indicate that in Hohenleipisch in the south of Brandenburg, the 
audience, which was said to have consisted of a large number of NSDAP members, 
allegedly clapped when exonerating evidence was presented and voiced their 
disapproval when prosecuting evidence was heard.
108
 Such evidence suggests that 
elements of the grassroots population in Brandenburg attempted to carve out a 
certain room for manoeuvre for themselves within these denazification attempts. By 
submitting false witness statements and untruthful biographical information, as well 
as publicly ridiculing prosecuting evidence, these acts of Eigensinn clearly attempted 
to undermine the vetting procedure at a local level. 
In addition to these grassroots attempts to impair the denazification process, 
throughout late 1947 and 1948 other serious barriers emerged in the implementation 
of Order no. 201 across Brandenburg. Principally, the lack of supporting physical 
infrastructure as well as the passivity of the political parties at a grassroots level 
proved problematic. In autumn 1947, the offices of the Brandenburg state 
investigative organs were located in an attic with a leaking roof without access to 
heating or light, resulting in over half of the clerks becoming ill.
109
 Furthermore, by 
early November 1947 a general lack of grassroots support and coordination was 
causing widespread delays to the execution of Order no. 201. In the Brandenburg 
district of Teltow, hearings had not yet begun, while across the board the Ministry of 
the Interior was extremely concerned that the parties were not showing sufficient 
cooperation and the police investigations were only progressing slowly.
110
 The 
situation was similar for the K5 in Brandenburg who, by the winter of 1947, were 
also increasingly irritated that the local SED branches were reluctant to forward 
cases, whilst alleging that local CDU and LDP functionaries were ‘showing no co-
operation whatsoever’.111 These problems continued to multiply and by June 1948 
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the Ministry of the Interior was gravely concerned that constructive co-operation of 
the local parties and other organisations in the denazification process in Brandenburg 
‘had halted completely’.112 In addition, internal reports indicate that local SED 
functionaries and the local branches of bloc parties and mass organisations regularly 
defended individuals accused of National Socialist involvement.
113
 Throughout 1948 
in Brandenburg local SED district administrators, SED mayors, SED police 
commissioners, SED lawyers as well as leaders of local SED factions and Party 
functionaries acted as exonerating witnesses or campaigned for milder sentencing.
114
  
Such initiatives were not just limited to local functionaries — grassroots 
attempts to campaign on behalf of local community members being denazified can 
also be seen, for example, in relation to teachers in Brandenburg. For instance, in 
December 1947 a group of 148 parents in Königs Wusterhausen, 35 kilometres west 
of Fürstenwalde, wrote to the Brandenburg government challenging the classification 
of the local teacher, Miss Schulze, as ‘Minderbelastet’, claiming instead that she had 
never been politically active and should be ‘at most be classified as a nominal Nazi’. 
They unanimously praised her pedagogical abilities and strongly requested that she 
should be allowed to continue her job.
115
 Similarly, Veronika K., a twelve year old 
from Ketschendorf, wrote to the state denazification commission in Potsdam on 25 
January 1948 regarding the dismissal of her teacher under Order no. 201:  
He is our only Altlehrer and we all like him very much. The other teachers 
are all Junglehrer whom we don’t respect. My father is a member of the 
VVN and he says that Mr Schüler wasn’t a Nazi and did a lot for the poor 
people in Ketschendorf. We Ketschendorf children sincerely ask you to 
return the teacher Schüler to our school.
 116
  
In highlighting the unpopularity of introducing new inexperienced teachers who are 
‘not respected’, this young petitioner reveals her scepticism at the wisdom of 
removing Altlehrer in the first place.
117
 Moreover, by utilising her father’s assertion 
that ‘Mr Schüler wasn’t a Nazi’, whose opinion is legitimised as a consequence of 
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his persecution by the Nazi regime, this twelve year old girl is simultaneously 
disputing the accuracy of the ruling by the denazification commission. Finally, by 
shifting the plea as being representative of the children of Ketschendorf, the 
individual petitioner attempts to add collective weight to her request. Whilst the 
handwriting clearly indicates that this letter was written by a young girl, 
unfortunately the evidence at hand cannot offer a definitive answer as to whether 
Veronika K. was particularly eigensinnig and contacted the Brandenburg state 
commission of her own volition, or whether she was encouraged to do so by a third 
party. This negative sentiment towards the new teachers who were to replace those 
who had been denazified is also reflected in a contemporary rhyme which was 
reported to be circulating in Brandenburg around this time: ‘Im Keller keine Kohlen, 
auf den Schuhen keine Sohlen, Die Neulehrer können kaum das ABC, das ist das 
Werk der SED’.118  
Further examination of the archival evidence reveals that numerous state 
bodies in Brandenburg received a wide variety of complaints about the 
denazification of the school system during this period.
119
 It would therefore seem 
that a certain room for manoeuvre did exist for grassroots actors, be they parents, 
children, or the teachers themselves, to voice grievances that arose from the 
denazification of teachers in Brandenburg. Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to 
assess the extent to which petitions such as these may or may not have affected the 
manner in which the policy to denazify teachers was implemented in Brandenburg. 
The secondary literature does suggest however, that certainly as a result of practical 
shortages the vetting procedure of teachers was forced to undergo some 
compromises in the long-run.
120
  
Likewise, the vetting of industry of Nazi remnants under Order no. 201 in 
late 1947 and 1948 faced numerous grassroots challenges when it came to the 
implementation of this policy in Brandenburg. This sluggish progress reflected not 
only political apathy as well as a fear of losing coveted skilled labour, but also 
camaraderie and loyalty amongst colleagues against what was perceived to be 
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unnecessary outside interference in many factories across Brandenburg. Reports 
compiled by the Ministry of the Interior throughout 1947 and 1948 indicate that both 
management and employees often appeared disinclined to denounce possible former 
Nazis within the factories, and that this reluctance amongst factory workers in turn 
had an effect on the thoroughness of the denazification attempts.
121
 Attempts to 
remove qualified experts during a time of extreme post-war shortage also appear to 
have had an impact on grassroots morale across Brandenburg more generally. For 
instance, in the Brandenburg district of Luckau, the K5 discovered that rumours were 
circulating in December 1947 that the recent removal of too many former nominal 
NSDAP members from the Reichsbahn was resulting in an increase in train accidents 
in the region.
122
  
The Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior had been instructed to complete 
vetting under Order no. 201 by 10 January 1948, yet progress lagged behind while 
continued appeals were being lodged against rulings by the town and district 
commissions.
123
 Across Brandenburg there were also concerns about what was 
happening with the former National Socialists who had been removed from their 
posts. Most of the ‘active fascists’ who had lost their jobs were being treated along 
the guidelines of SMAD Order no. 153 which stipulated that ‘fascists’ were only to 
be deployed for physical labour.
124
 Yet at a grassroots level, a lack of willingness to 
work in manual labour was claimed by Ministry of the Interior reports to have been 
relatively widespread, and it was frequently noted that a large number of local 
doctors across Brandenburg assisted in declaring former National Socialists to be 
‘unfit for manual labour’.125 Irrespective of the individual motivations of these 
doctors – be it bribery or altruistic notions of a grassroots community spirit – 
declaring some former NSDAP members to be unfit for physical work, in practice 
this somewhat undermined the implementation of these Soviet regulations at a 
grassroots level, further illustrating how these policies may have been realised on the 
ground in a different manner than originally intended. 
Nevertheless, despite these barriers to the implementation of Order no. 201 
some results could certainly be reported across East Germany. In the entire Soviet 
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zone, over 70% of a total of 100,214 cases had been processed by the end of January 
1948.
126
 By early April 1948, the Brandenburg denazification commissions had dealt 
with 93% of the 16,365 cases which had been received. On average, 58% of these 
individuals in Brandenburg had been declared to have been nominal National 
Socialists.
127
 Yet even amongst these final figures, an enormous discrepancy in the 
declaration of nominal status for former National Socialists remained at a local level. 
Brandenburg/Havel had the lowest declaration of nominal cases across all the 
Brandenburg districts at 24.2%, while the Lebus commission, which was responsible 
for Fürstenwalde, had declared 64.2% of their Nazis to have been nominal by March 
1948.
128
  This indicates that local factors may have played an important role in the 
manner in which Order no. 201 was implemented on the ground in Brandenburg. 
Furthermore, a high regional variation was also evident in the percentage of criminal 
cases passed on to investigative organs for formal prosecution. In Brandenburg a 
mere 3.2% of cases against National Socialists were forwarded to the judiciary 
whilst in Mecklenburg 18.5% of cases were classified as Nazi criminals and were 
presented for formal prosecution.
129
 
By early 1948 there was an increasingly strong push for an end to 
denazification, resulting in the issuing of SMAD Order no. 35 on 26 February 1948 
which commanded that the work of the denazification commissions be brought to an 
end by 10 March 1948.
130
 Furthermore, on 18 March 1948, under the guise of the 
100 year anniversary of the 1848 revolution, the SMAD announced Order no. 43 
declaring a general amnesty for certain prisoners being held under Order no. 201.
131
  
In summary, the implementation of Order no. 201, in ways similar to its 
predecessor, was also plagued with numerous practical challenges in its attempt to 
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remove remnants of the political influence of the Third Reich in post-war 
Brandenburg. The execution of Order no. 201 did assist in some aspects of 
formalisation and mobilisation of the judiciary and the police, helping to solidify 
their influence on the post-war political transition in the medium term. Nonetheless, 
the implementation of Order no. 201 also highlighted the lack of grassroots 
cooperation of the public, as well as the blurring of the officially prescribed loyalties 
of the parties. The evidence therefore suggests that, combined with the enormous 
physical and practical challenges of implementing the vetting process in post-war 
Brandenburg, grassroots responses were able somewhat affect how this policy was 
implemented on the ground. 
 
4.6 The sequestering and expropriation of property belonging to 
former National Socialists 
In order both to punish former adherents and carriers of the Third Reich as well as to 
facilitate the post-war transition from Nazism to socialism, alongside the various 
denazification attempts described above, the East German administration also 
endeavoured to sequester and expropriate private businesses and residential property 
which were deemed to be associated with the National Socialist regime.
132
 Much of 
the focus in the historical research on sequestering in the Eastern zone in the last 
twenty years has been on industrialists and large factories, with a particular emphasis 
on Saxony.
133
 Aside from top-down studies such as the assiduously researched work 
by Torsten Hartisch, which examines the process through the lens of the 
Brandenburg regional administration, little research has been conducted to date into 
sequestering and expropriations in urban areas in Brandenburg.
134
 This section 
therefore intends to contribute to the historical literature by examining the grassroots 
responses to this policy in Brandenburg as well as exploring whether these responses 
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had an effect on the manner in which sequestering and expropriation were 
implemented on the ground.  
The post-war East German administration adopted the definition of ‘fascism’ 
which had been coined by the Bulgarian ‘Comintern’ functionary Georgi Dimitroff 
in 1935, whereby ‘fascism’ was described as ‘the openly terrorizing dictatorship of 
the most reactionary, chauvinistic and imperial elements of finance capital’. As 
Andreas Dorpalen has argued, ‘fascism’ was thus seen as a phenomenon of the late 
phase of capitalism, by which that ‘historically obsolete and declining system seeks 
to preserve and strengthen its weakened rule’.135 Therefore, the land reform and the 
destruction of financial monopolies were to constitute a destruction of the foundation 
of capitalism.
136
 Consequently, in July 1945 the assets of East German banks and 
building societies were taken over, while in September 1945 the expropriation of 
landholdings over 100 hectares began under the populist slogan ‘Junkerland into 
farmland’.137 These changes were to have a lasting impact on rural social 
structures.
138
 
It appears that given that both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde were 
primarily urban areas, they remained relatively protected and removed from land 
reform and confiscation during the post-war period. Of the 1,773 estates over 100 
hectares in size which had been expropriated in the state of Brandenburg by October 
1947, only one was in Brandenburg/Havel, while in Fürstenwalde no large 
landholdings had been expropriated.
139
 Instead, the post-war sequestering and 
expropriating of private property and businesses of individuals who were deemed to 
have been Nazi and war criminals, which was carried out parallel to the larger scale 
land reform movement, played a more significant role in the urban centres of 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. Although this sequestration process, just like 
the land reform, also had its roots in the communist definitions of ‘fascism’, these 
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policies also constituted an attempt not merely to punish large capitalists and 
industrialists, but also to reduce the influence of local National Socialists at a 
grassroots level. 
Sequestering of National Socialists began in a sporadic manner at a local 
level almost immediately following the collapse of the Third Reich. Already in the 
early post-war months, first confiscations of private property belonging to adherents 
of the National Socialist movement were carried out in a non-systematic manner by 
local dismantling troops, antifascist committees and local governments across the 
state of Brandenburg, while in the summer of 1945 local self-governing bodies such 
as mayors and district administrators began to sequester businesses and private 
property, albeit without a legal basis.
140
 These developments reflected the power 
vacuum of the summer of 1945, when local authorities had wide latitude to exercise 
authority.
141
  
While the Allied Potsdam Conference was still deliberating on Germany’s 
future path, the mayor of Fürstenwalde, Wilhelm Zernicke, a former town councillor 
for the KPD, ordered on 27 July 1945 that all assets belonging to ‘leading and active 
National Socialists’ were to be confiscated and transferred to municipal ownership. 
He maintained that these actions were ‘carried by the wishes of wide circles of the 
population who desired retaliation and reparations for the hardship and misery which 
the National Socialist regime had brought upon the German people’.142 At this local 
level, direct personal hangovers from the Third Reich often played a significant role 
when it came to which private property was to be confiscated in these initial post-
war months. Denunciations as a result of the Fürstenwalde decree on 27 July 1945 
appeared to have been common, leading to a difficulty in differentiating between 
justified grievances and personal vendettas.
143
 This predominantly haphazard method 
of confiscation at a local level quickly led to waves of complaints which spread to a 
regional level. Already in August of 1945 the provincial administration in Potsdam 
was forced to deal with numerous written grievances concerning unlawful 
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sequestrations by local district administrators and mayors.
144
 In both 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, hundreds of petitions were filed which 
claimed wrongful expropriation of property and belongings in the immediate post-
war period.
145
 
These relatively chaotic circumstances required a formalisation of the 
sequestration and expropriation process, leading the SMAD to issue Orders no. 124 
and 126 on 30 and 31 October 1945 respectively. Order no. 124 focused on the 
confiscation of assets which had belonged to officials, members and influential 
supporters of the NSDAP and its organs, while Order no. 126 concentrated on the 
confiscation of Third Reich assets, as well as those belonging to associated 
organisations, agencies, companies, businesses and private individuals.
146
  
In a further attempt to co-ordinate and facilitate the sequestering and 
expropriation of former National Socialists, the SMAD announced the establishment 
of the ‘Central German Commission for Sequestering and Confiscation’ (ZDK) 
through Order no. 97 on 29 March 1946. The ZDK was the highest organ of the East 
German self-governing bodies in issues of sequestering and confiscation.
147
 In order 
to harmonise and integrate the disjointed activities of the numerous sequestering 
bodies, the ZDK convened a conference on 12 April 1946. It was agreed that the 
states and provinces would from here onwards forward all documents pertaining to 
the sequestering of businesses and other assets to the ZDK.
148
 Subsequently, in order 
to further strengthen the efforts of the ZDK, in early May 1946 the Lord Mayors and 
district administrators in Brandenburg were instructed to establish a ‘District 
Commission for Sequestering and Confiscation’ in every town and rural district. 
With the appointment of these district commissions and their brief to review all 
registered cases, it was intended that the mistakes which were made in the hectic 
work of the winter of 1945-46 should be eliminated.
149
  Moreover, Friederike Sattler 
has argued that these district commissions were also created in order to politicise the 
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decision making process.
150
 Despite central attempts to unify these developments, by 
the summer of 1946, problems with thoroughness and consistency in the 
expropriation process continued to persist across the state of Brandenburg and it was 
not uncommon for the Provincial Commission in Potsdam to examine 200 or 300 
cases per day, causing concern within the ZDK.
151
 
While this work of the provincial and district commissions in Brandenburg 
was only beginning in June 1946, preparations for a referendum in Saxony on 30 
June 1946, with the intention of legitimising and establishing public consensus for 
the ‘dispossession of war criminals and Nazis’, had already been well under way. 
Attempts were made to mobilise the population with slogans such as ‘War – never 
again. We want butter instead of canons, that’s why dear parents – vote yes!’152 The 
referendum was eventually passed with 77.6% of the yes vote and the outcome was 
officially celebrated by the SED leadership as a success. Yet Widera contends that 
internally the SED were especially concerned about the ‘lack of class consciousness’ 
among Saxons in particular, and East Germans more generally.
153
 Nevertheless, this 
result was in turn utilised as a legal basis for the continued expropriation of National 
Socialist property in the remaining East German states and provinces, despite the 
fact that no referenda were carried out there. 
The ZDK gradually made some inroads into co-ordinating regional 
sequestration and expropriation methods, yet even by 1947 the practical 
implementation of the SMAD orders continued to be fraught with difficulties. In 
January 1947 the ZDK in Berlin expressed concern that the wording of Order no. 
124 was not as concrete as the land reform laws, and for this reason ‘was more 
reliant on the political qualities of those executing the Order’.154 By October 1947, 
during an inspection of the sequestering process in the state of Brandenburg, it was 
noted by the ZDK that the sequestering department within the provincial government 
continued to produce ‘unsatisfactory organisational work’, as a result of ‘inadequate 
staff, both qualitatively and quantitatively’.155 Nevertheless, despite these internal 
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problems, the confiscation and sequestering of industries, businesses and residential 
properties in Brandenburg did proceed at a grassroots level, albeit not without some 
difficulties. These sequestrations and expropriations of factories and businesses were 
to have an impact in both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde given that both been 
important industrial armament centres and garrison towns before 1945.  
In Brandenburg/Havel, ‘Adam Opel AG’ had relocated their truck 
manufacturing plant to the town in 1935, while the ‘Arado’ aircraft factory had 
established important manufacturing plants here. The ‘Brennabor’ factory, which 
had produced baby carriages, bicycles, cars and motorbikes since the nineteenth 
century also began to manufacture grenades and gun carriages. Similarly, the large 
local steel-mill had aided in the production of aircraft bombs, while the ‘Jute’ 
spinning-mill had produced yarn for the Wehrmacht.
156
 As noted in chapter two, by 
late 1945 a significant number of the larger industries such as ‘Adam Opel AG’, 
‘Arado’ and the ‘Brennabor’ factory had already been dismantled by the Red 
Army.
157
 Between May 1946 and spring 1948 the links with National Socialism of 
the remaining industries and businesses which were still intact were examined by a 
local sequestering commission in Brandenburg/Havel. During these expropriation 
rulings, the local CDU and LDP representatives frequently abstained from voting or 
would vote against a specific expropriation altogether. Yet despite these 
interventions, on 12 February 1947 the local magistrate issued a list of companies 
intended for expropriation which included dozens of local businesses such as a toy 
manufacturing plant, building firms, furniture shops, cafes, restaurants, pharmacies, 
bakeries, a printing business, a shipyard and a concert hall.
158
  
Similarly, in Fürstenwalde industry and businesses were also significantly 
affected by the sequestering and expropriation campaign after the war. Here the main 
pre-1945 industrial base had been a subsidiary of the ‘Julius Pintsch’ company 
which had settled in Fürstenwalde in 1872, manufacturing light bulbs and gas meters 
and establishing it as an important industrial centre of the region. By the Second 
World War, ‘Pintsch’ and surrounding factories had employed roughly 12,000 
people, many of them forced labourers from the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen 
satellite camps. After the war, the dismantled ‘Pintsch’ factory, as well as local 
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chemical factories, a machine factory and other additional mills were placed under 
the ownership of the provincial government.
159
 Meanwhile, the remaining local 
factories and businesses in the town underwent a vetting process in which a 
sequestering commission was to evaluate links with the National Socialist regime. 
These included furniture factories and carpentry workshops, a printing business, 
restaurants, the ‘Schultheiss’ brewery, a metal-ware business, a stove factory, 
chemical plants and a timber mill.
160
 
The uncertainty these sequestrations created for the commercial middle-class 
at a grassroots level in Brandenburg was considerable.
161
 Local administrators 
frequently reacted by stepping in to defend businessmen, in an attempt to secure 
commercial stability within the community. For instance, former NSDAP member 
since 1935 Fritz H., the owner of a factory producing agricultural machinery as well 
as a small shipyard in Brandenburg/Havel, was threatened with the sequestering of 
his property in 1946. Not only did Fritz H. write a large number of complaints 
himself, but he also secured the support of the local district mayor Eichler, who 
submitted a statement defending Fritz H. claiming that he was:  
[…] happy to confirm that Herr H., already in the first days after the arrival 
of the Red Army, had supported the rebuilding process […] As we should be 
anxious to support all forces who are willing to advance forward, I would 
regret if Herr H. would be deprived of the opportunities to be active in 
Brandenburg/Havel commercial life and if it were no longer possible to 
continue to make use of his strengths.
162
  
Interventions such as these illustrate how local business and community interests 
sometimes appeared to supersede the importance of central punitive approaches to 
removing the economic legacy of the Third Reich. Moreover, a certain room for 
manoeuvre also appears to have existed for the expropriated business owners 
themselves, many of whom submitted complaints, either personally or through 
solicitors, to various administrative bodies. Another such complainant was the wife 
of a local hotel-owner in Brandenburg/Havel who, in May 1946, protested about the 
expropriation of the hotel, claiming that her husband had only been a nominal 
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member of the NSDAP and the hotel had never been a ‘Nazi haven or propaganda 
organ’.163  
Some of these complaints by business owners in Brandenburg/Havel appear 
to have enjoyed a limited success and in February 1947 the local sequestering 
commission in Brandenburg/Havel was forced to overturn a number of previous 
rulings. This included Erna B., who owned a textile business in Brandenburg/Havel, 
as well as Alfred E., the owner of a local tobacco shop.
164
 In addition, by early 1948 
the Cabinet of the Brandenburg government had reversed further previous rulings by 
local commissions.
165
 In fact, by March 1948, just over 20% of sequestered 
businesses had been returned to their former owners in Brandenburg/Havel by the 
state government.
166
 These developments illustrate similar trends to those which 
have been explored in relation to the implementation of Directive no. 24 earlier in 
this chapter. Not only does a preliminary comparison of local, regional and central 
archival material suggest the existence of discrepancies between local and regional 
judgements, they also imply that in certain cases the petitioning by some local 
business owners was able occasionally to enjoy some small success.  
A further comparison between the local, regional and federal archives in 
relation to both the denazification and sequestration of local business owners in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde uncovers a significant number of 
inconsistencies in the rulings of the local commissions. For instance, Karl G., the 
owner of a cabinetmaker’s shop in Fürstenwalde and member of the NSDAP from 
1934-45, appealed to both local and regional denazification commissions three times 
between early 1947 and February 1948, and was finally granted permission to 
continue working in a non-executive role in private enterprises. In contrast, the 
following month the sequestration commission of the Brandenburg state 
government, which functioned in a separate capacity, considered Karl G. to have 
been an influential supporter of the NSDAP and therefore permanently expropriated 
his business.
167
 Rulings such as this may be relatively unsurprising given the central 
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administration’s dual desire at this stage to both integrate the majority of the 
workforce on the one hand and gradually establish state control of the means of 
production on the other hand.  
Yet what is more remarkable is that the inverse trend of this is also apparent. 
For instance, Paul U., the owner of a clothes factory in Brandenburg/Havel and long-
time NSDAP member, had his trading license revoked by both the local and state 
denazification commissions in spring 1947, despite submitting a number of appeals 
and complaints.
168
 Yet in contrast, the files in the federal archives indicate that in 
October of the same year, although half of his factory’s output during the war had 
been for the Wehrmacht, Paul U.’s expropriated factory was returned to him by the 
state commission after a number of appeals.
169
 Similarly, the aforementioned Fritz H. 
was eventually found guilty of falling under Directive no. 24 by the local 
denazification commission, but concurrently was found not guilty by the regional 
sequestering commission and had at least his shipyard returned to him.
170
  
In some cases repeated appeals against both denazification and sequestration 
rulings appear to have been doubly successful as some local individuals managed to 
get both their jobs and their businesses back. For instance, NSDAP member Paul D., 
an optician in Brandenburg/Havel, separately had both his trading licence revoked 
and shop sequestered by the local denazification and sequestration commissions in 
the town in 1947, only to have both returned to him by the respective regional 
commissions by early 1948.
171
 Similarly, drugstore owner Paul L., a long-time 
NSDAP member from Brandenburg/Havel, was eventually permitted to continue 
working by the local denazification commission in March 1947 despite the 
defendant’s ‘strong NS attitude’. Yet whilst the federal archives indicate that Paul 
L.’s pharmacy had also been sequestered in the post-war period, it was returned to 
him by the Brandenburg state government in March 1948.
172
 Overall, across the state 
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of Brandenburg, out of the roughly 1,400 businesses which had been expropriated, 
573 were later returned to their original owners.
173
  
Whilst, as Thomas Widera has argued, ‘the German communists’ main aim 
was the transformation of the political system’ therefore ‘intending to 
instrumentalise political cleansing for their own aims’, this archival evidence 
suggests that in actuality these delineations were often not as clear-cut in post-war 
Brandenburg.
174
 These inconsistencies between local and regional sequestration 
bodies, as well as between denazification and sequestration commissions, also 
reflected the contemporary worries of the ZDK in October 1947, when they showed 
great concern that the district organisations in Brandenburg, with few exceptions, 
‘had not recognised the political purpose of Order no. 124’, which was to be 
‘particularly blamed’ on Brandenburg’s regional commission.175 These apparent 
limits of the Brandenburg regional commission to control the implementation of 
Order no. 124 as desired by the ZDK should be considered as a contributing factor in 
the ability of grassroots actors, in some cases quite successfully, to exert Eigensinn. 
Yet these examples from Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde are not necessarily 
representative of wider developments across the state, and a larger-scale comparison 
would need to be undertaken in order to assess the extent of these discrepant and 
‘non-political’ rulings across Brandenburg as well as in the Soviet sector more 
generally. Nonetheless, these preliminary archival findings suggest that due to 
variations in the interpretation and implementation of Soviet directives, the 
sequestering of businesses in Brandenburg may not have been as monolithic as 
previously assumed, resulting in a limited room for manoeuvre through repeated 
appeals and complaints which was utilised by businesses owners in Brandenburg in 
an attempt to moderate the impact of post-war policies on their livelihoods.  
Although some factory and business owners were able to negotiate a better 
deal for themselves with various commissions, a total of 71 businesses in 
Brandenburg/Havel remained permanently expropriated without compensation by 
May 1948.
176
 The memories of the oral history interviewees suggest that these 
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expropriations had an impact, not just on the businesspeople involved, but also on 
the wider locality as local traditions were seen to be lost and previous pillars of 
society slowly disappeared. Whilst this may have indeed been the case, this sense of 
destabilisation and loss may have been particularly pronounced for this young age 
cohort. Dr Edith Dorn from Brandenburg/Havel recalled that:  
We had a wool factory here and a shipyard, they don’t exist anymore, they 
were expropriated too. There had been big shops here, a department store, 
they were also expropriated and the family went to West Germany […] The 
man who owned that wool factory, he was said to have been a really decent 
man who really looked after his employees […] why should he not be 
allowed to continue to operate his business, especially because there was so 
much shortage.
177
  
This incomprehension at punishing local ‘decent’ business owners for Third Reich 
crimes was also reflected in a large number of other interviews from both towns. 
Moreover, some of the memories, such as those of Reinhold Rösner, were more 
personal. He recalled his impressions when his childhood friend’s family business, 
which had produced transmission and fan belts prior to 1945, was sequestered in 
Fürstenwalde:  
They took away their business and they weren’t given any compensation, as a 
result of which they had a very miserable existence [...] they didn’t get any 
financial support from the state [...] they ended up going to the West, around 
1950 [...] They had owned a large apartment, and I remember that they had 
had a big electric train set that ran through three rooms [...] That’s why they 
went to the West because they had no more money. The people were 
certainly not treated well.
178
  
This repeated mention of going ‘to the West’ points to the range of responses which 
were open to expropriated business owners beyond merely writing petitions and 
complaints, even before the authorities began to grow concerned about 
Republikflucht in the early 1950s. Furthermore, the evidence of the interviews 
suggests that these local business owners were perceived as victims of punitive 
measures rather than perpetrators accused of supporting the Nazis’ war efforts. 
Instead, such expropriations, naturally combined with other factors of post-war 
tumult, appeared to have contributed to memories of the de-stabilisation and 
disintegration of the social fabric which constituted local, traditional economic and 
social hierarchies. On the one hand, these memories appear to somewhat converge 
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with the archival material in emphasising a sense of victimhood at the supposed 
unfair expropriation of Brandenburg business owners. On the other hand, however, 
these memories also appear to diverge somewhat from the archival material, by 
perhaps painting a more negative picture by not acknowledging that in a significant 
proportion of cases commercial properties were indeed returned to their owners.  
In addition to the expropriation of commercial properties, the sequestering of 
residential property owners incriminated by their involvement with National 
Socialism also played a role in the post-war transition in Brandenburg. Numerous 
private property owners from Brandenburg/Havel appeared in front of the 
‘Provincial Commission for Sequestration’ in Potsdam throughout the spring and 
early summer of 1947, where frequently over half the properties were 
expropriated.
179
 In Fürstenwalde, similar confiscations under Order no. 124 also took 
place in the post-war period, and sittings of a local sequestering committee were held 
throughout 1946, where often more than half of the properties were also suggested 
for permanent expropriation.
180
 Given that by the summer of 1946, over 40% of 
residential buildings in Brandenburg towns remained uninhabitable, residential 
property was an important commodity in both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde 
and these attempts to economically punish individuals associated with the Third 
Reich did not go entirely uncontested.  
The Fürstenwalde town council received a stream of petitions throughout 
1946 and 1947 which often followed a similar pattern where former membership of 
the NSDAP was presented as being forced on the individual in question.
181
 
Similarly, the authorities also received a large number of petitions from expropriated 
residential property owners in Brandenburg/Havel. One such complainant was Fritz 
N., who, on 15 July 1947, challenged the expropriation of his house on the basis of 
his nominal NSDAP membership:  
If you don’t wish that I, my wife and my two sons lose our belief in justice, 
then you will only adjudicate in our case after you have considered the 
enclosed statement and have listened to witnesses who genuinely know me 
and my family.
182
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As with many other of these local petitions, the manner in which this complaint is 
expressed insinuates a strong sense of victimhood in the face of perceived arbitrary 
injustice by the sequestration commission.  
On 27 January 1948 the Brandenburg state government established 
centralised complaints offices within its ministries. It was intended that such a 
formalised complaints system would ‘firmly strengthen the trust’ of the population in 
the administration.
183
 By the following year, this complaints (or ‘Eingaben’) system 
had become embedded in Article 3 of the 1949 constitution.  Numerous ministries 
within the Brandenburg state administration were now instructed to deal with written 
complaints and monthly petition statistics were then to be sent to the Brandenburg 
SMA in Potsdam. The submission of petitions and complaints from the general 
public on sequestering and appropriations in the state of Brandenburg continued to 
be substantial, particularly throughout 1948 and 1949. Out of the 601 complaints 
received by the Minister President in the month of June 1949 alone, a large majority 
were to do with expropriations and the confiscation of motor vehicles, machines, 
materials, furniture, miscellaneous furnishings and foodstuffs.
184
  Likewise, the 
Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior received a constant stream of complaints over a 
quarter of which were to do with ‘confiscations of all types’, while the Brandenburg 
Ministries for Justice and for Employment and Social Affairs received a large 
number of petitions about forced evictions, rehousing and confiscations.
185
 
In a manner similar to the patterns of complaints which the Fürstenwalde 
town council received in 1946 and 1947, these petitions also provide evidence that 
the large majority of these NSDAP members presented themselves as politically 
passive throughout the Third Reich, in some cases even as victims of the National 
Socialist regime. This corresponds to Mary Fulbrook’s finding that such 
denazification proceedings tended to elicit narratives which emphasised a ‘lack of 
agency during the Third Reich’, and that individuals portrayed themselves as ‘having 
been forced to conform’.186 Similarly, many of these petitioners in Brandenburg 
attempted to persuade the reader of their own innocence on the one hand, as well as 
clearly distancing themselves from potentially politically incriminating relatives or 
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associates on the other hand. Some other petition writers adopted a judicial approach 
and penned repeated complaints in an effort to provide evidence that there was no 
legal basis for their expropriation.
187
 Moreover, it was not uncommon for individuals 
to exhibit tenacious resourcefulness and Eigensinn by complaining to local, district 
and regional sequestration commissions simultaneously.
188
 Arguably, by establishing 
centralised complaints offices within its ministries in January 1948, the Brandenburg 
state government was both recognising the high levels of dissatisfaction at punitive 
Soviet policies, while at the same time attempting to appropriate this sphere of action 
by closely monitoring developments in an effort to control how grassroots 
complaints were vented in Brandenburg society. 
The expropriation of residential property of those accused of active National 
Socialist involvement proved to be a persistently emotive political, economic and 
social issue and as a result not just private individuals but also political parties 
increasingly involved themselves in the process of petitioning both against, and in 
favour, of certain expropriations. From mid-1947, numerous party branches began to 
submit petitions on issues of expropriation and sequestering to the German 
Economic Commission (DWK) which had been established in June 1947 through 
SMAD Order no. 138.
189
 Particularly grassroots functionaries of the CDU and LPD 
protested to them in cases of perceived unfair expropriation, while the NDPD also 
sought to protect its members from sequestering, frequently intervening on their 
behalf.
190
  
Eventually, from 1948 onwards, the Brandenburg sequestering commission 
began the process of restitution of certain residential properties sequestered under 
Orders no. 124 and 126. As with the denazification rulings explored earlier in this 
chapter, these restitutions of residential property frequently caused tensions between 
local and regional authorities, where local knowledge of an incriminating political 
past was deemed insufficient to justify a decision to expropriate at a regional level.
191
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For instance, the restitution list included former NSDAP member Wilhelm L. from 
Fürstenwalde who had his property returned on appeal to the regional commission 
on the basis that previous local claims that he had taught neighbourhood children the 
Hitler salute were not considered by the regional Brandenburg commission to 
constitute ‘political activity’ but merely ‘friendliness’, illustrating the subjective 
political interpretations which were often at play in the expropriation process.
192
 
Moreover, unverifiable claims which had sufficed as a justification for expropriation 
at a local level were frequently later rejected as unsubstantiated by the regional 
commission, as was the case with Fürstenwalde resident Max M., whose property 
was returned after his appeal with the explanation that: ‘The allegation that back then 
Max M. was to have declared that he “would donate a Tonne of beer for every 
murdered communist” cannot be sustained’.193  
Similarly, other appeals lodged by complainants from Fürstenwalde had been 
brought in front of the State Commission in Potsdam throughout 1948, and although 
many were placed under permanent sequester, some private properties in 
Fürstenwalde were also returned by the regional commission during this period.
194
 
Effectively, 98 of the 238 residential properties associated with National Socialism, 
which had been confiscated by Fürstenwalde’s administration between 1945 and 
1946, were eventually returned to their original owners by early 1949.
195
 Likewise, 
the Brandenburg state government decided to return a number of private properties 
in Brandenburg/Havel in 1948.
196
  
Similar to the examples above, these developments not only highlight the 
sense of Eigensinn among some former adherents of National Socialism who 
actively (and sometimes successfully) complained and appealed against these 
punitive measures, but also serve to illustrate the opportunities and room for 
manoeuvre which the post-war chaos and lack of a consistent application of Order 
no. 124 provided, as well as how these limitations were exploited wherever possible. 
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Nonetheless, although the archival material provides evidence that expropriation was 
often carried out in a different manner than may have been intended, it must also be 
noted that there were surely many other individuals who either remained passive in 
this process and chose not to intervene, or absconded to the West without any 
protest, therefore not appearing in the historical record.  
In summary, the expropriation and sequestering of private property belonging 
to former National Socialists in the post-war period was not only designed as a form 
of punishment, but also intended by the central authorities to reduce the immediate 
economic, social and political influence of remnants of the Third Reich, thereby 
facilitating the transition from Nazism to socialism. However, initial confiscations 
through local initiatives were often considered illegal and haphazard and led to 
public complaints as early as summer 1945. The establishment of the ZDK in March 
1946 made some inroads into co-ordinating the expropriation process in 
Brandenburg; nonetheless, the persistence of structural impediments in the form of 
practical difficulties and physical shortages led to a lack of mobilisation amongst 
commissions, as well as notable inconsistencies in decision-making processes, 
especially between the local and regional commissions. Although 40% of 
expropriated businesses were later returned to their owners across Brandenburg, the 
oral history evidence suggests that the sequestering of the remaining businesses and 
industries may have caused a certain level of de-stabilisation for both the commercial 
middle-class and disruption to the traditional fabric of both Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde more generally.  
When it came to the expropriation of residential property, many of the 
petitioners emphasised their passivity in the Third Reich, despite their NSDAP 
membership, which tended to mirror the wider contemporary public opinion at the 
grassroots where many could not reconcile the punishment of the ‘small Nazis’ with 
the war and genocide committed by the ‘big Nazis’. This lack of comprehension is 
also reflected in the actions of some local party functionaries who frequently 
defended expropriated individuals in an effort to moderate the impact of this punitive 
Soviet policy on their own communities. Furthermore, preliminary comparisons 
between local and regional rulings illustrate the interplay between individual actions 
on the one hand, and structural weaknesses and limitations on the other hand; in turn, 
this dynamic frequently resulted in the dilution of the impact which this punitive 
policy had in post-war Brandenburg. Yet, although some of the impact of the 
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expropriation of businesses and residential properties could be somewhat moderated, 
ultimately SMAD Orders no. 124 and 126 appear to have had a significant effect on 
the social and economic fabric within local communities and played a considerable 
role in the post-war transition from Nazism to socialism in Brandenburg. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The East German administration’s efforts to remove the physical, political, economic 
and social legacy of the Third Reich in post-war Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde proved challenging, complex and in some instances even 
contradictory. The attempts to eliminate the immediate physical remnants and sites 
of memory of the Third Reich were met with some success in the public sphere, 
particularly by the early 1950s. Yet, as both the archival and oral history evidence 
suggests, permeation of the personal sphere often proved arduous. The 
implementation of the initial attempt at denazification of the workforce proved to be 
somewhat sporadic, while the second phase prematurely offered the prospect of 
economic integration to former National Socialists in return for political allegiance. 
The practical realisation of the third and fourth denazification phases illustrated not 
just the wide latitude of interpretation of Directive no. 24 and the impact which 
grassroots factors and practical issues could have on the implementation of the 
denazification process, but also the apathy and negative responses, not just in the 
local civilian population, but also of grassroots political functionaries in 
Brandenburg. The sequestering and expropriation process was plagued with similar 
challenges of shortcomings when it came to adjudication, while the de-stabilisation 
the policy created at a grassroots level served to mobilise a substantial number of 
individuals to express discontent at perceived injustices.  
The success of a notable proportion of individual complaints both against 
denazification and sequestering rulings in Brandenburg challenges Konrad 
Jarausch’s observation that denazification in the Soviet Occupation Zone was 
pursued in ‘disregard of the right to self-defence’.197 Whilst this self-defence may 
have been relatively haphazard, non-transparent and subjective until the 
Brandenburg state government established centralised complaints offices in January 
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1948, it nonetheless suggests that a certain room for manoeuvre, however restricted, 
was available to some individuals affected by the various denazification measures, 
thereby somewhat diluting the impact which at least this aspect of the post-war 
transition process had at a grassroots level in post-war Brandenburg. Nonetheless, 
the potential effect which grassroots challenges could have should not be overstated, 
and many thousands of individuals were affected by these punitive Soviet measures 
in these early years. All in all, by the time these policies were ended by the late 
1940s, many facets of grassroots Brandenburg communities had been radically 
altered. Once the main wave of this deconstruction had been completed, the path was 
now cleared for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the majority of the populace in 
order to ensure a successful transition from Nazism to socialism. It is this new phase 
which will now be explored in the second half of this thesis. 
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 Part 2: Grassroots responses within the context of 
rehabilitative measures in Brandenburg  
 
As has been shown in part one of this study, the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 
had resulted in a significant rupture for many in Brandenburg. Even for those who 
may not have been active supporters of National Socialism, the official political 
parameters nonetheless shifted rapidly and required some level of readjustment. It is 
these processes of reorientation, rehabilitation and (re)integration which will be 
addressed in the second half of this thesis by addressing the question of the extent to 
which grassroots Brandenburgers participated in political organisations which were 
designed to integrate East Germans in the wake of the previous punitive measures 
and what impact these responses may have had on the post-war transition. Chapter 
five will explore the manner in which former NSDAP members and soldiers in 
Brandenburg responded to political overtures by the National Democratic Party 
(NDPD) and chapter six will explore grassroots responses to the Society for German-
Soviet Friendship (DSF). Both the NDPD and the DSF had been expressly 
established to challenge previous National Socialist sentiments and aid in facilitating 
the political transition from ‘fascism’ to socialism. Finally, chapter seven will focus 
on factors which may have both impeded and facilitated the process of post-war 
transition for the oral history interviewees and other local Brandenburgers. In turn, 
part two of this thesis argues that the rehabilitative stage, despite some grassroots 
challenges, generally provided a favourable system for grassroots integration in 
which the needs of the policy makers and a significant proportion of grassroots 
individuals somewhat converged, eventually contributing to the partial stabilisation 
of the emerging East German socialist state. 
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Chapter V: Grassroots responses to the National 
Democratic Party (NDPD) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Within the bloc party system, the National Democratic Party (NDPD) was intended 
to act as an important facilitator in the process of political transition from National 
Socialism to socialism in post-war East Germany. Born directly out of the end of 
denazification in 1948, the National Democratic Party was officially established on 
16 June, as the SMAD and the SED attempted to get thousands of former nominal 
NSDAP members out of political isolation and integrate them back into society. 
While up until 1947 the reduction of the power of traditional elites had been at the 
centre of the administration’s policy, it now became important to integrate 
particularly the bourgeois and the petit-bourgeois groups within East German 
society, and the NDPD was therefore expected to act as a ‘safety net for 
denazification’, in order for the new state to succeed.1 Because the NSDAP, at least 
in the early years, was believed to have had strong support among the middle-class, 
and a significant proportion of those denazified came from this stratum in society, it 
was decided to establish a middle-class-party that would act as a political 
transmission-belt to the middle-classes as well as taking members and voters away 
from the other bourgeois parties.
2
 
Although the NDPD was the only party in East Germany which was 
established for, and expressly charged with, the integration of former National 
Socialists, soldiers and officers, this Party is under-researched in both German and 
English historiography. In an East German context, six dissertations occupied 
themselves to a greater and lesser extent with aspects of the NDPD throughout the 
GDR; however, all of these authors were functionaries or full-time employees of the 
Party.
3
 In the West German historiography, two dissertations were written by 
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Dietrich Staritz and Joseph Haas in the 1960s and 1980s respectively, while since 
reunification
 
only a smattering of texts have been published as part of anthologies.
4
 
Furthermore, the emphasis of research to date in this area has been on top-down 
political perspectives; the main aim of Staritz’s work was to examine how the NDPD 
contributed to the SED transmission system and to appraise the system of rule within 
the GDR, while Haas focused on mapping the development of NDPD politics within 
the space in which the SED allowed the Party to manoeuvre.
5
 Since the appearance 
of these theses however, a wealth of archival material has become available in the 
federal archives in Berlin which to date has been markedly under-utilised.  
Notwithstanding that this material contains much Party propaganda about its 
supposed successes, particularly when it comes to public congresses and pamphlets, 
these documents nonetheless provide a window into the conceptual and linguistic 
tenets used in the Party’s attempts at an efficacious political self-representation. The 
majority of internal Party reports from the early years, both at a regional and central 
level, are also surprisingly frank and self-critical of the Party’s problems and 
shortcomings, which can perhaps be explained by the desire to ameliorate difficulties 
so that the Party could successfully expand its support base. The archival material 
also permits an insight into the manner in which former NSDAP members and 
soldiers attempted to utilise the opportunities provided by the NDPD for personal 
advancement and gain as well as the grassroots responses to various political 
strategies.  
The following chapter examines the extent to which former NSDAP 
members and soldiers participated in the NDPD in Brandenburg. An examination of 
the NDPD can provide an insight into the attempts made by the East German 
administration to redefine the public political sphere and rehabilitate, reeducate and 
reintegrate former NSDAP members and soldiers at an institutional level as well as 
also acting as a window into some of the grassroots opinion and activity amongst its 
membership and the room for manoeuvre available to this specific target group. In 
                                                                                                                                          
Hoschke (Karl-Marx-Stadt, 1987). Bernd Gottberg, ‘Die Gründung und die ersten Jahre der NDPD 
1948-1954’, in ‘Bürgerliche’ Parteien in der SBZ/DDR: Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD 
und NDPD, ed. by Jürgen Frölich (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), 73-87 (pp.74, 85). 
4
 Staritz, Beitrag, and Josef Haas, Die National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD). 
Geschichte, Struktur und Funktion einer DDR-Blockpartei (Bamberg: Inaugural-Dissertation, 1987). 
There have also been briefer analyses with reference to other bloc parties, see, for example, Walter, 
Es ist Frühling and Gottberg, Gründung, pp. 73-87, which is written by a former NDPD member. 
5
 Haas, NDPD, p. 2. 
167 
 
general, the target group of the NDPD differed from the cohort of oral history 
interviewees, and instead expressly focused on NSDAP members and ‘former 
militarists’. This chapter thus illustrates the post-war political transition from a 
different perspective to that described by the oral history evidence in other chapters, 
and instead explores a microcosm of Brandenburg society which had arguably been 
the most active in the Third Reich as functionaries and carriers of the system. 
 
5.2 The founding of the NDPD 
The strategy of a ‘politics of alliance’, on which the bloc party system was based, 
had already been tested in a German context prior to 1945 with the establishment of 
the ‘National Committee for a Free Germany’ (NKFD) and the ‘League of German 
Officers’ (BDO) among German prisoners in Soviet POW camps in 1943. Although 
these organizations appeared to be spontaneous German ‘antifascist’ organizations, 
they were in fact tightly orchestrated by Russian communists and KPD exiles.
6
 
Within these organizations, POWs had undergone a closely controlled system of re-
education, with daily lessons which covered topics such as ‘The war is lost’ and 
‘Fundamental Questions on Socialism’.7 These organizations were also charged with 
undermining support for Hitler and the war at home and became active in antifascist, 
anti-war propaganda, which included printing newspapers and pamphlets with 
headlines such as ‘I have recognized the truth’, as well as broadcasting radio 
programmes which urged Germans to halt combat, having ‘nothing to fear’ from the 
Red Army.
8
 Yet interestingly, nationalist patriotic sentiment, which may have 
remained among many German POWs in these organizations, was to be partly 
placated with the concession that German officers in the camps were permitted to 
continue wearing their uniforms and medals, while the flag of the NKFD consisted 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion on the shifting image of the Russians in the NKFD and BDO see Paul Heider, ‘Zum 
Russlandbild im Nationalkomitee ‘Freies Deutschland’ und Bund Deutscher Offiziere’, in  Das 
Russlandbild im Dritten Reich, ed. by Hans Erich Volkmann (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1994). 
7
 BArch, SgY12/238/1/9, ‘Berichte, Briefe und Flugblätter des Frontbevollmächtigen Leutnant Kehler 
1944-45’, p. 3. 
8
 BArch, SgY12/238/1/5, ‘Flugblätter des NKFD an Offiziere und deutsche Soldaten 1944’, no pag. 
and BArch, SgY12/V238/3/101, ‘Nationalkomitee ‘Freies Deutschland : Sender Freies Deutschland- 
Tages-Verzeichnisse u. Manuskripte der Sendungen vom 26. April, 1945 bis 30. April 1945’, pp. 208-
209. 
168 
 
of the imperial colours black, white and red.
9
 Such political concessions illustrated 
how a number of ideological layers and strands could co-exist within such a hybrid 
organisation and demonstrates the latitude afforded to former higher officers in the 
Wehrmacht. 
Subsequent Cold War propaganda in both post-war German states later 
varied greatly in their portrayal of those POWs who decided to join the NKFD and 
BDO. The East German press highlighted the genuine disillusionment with Hitler 
and the war among many German soldiers after Stalingrad, while discourses in the 
West German Press tended to emphasise the POWs’ opportunistic nature, arguing 
that they were given better food and less manual labour than non-members.
10
 With 
this approach of ideological re-education and reintegration of former National 
Socialists, the communists had already established a successful precedent for their 
post-1945 treatment of the wider East German population. This experiment proved 
that a socially heterogeneous group, with reduced political freedoms, could 
formulate common goals and develop political programmes under the hegemony of a 
group of Communist Party functionaries.
11
 It was therefore this relatively successful 
‘politics of alliance’ of the ‘National Front’ which was to act as a blueprint for the 
political bloc system in post-war East Germany and specifically for the NDPD. 
While denazification in the Eastern zone was still in full swing, the SMAD, 
in a meeting with officers of the political department of the military administration 
of the provinces chaired by Colonel Sergej Tjulpanow, had already agreed on the 
establishment of a national-democratic party in late 1947. Subsequently, on 22 
March 1948, a new newspaper entitled the ‘National Zeitung’ appeared, which six 
months later became the press organ of the NDPD.
12
 By 16 June 1948, the SMAD 
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officially sanctioned the creation of the NDPD, and on 31 July 1948 the Party was 
entered into the Volksrat.
13
 In Brandenburg, the first public meeting of the NDPD 
took place in Brandenburg/Havel on 30 June 1948 and was organised by Dr Geissler, 
who would later become the chairman of the local party branch in the town. This was 
followed by the establishment of further district associations of the NDPD at a local 
level across the state of Brandenburg.
14
 
Sergej Tjulpanow emphasised in his 1986 memoirs that ‘it was necessary that 
this Party was to be led by a strong and experienced leadership who would be able to 
win the trust of its members, whose ‘democratic convictions’ still varied greatly’.15 
Therefore, Lothar Bolz, a former KPD émigré who had worked with the NKFD, was 
voted in as chairman.
16
 In the following months the make-up of the central 
committee and principal functionaries changed somewhat, as many of those NKFD 
officers who were still in the Soviet Union returned to Germany during the mass-
release of prisoners in the second half of 1948 and 1949, significantly strengthening 
its leadership as well as boosting membership numbers.
17
  
In fact, the entire NDPD Party leadership had some form of military 
experience, and the large majority of them had held positions of officers, or higher, 
in the Wehrmacht, illustrating the degree of political latitude available to some of 
those who were willing to undergo political conversion.
18
 For instance, in February 
1949 Vincenz Müller, a former Wehrmacht general and NKFD and BDO member, 
took over the position of party whip. He was to become extremely influential both in 
the NDPD and in other organs of state in the years to come. Similarly, at the first 
party conference in June 1949, Dr Otto Korfes was officially voted into the central 
committee of the NDPD, becoming chairman of the Brandenburg district association 
of the NDPD in Potsdam. Dr Korfes had been a Major General in the Wehrmacht 
who had been taken prisoner after Stalingrad and became a founding member of the 
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BDO and a member of the NKFD.
19
 This strong presence of former BDO and NKFD 
members played a significant role in helping to tightly orchestrate the actions of 
those in the Party’s higher echelons.  
The organisation structure of the NDPD was crowned by the Party Congress 
which was its highest organ and, in the early years, met annually. The rules and 
regulations of party politics were determined by the Party Council and together with 
the party whip, the Council was essentially in charge of the majority of decisions 
regarding the NDPD.
20
 Grassroots branches were established quite rapidly across the 
Eastern zone and regional and local meetings of NDPD members were to occur 
monthly.
21
 By November 1948 the NDPD office in Brandenburg/Havel had 
officially established itself in the Steinstraße, just 350 metres from the local Soviet 
war memorial, while the NDPD regional office for the district of Lebus had its 
provisional headquarters in the Clara-Zetkin-Straße in Seelow, 30 kilometres north- 
east of Fürstenwalde and was initially responsible for the town until its own branch 
was established a short time later.
22
  
 
5.3 The ‘practical politics’ of the NDPD 
As the NDPD had been founded specifically both to appeal to and reeducate former 
NSDAP members, soldiers, officers and the nationally-minded middle-classes, one 
of its most urgent tasks was to address some of the perceived inequities which were 
most affecting these groups in the post-denazification period after 1948. In its early 
years, the Party therefore committed a significant proportion of its resources to 
working with, and for, ordinary former nominal NSDAP members and soldiers on 
the ground by offering a combined form of political and professional rehabilitation. 
Throughout 1949 the NDPD sent recruiters to camps for POWs returning from the 
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Soviet Union in an effort to increase membership numbers within this group, 
attempting, for instance, to entice new members by offering free legal counsel to the 
men.
23
  
They also began to intervene actively at a grassroots level on behalf of 
individuals who had been removed from their previous jobs or whose property had 
been sequestered. For instance, in April 1949 the political director of the NDPD in 
Brandenburg sent a list of petitions of former NSDAP members from across the 
region to the central committee of the NDPD in Berlin. Many of these individuals 
had been long-time members of the NSDAP, having joined the party before 1933. 
Yet the Brandenburg NDPD justified the proposed (re)integration into their previous 
posts and professions with phrases such as ‘this individual enjoys a lot of respect in 
his community’, or that ‘they would be better able to contribute to the community if 
they could once again practice their old profession’.24 Claimed achievements by 
local Brandenburg branches of the NDPD in assisting in the reinstatement of a 
significant number of former NSDAP members in their jobs were heralded at the 
first Brandenburg Party Conference in June 1949.
25
 Similar events were also 
occurring in the other East German provinces and the archival evidence suggests that 
regional NDPD branches across the Soviet zone had considerable successes in 
preventing and reversing job-losses and sequestering the property of National 
Socialists throughout late 1948 and early 1949, priding themselves in their 
successful ‘practical politics’, which enabled members of the target group to be 
reintegrated into their communities.
26
  
By early 1950 the NDPD in Brandenburg were continuing to assist their local 
members in finding employment in the wake of denazification as well as aiding them 
to regain possession of sequestered homes.
27
 When the regional Party conference of 
the NDPD in Brandenburg took place in May 1950 it was attended by delegates both 
from Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, including some who, only two years 
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previously, had stood on local denazification lists.
28
 Such instances illustrate the 
tandem advantages for both former NSDAP members and the NDPD in this 
arrangement. Former National Socialists were offered the possibility of 
(re)integration and social advancement, whilst the NDPD benefitted by being given 
the potential opportunity to politically instrumentalise their new recruits. 
The eagerness with which this form of political redemption and the 
possibility of economic and social (re)integration was greeted among this subsection 
of society is also evidenced by the significant number of letters and petitions which 
were posted either directly to the NDPD or the SMAD by former NSDAP members 
and soldiers in both Brandenburg and the Soviet sector, in an attempt to win back 
their homes and their livelihoods. Many of these letters were relatively long and 
tended to follow a similar pattern. The individual usually highlighted the perceived 
injustice which had been committed against them, the hard-working nature of the 
individual and their family and the former political history of the individual, 
commonly containing such caveats as ‘I held no post in the NSDAP or SA’. If a post 
was held, it was usually qualified with arguments such as ‘this post was extremely 
unimportant’ or ‘I didn’t get a higher promotion because the NSDAP or SA saw me 
as politically unreliable’. Furthermore, such letters also often contained references 
such as ‘I was always against the war with the Soviet Union’. One such letter from a 
former SA member in Kleinmachnow, on the southern border of Berlin some fifty 
kilometres from Brandenburg/Havel, went as far as to state: ‘It is widely known that 
the SA, in contrast to the SS, consisted of large numbers of people who were 
consciously against the anti-Soviet politics of the NSDAP [...] I in fact belong to the 
so-called circle of ‘pro-Bolshevists’.29 Many authors then concluded these appeals 
by emphasizing how active they had been in the local NDPD and in the rebuilding of 
Germany more generally.  
Such grassroots responses from Brandenburg tell us much about the 
normative rules adopted by the petitioners as well as the manner in which they 
attempted to present themselves, tending to fall into the three categories of self-
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representation after 1945 identified by Mary Fulbrook: claimed conversion from 
‘fascism to antifascism’, claimed consistency that ‘one had always been privately 
against the Nazis’, or thirdly the continued implicit or explicit clinging to tenets of 
National Socialism. Fulbrook maintains that ‘vestiges of Nazism were often difficult 
to eradicate entirely and narratives can be found which combine all three 
strategies’.30 Similarly, the archival evidence suggests that NDPD strategies 
condoned and offered a form of political conversion by emphasising and reinforcing 
a lack of personal Eigensinn and responsibility during the Third Reich in return for 
membership, support and a new-found agency to ‘do the right thing’ in the present.  
Whilst these strategies were complemented with active campaigns to expand 
the Party’s base at the grassroots level, initial growth was nonetheless sluggish. By 
the end of August 1948, ten weeks after the establishment of the Party, the NDPD 
had only 80 members in the state of Brandenburg – 32 of these were in 
Brandenburg/Havel and none were in Fürstenwalde’s district of Lebus.31 A month 
later the NDPD had increased to 187 members in the state of Brandenburg – 32 of 
these were still in Brandenburg/Havel, while 8 were now in Lebus.
32
 By October 
1948 the Party had grown to a mere 279 members in the state of Brandenburg out of 
a total of 1,376 across the Soviet sector.
33
  
Nevertheless, grassroots campaigns to attract local members continued, and 
at the first Brandenburg Party Conference the following year, it was proudly 
announced that between June 1948 and May 1949, 122 public NDPD meetings had 
been carried out across the region, attracting, it was claimed, ‘many thousands’ of 
listeners.
34
 This pressure to expand continued, and at the NDPD Party Conference 
the following month it was announced that there was to be ‘no town without a local 
NDPD branch’.35 This push for the creation of local branches was twinned with an 
attempt to expand existing ones. Subsequently, two large public meetings were held 
in Brandenburg/Havel – one on 27 July 1949 and the second on 19 October 1949 – 
attracting 450 attendees; here discussions were dominated by issues surrounding the 
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fate of former National Socialists.
36
 Yet by September 1949, fourteen months after 
the establishment of the Party, the American paper in Berlin ‘Die Neue Zeitung’ 
reported that the NDPD had attracted merely 16,900 members in the Eastern zone, 
2,800 of whom were living in Brandenburg.
37
  
The archival evidence suggests that suspicion and scepticism about the true 
intentions and purpose of the NDPD remained at a grassroots level. For instance, in 
early 1950 the local NDPD branch in Müllrose, 30 kilometres from Fürstenwalde, 
was dealing with the accusation by local members that the NDPD was merely a tool 
with which to entice people out of their hideouts, only to ‘lock them away at the 
right moment’.38 Such reports provide an insight into the challenges in establishing 
credibility which the Party faced amongst the populace at a local level in 
Brandenburg. It would only be from late 1949 onward, after the creation of the GDR 
state and some legislative successes, that the Party would increasingly gain the trust 
of former NSDAP members and soldiers and gradually expand. 
 
5.4 Political conversion in the NDPD 
Although the NDPD were slowly beginning to attract new members, this did not 
necessarily mean that Nazi ideology had disappeared amongst the East Germans who 
did choose to join. Dietrich Staritz maintains that because the NDPD offered 
rehabilitation to former nominal NSDAP members, soldiers and members of the 
bourgeoisie, as well as the opportunity of resuming an interrupted career-path, or 
beginning a new one, this often led to opportunistic behaviour, but not necessarily to 
a fundamental change of consciousness or outlook.
39
 The archival evidence also 
suggests that the complex political and ideological transition of former NSDAP 
members and soldiers was often heavily burdened by the legacy of their National 
Socialist past.  
In Brandenburg, at the first regional Party Conference in June 1949, a speech 
by local Party member Hans L. acknowledged that the fact that many Party members 
had once belonged to the NSDAP resulted in certain difficulties, especially with 
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respect to ‘the overcoming of the National Socialist ideology’. ‘I know from 
personal experiences’, he confessed, ‘I myself was an NSDAP member, how 
difficult it is to throw the entire ballast of the past overboard’.40 Similarly, an article 
in the ‘National Zeitung’ admitted in January 1949 that ‘no one can claim that the 
National Socialist ideology promptly disappeared with German capitulation on 8 
May 1945 […] even today many Germans still believe in the National Socialist body 
of thought’.41 Therefore, if the NDPD was to transform their arrangement with 
former National Socialists and soldiers into an engagement with the new societal 
order, the NDPD leadership not only had to attempt to break down vestiges of the 
National Socialist ideology and ‘middle-class attitudes’, they also had to help these 
people overcome their views and encourage the conscious recognition of the new 
status quo.
42
 This new status quo was naturally determined by the SED and the 
Soviet occupying forces. Therefore, the NDPD had to walk a difficult political 
tightrope between placating former members of the NSDAP on the one hand, and yet 
still obediently toeing the political line of both the Soviet occupation forces and the 
SED on the other hand.  
In order to help the Party overcome this political challenge of ideological 
transition and reorientation, they established a systematic ideological re-training 
programme for functionaries and members. This re-education of former NSDAP 
members, soldiers and officers in favour of the new political circumstances was to be 
based on the principle of the NKFD schools before 1945. On 28 March 1949 the 
‘School for National Politics’ was opened in Buckow, near Berlin. The following 
year, five additional provincial party schools were opened, including one in 
Brandenburg.
43
 These were designed to strengthen the organizational structure of the 
Party, especially at a grassroots level.  
Much of the curriculum attempted to engage with the National Socialist 
‘Lebensraum’ concept, which had once again become an immediate issue after the 
permanent establishment of the Oder-Neisse border through the Görlitzer Agreement 
on 6 July 1950.
44
 Moreover, based on a relatively realistic assessment by the Soviet 
administration as to the continued high levels of anti-Soviet sentiment among sectors 
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of East German society, they also embarked on a systematic re-education offensive 
in order to combat the ‘legend’ of the ‘danger from the East’.45 A large proportion of 
the curriculum therefore continued to focus on East Germany’s relationship to the 
Soviet Union, covering subjects such as ‘the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and 
their struggle for peace’. It was also expanded to address middle-class 
preoccupations with culture and education in particular, including subjects which 
dealt with Russian art, science, sport, health-care and architecture.
46
 All the same, 
internal NDPD reports indicate that it was these particular aspects of the curriculum 
which often encountered the most resistance among students in the party schools 
across the provinces, highlighting the deep-rooted scepticism at political reform of a 
substantial number of NDPD students at the grassroots level.
47
 Nonetheless, the 
regional party schools were expanded into the local level and in April 1952 the 
NDPD in Brandenburg/Havel opened a district party school, while Fürstenwalde was 
to receive a similar school a short time later.
48
 By mid-1953, 8,000 members had 
graduated from one of these Party schools, suggesting that the NDPD had some 
successes in their attempts to spread their message and to train cadres at a local level. 
However, the archival evidence also suggests that the Party had some difficulties in 
enforcing their new doctrines amongst grassroots members. 
Beyond the Party’s school system for its existing members, the NDPD also 
continued their drive for popularity and growth in Brandenburg as well as across the 
Eastern sector. In order to achieve this they had to invest great energy into 
harnessing potentially dangerous political sentiments and utilising them for their 
own ends. It was for this reason that the NDPD was particularly keen to redefine and 
re-use key tenets of National Socialist ideology on nationalism and national identity 
and make them usable in the post-war present. Fulbrook maintains that ‘a sense of 
acceptable national identity is usually constructed, in part, by singing tales of heroes 
and martyrs’. Yet, she argues, ‘to do this in Germany after Hitler was an 
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extraordinarily complex matter, beset with potential pitfalls and sensitivities’.49 
Nonetheless, the NDPD aimed to recycle National Socialist sentiments in order to 
reach out to potential members at a grassroots level. The emblem of the NDPD 
consisted of three oak leaves, thus directly tapping into the long-running symbolism 
of an oak leaf being used to represent German militarism and nationalism. The image 
of oak leaves had previously been used on German iron cross decorations, as well as 
later also appearing in a different form on the caps of the East German National 
People’s Army (NVA).50  
The NDPD did not merely employ nationalist symbols, they also constantly 
modified their concept of ‘national’ in order to utilise these sentiments for a larger 
political purpose. In Brandenburg, at the first NDPD meeting in Potsdam in 
September 1948, Lothar Bolz called upon the Party to ensure that ‘national’ was at 
the core of all of NDPD politics in order to overcome other differences such as 
professional standing or one’s own ‘world view’ (Weltanschauung).51 Such 
statements explicitly acknowledged the continued prevalence of nationalist 
sentiments in the Soviet sector three years after the collapse of the Third Reich. 
Similarly, in a 1948 pamphlet, the NDPD voiced its support for the ‘healthy 
nationalist forces’ within East Germany and advocated a ‘politics of true 
nationalism’ which every ‘true German’ should follow.52 This reference to the notion 
of ‘healthy’ suggests that adherents to Nazism would now be considered to be cured 
and thus rehabilitated, if only they were to invest their ‘nationalist’ energies into the 
rebuilding of the new Germany.   
In a speech in June 1949 the party whip, Vincenz Müller, went so far as to 
declare that: ‘we are not afraid to use the word ‘national’ with pride, and return 
honour to the word in a new political context. For us ‘national’ means the bringing 
together of all Germans to represent our rightful ‘Lebensinteressen’’.53 It appears 
astonishing that such references to exclusionary National Socialist notions of the 
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‘Germans’ and linguistic allusions to concepts such as ‘Lebensraum’ could be used 
so publicly in order to entice former NSDAP members and soldiers into the Party. 
Nevertheless, the NDPD also attempted to circumvent direct references to the Third 
Reich by frequently emphasizing a German heritage which was instead viewed as 
being rooted in the period of the wars of independence.
54
 Yet in their attempt at 
instrumentalising these tenets of National Socialist ideology in order to appeal to 
elements within the Brandenburg as well as the East German public, the NDPD not 
only invariably reproduced a new hybrid form of nationalism, they also created a 
space within which former adherents of the NSDAP could achieve political 
rehabilitation without necessarily fundamentally changing their entire belief system.  
The latitude created by the Party for redefining acceptable nationalist 
sentiments nevertheless had its limits. When numerous individual and group 
initiatives by NDPD members, both in Brandenburg and across the Soviet sector, 
attempted to stretch the concept of national identity and pride in order to challenge 
taboos surrounding the commemoration of German war dead, they received meagre 
support from the Party echelons and the issue was increasingly side-lined from the 
public political sphere.
55
 In this manner, it would appear that NDPD members were 
subject to the same official restrictions against commemorating German war dead as 
the local community members explored in chapter two. 
 
5.5 The NDPD and the German-Soviet dynamic  
Given the contested victimhood which existed between East Germans and Soviets in 
post-war discourses, especially at a grassroots level, the thorny area of German-
Soviet relations was to prove the most challenging to the NDPD leadership. In order 
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to promote political transition for their members in the late 1940s, the treatment of 
German-Soviet relations had initially emphasised resigned and pragmatic rhetoric. In 
September 1948 a speech by the Chair of the NDPD, Lothar Bolz, had maintained 
that:  
Our relationship with the Soviet Union is neither based on common political 
or economic doctrines, nor on shared social or philosophical doctrines […] 
One can have as many differing opinions on the Soviet Union as one likes, 
but […] we must not forget that the Soviet border is much closer to us than 
the American continent.
56
  
With this early interpretation of the German relationship to the Soviet Union in 
1948, the Party leadership had soberly attempted to justify their stance. Yet by the 
early 1950s, the language of the NDPD on this issue had transcended into more 
emotive political rhetoric and the NDPD now attempted to emphasise the historical 
connectedness between the two states and legitimise their pro-Soviet stance by 
evoking the coalition victories during the Napoleonic Wars as well as Bismarck’s 
strategic alliance system during the second German empire. 
One is trying to scare you with Russia. One is therefore trying to scare you 
with politics that led to the national liberation of our German people between 
1813 and 1815; with a politics which Bismarck himself recognised was 
essential to both his diplomacy and the Reich.
57
  
Nonetheless, anti-Soviet sentiment continued to remain an important challenge to the 
National Democratic leadership in their attempt at political re-education of their own 
members.  
A significant number of NDPD members actively chose to reject these 
aspects of the Party’s political revisionism. For instance, in February 1950, in the 
northern Brandenburg town of Wittenberge, two NDPD members, both men over 
seventy years of age, had left the Party because they ‘could not reconcile themselves’ 
with the Party’s pro-Soviet language. Despite visits by local NDPD functionaries, 
the two men refused to reverse their decision.
58
 In August 1951 at a main committee 
meeting of the NDPD, Vincenz Müller reported of a case from Malchin in 
Mecklenburg, 60 km from the border of Brandenburg in which a local NDPD 
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member refused to stand guard at a local Soviet memorial. This, he claimed, created 
tension between the local NDPD and SED chapters in the small town. The SED 
demanded not only that the party withdraw his membership, but also ensured that the 
gentleman was fired from his job in the local Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB). The 
situation was further exacerbated when an SED member of the district council in the 
region insisted, as a result of this incident, that all members of the NDPD would be 
removed from employment in the VEB.
59
 It is unlikely that such a blanket dismissal 
of local NDPD members actually came to pass; nonetheless it highlights not only 
that anti-Soviet sentiments amongst NDPD members at a local level could have a 
potentially damaging effect at a wider level, but also exemplifies some of the 
resulting local tension and in-fighting between the NDPD and SED at a grassroots 
level. 
Grassroots challenges to the new political status quo could also take the form 
of group protest among local Party members in Brandenburg. For instance, on 28 
February 1950, 154 NDPD members in Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt 
issued a joint statement in which they complained that they had joined the NDPD 
with the expectation that it would remain loyal to its founding edicts, particularly 
that it would remain anti-Marxist and anti-communist. They threatened that they 
would do everything in their power to dissuade other former NSDAP members from 
joining the Party.
60
 This ambivalent attitude towards the Soviets was also reflected in 
membership figures of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) which in 
some areas was often as low as 10% among National Democrats in Brandenburg.
61
 
Even by 1951 the local NDPD branch in Brandenburg/Havel reported to the central 
political director in Berlin that its local members were behaving ‘passively’ towards 
the DSF and needed to be ‘steered’ in the right direction.62 
As noted above, the ratification of the Oder-Neisse border in July 1950 also 
developed as a contentious issue for the NDPD. Particularly in Brandenburg towns 
and villages which had been directly physically affected by the re-drawing of the 
new border, the Brandenburg NDPD showed great concern that ‘reactionary’ 
elements within local populations who protested against the border remained a 
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constant problem.
63
 Active attempts were made by the Party to garner understanding 
and support for the issue across Brandenburg. In March 1951 the local branch of the 
NDPD in Fürstenwalde organised a public parish meeting entitled ‘German-Polish 
Friendship’.64 Similarly, during the preparations for the month of German-Soviet 
friendship in 1951 in Brandenburg/Havel, the local NDP branch instructed all of its 
members not only to participate in DSF events, but also, for those who owned 
businesses and shops, to decorate their shop windows in a manner which ‘celebrated 
German-Soviet friendship’.65 Notwithstanding these attempts, grassroots sentiment 
appears to have remained predominantly negative, affecting the Party at a local level; 
during the preparation for the second Party conference of the Brandenburg NDPD, 
when local district conferences took place in all 27 municipalities in Brandenburg, 
strong concern was expressed by the organisers that a lack of acceptance of the 
Oder-Neisse border as a ‘border of peace’ was causing difficulties and leading to 
extreme negativity in the local Party discussions.
66
 
Reluctance amongst some NDPD members to accept the Party’s pro-Soviet 
rhetoric was also evident in other spheres. POWs who had joined the ‘National 
Committee for a free Germany’ (NKFD) were still considered by some within the 
NDPD to have been ‘traitors’ who had supported the Soviet ‘enemy’. Particularly the 
chairman of the Brandenburg NDPD, Dr Otto Korfes, who had been active in the 
BDO and NKFD, remained a controversial figure for the NDPD in this regard. By 
the summer of 1949, party whip Vincenz Müller expressed concern about a number 
of Dr Korfes’ speeches, in which it was felt that ‘he sometimes goes too far in his 
statements about the Soviet Union, to the point that our members and other listeners 
cannot sympathise with him’. Müller instead instructed Dr Korfes that from now on 
he should keep to the NDPD Party literature which advocated a ‘sober policy’ 
towards the Soviet Union, as this slower, earnest approach was said to be ‘the first 
step which the majority of our members and friends need to take’ in order to be 
convinced of the pro-Soviet policy of the NDPD. He also cautioned Dr Korfes not to 
mention the NKFD, as the issue was still received by many with ‘suspicion and 
mistrust’.67 Such internal self-censorship about a pro-Soviet organisation such as the 
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NKFD, within the Brandenburg NDPD, provides evidence that the transition of anti-
Soviet NSDAP member to pro-Soviet NDPD member tended to be, at least initially, 
an ambivalent process for many individuals, forcing the Party into somewhat 
moderating its political rhetoric to the desires of its membership as it tried to affect 
and appropriate them. As a consequence, the attempts by the NDPD to water down 
their pro-Soviet stance when addressing their wider target group at local and regional 
meetings illustrates the existence of a considerable reticence to publicly revise 
certain tenets of the anti-Soviet ideology of the Third Reich. 
 
5.6 Growth of the NDPD in Brandenburg 
Despite such internal party problems at a grassroots level, the NDPD could also 
boast some early successes. One of the most urgent early tasks of the NDPD 
included the call for the complete political and economic equality of all former 
nominal NSDAP members and soldiers and the abolition of continued discrimination 
against this group. This was a vital element of public support for the Party, and along 
with their grassroots rehabilitation of local former NSDAP members, was a central 
cornerstone of their raison d’être, especially in the early years, and therefore required 
careful preparation by the Party. When on 11 November 1949, just over a month 
after the official founding of the GDR state, a first equality law restoring both active 
and passive voting rights to former nominal NSDAP members and officers was 
finally passed, the NDPD claimed this as its own victory.
68
 This was a huge public 
boost to the Party as it could now legitimately claim to portray itself as truly 
representing the interests of former National Socialists. This success in turn became 
the basis of much of the Party’s propaganda in the years which followed and at the 
third regional party conference of the Brandenburg NDPD, its president Dr O. 
Koltzenburg proudly announced that former NSDAP members who had joined the 
NDPD in Brandenburg had risen to become mayors, ministers and even members of 
parliament.
69
  
With the establishment of the GDR and the passing of this legislation, 
membership numbers also finally began to increase. Between 21 December 1949 and 
20 January 1950 the membership across Brandenburg grew from 4,503 to 5,018 and 
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the number of local branches in the region increased from 190 to 202.
70
 In 
Brandenburg/Havel the NDPD had 187 members in January 1950, while 
Fürstenwalde’s district of Lebus had 250 members.71 This was out of a total of 
35,128 members across the GDR in February 1950.
72
 By this stage the NDPD in 
Brandenburg/Havel had managed to establish Party representatives in the district 
administration, in the local structural engineering office, the local communal 
enterprise and the tractor factory.
73
 Yet in reality, not all of these members were 
politically active within the Party. For instance, between 31 March 1950 and 5 April 
1950, 27 district party meetings were held by the NDPD across Brandenburg; 
however, in Brandenburg/Havel only 50% of the members attended, while in the 
district of Lebus merely 20% of members turned up.
74
 Similarly, between 20 April 
and 20 May 1950, the NDPD carried out 288 members’ meetings with 2,649 
participants across the state of Brandenburg – an average of fewer than ten members 
per meeting.
75
 Nonetheless, by July 1950, Brandenburg’s NDPD had grown to 293 
local branches with 7,539 members, of whom still only 8% were simultaneously 
members of the DSF.
76
 In the same month, Brandenburg/Havel had 250 members, 
while in Fürstenwalde there were now 139 members of the NDPD.
77
 By October 
1950, Brandenburg’s NDPD membership increased to 9,041, distributed across 397 
local branches.
78
 In Brandenburg/Havel membership numbers had risen to 282, and 
in Fürstenwalde they gradually increased to 202, while across the GDR membership 
had grown to 71,437 in January 1951.
79
  
The archival material indicates that internally the Party was dissatisfied with 
the standard of its grassroots network and political activity amongst its members in 
Brandenburg. In March 1951 the local NDPD branch in Brandenburg/Havel 
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admitted to the central political director in Berlin that although membership in the 
town had risen by 11% the previous month, an average of only 20 to 30% appeared 
at local members’ meetings, while the turn out for the monthly study evenings was 
even lower, with one recent one being cancelled because only one speaker had 
showed up.
80
 Meanwhile, in Fürstenwalde that same month the report-writing was 
somewhat less forthright, as here the local NDPD branch justified its failure to meet 
membership targets by claiming that although the local population of the town was 
said not to be ‘adverse’ to the NDPD, only ‘a few’ were taking the decision of 
actually becoming members.
81
 In fact, by spring 1951, with the exception of 
Prenzlau, none of the local NDPD branches across the state of Brandenburg had 
succeeded in reaching their internal targets for membership increases.
82
 Nonetheless, 
the NDPD across the state of Brandenburg could report a modest growth to 12,693 
by spring 1951, and in order to continue to improve the presence of the Party at a 
grassroots level, the newspaper ‘Brandenburgische Neueste Nachrichten: Das Blatt 
des Landesverbandes Brandenburg der National-Demokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands’ began to appear across the region that same year.83 
Despite these attempts to convince their target group of their form of political 
revisionism, the NDPD still had problems converting their own members. The 
regional chairman of the NDPD in the state of Brandenburg complained to the 
central political director in spring 1951 that some of the Party’s representatives at a 
local level were still lacking the ‘necessary political clarity’ to convince reluctant 
members of the public of the validity of the new political system in the GDR.
84
 And, 
notwithstanding the attempts to popularise the Party in the region, an internal report 
examining the progress of the NDPD in the state of Brandenburg in November 1951 
noted that membership growth across the region was below the average of the other 
GDR states, where the total membership had reached 101,846 by December 1951.
85
  
Despite the unwillingness of the Brandenburg public to join the Party in their 
masses, grassroots activity amongst some of its members continued in the region, 
and by the early 1950s, the NDPD had become more firmly established in local 
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administrative organs, with members gaining seats as city councillors in 
Brandenburg/Havel.
86
 Similarly, when the NDPD in Brandenburg held their annual 
conference in Potsdam on the 18-19 April 1952, it was once again attended by 
delegates from both Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde.
87
 Moreover, local NDPD 
business also increasingly involved close public co-operation with the SED. The 
NDPD district party conference which took place in Brandenburg/Havel later that 
same month was attended by the district head of the SED and the SED Lord Mayor 
of Brandenburg/Havel Otto Kühne, while at a similar district party conference in 
Fürstenwalde the following day the respective district party secretary of the SED was 
also present.
88
 This presence of prominent local SED functionaries at these events in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde reflect the increasing role of the NDPD as a 
‘transmission belt’ for the will of the SED, in which it was intended that strategies or 
tactics of the SED could, in principle, be conveyed to every stratum and group within 
the NDPD.  
Attempts to package socialism in a more attractive manner to its 
predominantly middle-class followers were intensified after 12 July 1952 when the 
second Party conference of the SED decided on the ‘Building of socialism’, 
beginning a new phase of socio-economic transformation in the GDR. In an NDPD 
Party congress two months later, it was proclaimed that: ‘we need to make it clear to 
the populace that socialism has nothing to do with uniformity, or joylessness, or a 
drab existence – not even with equal pay’.89 Despite these NDPD attempts at 
explicitly mobilising their members for socialism from the summer of 1952 onward, 
it is difficult to assess what proportion of former National Socialists and soldiers in 
the Party in Brandenburg genuinely experienced a thorough political conversion. The 
archival evidence from Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde suggests that once 
local NDPD members had achieved their goals at political and economic 
reintegration, their participation rates in the Party’s daily activities on the ground 
also dropped substantially. This indicates that a significant proportion of members 
merely had a functional relationship to the Party, implying that many members were 
not necessarily convinced by its revisionist doctrine, but instead took advantage of 
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the room for manoeuvre which NDPD membership afforded them, and utilised the 
Party as a stepping-stone to achieving their own personal objectives.  
The first legislative success in 1949 was to be followed less than three years 
later by a second, which further widened the room for manoeuvre within the new 
political system for former adherents of National Socialism in Brandenburg. On 25 
June 1952 the NDPD passed a proposal to the government which concerned the 
complete abolition of discrimination against individuals who had been given more 
extensive rights in 1949. In an article in the ‘National Zeitung’ on 9 July 1952, the 
NDPD publicly justified their stance, arguing that ‘Germany now needs Germans, 
who will stand honestly beside their people. What is now important and decisive, is 
not that which a German once was, but instead what a German can or would do for 
Germany today’.90 On 2 October 1952, the Volkskammer eventually passed the ‘Law 
on the Civic Rights of Former Officers of the Fascist Army and Former Followers 
and Members of the Nazi Party’. Paragraph 1 of the law stated that all restrictions 
would now be lifted, with the exception of sentenced Nazi activists and those guilty 
of war-crimes.
91
 As a consequence, these legislative measures served to bestow the 
opportunity for acts of Eigensinn on disenfranchised former NSDAP members, in 
return for at least external political fidelity enabling them to integrate fully into 
political, economic and social life in Brandenburg. The NDPD utilised the adoption 
of this law as the basis of an extensive propaganda campaign and consequently 
membership numbers rose sharply. By 1954 membership had expanded to 172,000, 
overtaking the membership numbers of the CDU, LDPD and the DBD, making it the 
second largest Party in the GDR after the SED at the time.
92
 
After the initial post-war political transition phase had ended, from 1952 
onwards the work of the NDPD, apart from the campaigns supporting 
collectivization, primarily consisted of mobilizing its members in the middle-classes 
for state initiatives such as the fulfilment of plans, and continued attempts at 
educating its target group to recognise the societal and political status quo of the 
GDR.
93
 The drive to improve its members’ relationship to the DSF was also 
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continually intensified, and by 1953 the fourth district Party Conference of the NDP 
in Gross-Berlin was held in the ‘Haus der Kultur der Sowjetunion’ in order to 
express their ‘close and friendly connection to the Society for German-Soviet 
friendship’.94  
Indeed, the scope for the (re)integration of ‘converted fascists’ created by the 
NDPD, combined with parallel efforts by the other bloc parties, particularly the SED 
to also integrate former National Socialists, enjoyed some significant successes.
95
 A 
considerable number of former NSDAP members were able to rise to high ranks in 
politics, government and society, despite their ‘brown past’. By 1958, the 
Volkskammer of the GDR included 56 members who had formerly been NSDAP 
members, while by the late 1950s, former members of the NSDAP and SS had 
joined the NVA, the Ministry for State Security, the Central Committee of the SED 
and the People’s and Border police, with others holding positions as mayors, in the 
foreign ministry and in the ministry for National Defence.
96
 This also included 
former NSDAP member Kurt Schumann who became an NDPD member in 1948 
and was subsequently made president of the high court of the GDR from 1949-
1960.
97
 Such instances of political and economic advancement illustrate the generous 
room for manoeuvre provided by the NDPD which enabled some former NSDAP 
members to rise to prominent positions, in exchange for outward political 
conversion. 
However, amongst the oral history interviewees in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde, none of whom ever became NDPD members, the grassroots memories 
of, and attitudes towards, the Party were heterogeneous, and conflicting assumptions 
and opinions about the NDPD emerged. The varied reactions amongst the 
interviewees mirror some of the different viewpoints and responses amongst the 
grassroots populace discovered in the archival material from the post-war period and 
range from negativity, to skepticism, to positivity. Gunther Dietrich’s opinion 
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reflected the findings in the archival material that many individuals utilized the Party 
for social advancement, perceiving NDPD members as ‘opportunists and careerists’ 
who only joined the Party ‘in order to get a better position in their job’.98 Erika 
Schulz, with her opinion that the NDPD was simply a ‘splinter party of the SED’, 
reflected the increased SED involvement in Party affairs.
99
 Picking up on similar 
feelings of suspicion as to lack of independence of the Party from the powers that be, 
Alfred Wegewitz viewed the NDPD as an ‘artificial construction’ and felt that ‘no 
convinced National Socialist’ would want to join such a party.100  
In contrast, the majority of other interviewees highlighted the National 
Socialist and military backgrounds of NDPD members, providing different personal 
memories and interpretations of what role and impact this had. Kurt Michel claimed 
to have taken ‘no interest’ in the NDPD in the post-war period, being wary of the 
fact that its members were ‘former Nazis’.101 Likewise, Dr Edith Dorn felt that the 
Party was disliked because of the membership of former National Socialists.
102
 
Moreover, similar to some of the findings in the archival material, a proportion of the 
interviewees believed that those who joined the NDPD were unable to entirely reject 
sentiments from the Third Reich. Ulla Beck felt that ‘the former Nazis in the Party 
remained Nazis’, while Dr Siegfried Reinke felt that perhaps the NDPD acted as a 
‘cocoon for old bygone sentiments’.103 Similarly, Hans Gericke saw the NDPD as 
having unrealistic goals: ‘Crazy! [...] they tried to do something which was clearly 
impossible [...] they couldn’t want to rebuild an idea just with a different name’.104 
Conversely, Wolfgang Heinrich and Paul Gärtner, who presented themselves as the 
most loyal to the SED state throughout their interviews, reproduced much of the 
GDR’s own language and propaganda on the NDPD. For instance, Paul Gärtner 
declared that the Party absorbed the former members of the ‘fascist army’ and 
became a melting pot for former officers with a ‘progressive attitude’.105  
Similar to the archival evidence, their range of responses to their memories of 
the NDPD unwittingly reflect the many facets of the post-war grassroots’ responses 
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to the Party found in the archival material, thus highlighting the very mixed reactions 
to the political revisionism which the NDPD attempted to incorporate. Yet these 
perceptions in the oral history interviews on the NDPD must naturally also be 
qualified. This interview cohort had not carried functions in the Third Reich and had 
not been members of the NSDAP, and therefore did not constitute a target group for 
the Party, which consisted of a highly concentrated forum of former carriers of the 
Third Reich. The interviewees themselves would follow different paths of post-war 
(re)-integration which will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
5.7 Conclusion   
In summary, the findings of this chapter indicate that amongst its specific target 
group of former NSDAP members and soldiers, significant inroads were made in 
redefining, reeducating and (re)integrating some of those who were available for 
political mobilisation in Brandenburg. In fact, the NDPD was somewhat successful 
in tying former NSDAP and military members to the new political and economic 
system and a significant number were happy to avail themselves of the new 
opportunity for political redemption. Furthermore, former National Socialist 
members were not merely given the scope for integration and re-socialisation, they 
were also often offered career-advancing opportunities, with the caveat of expected 
outer political conformity and a large number of individuals used this restricted room 
for manoeuvre in the new political system to their personal advantage.  
Nevertheless, particularly at a grassroots level in Brandenburg, the NDPD 
was also confronted with a significant number of internal and external challenges in 
their attempts to politically reeducate and (re)integrate their ‘post-fascist’ clientele, 
illustrating some of the complexities associated with political and ideological 
revisionism for this particular target group. In some instances the Party adapted its 
strategy in order to deal with some of the negative grassroots responses, highlighting 
the partial effectiveness which various acts of grassroots Eigensinn could have, while 
in other cases the political system enforced rigid limits on what was acceptable in the 
public sphere which were non-negotiable for its grassroots membership. It appears 
that some Brandenburg NDPD members could nonetheless also exert their Eigensinn 
by increasingly withdrawing from public Party events once they had utilised the 
economic and social opportunities presented to them as part of the East German 
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transition from Nazism to socialism. As a consequence, it would seem that, despite 
some grassroots challenges and various degrees of participation on the ground, the 
NDPD generally succeeded in providing a favourable framework for grassroots 
political, economic and social integration for former NSDAP members and soldiers 
in the post-war period and thereby arguably played a role in contributing to the 
partial stabilisation of the GDR by the early 1950s. 
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Chapter VI: Grassroots responses to the Society for 
German-Soviet Friendship (DSF)  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The ‘Society for German-Soviet Friendship’ (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische 
Freundschaft) was established as a mass organisation in 1949 in order to revise 
certain tenets of previous anti-Soviet pre-conceptions existent in the Third Reich 
which had, combined with post-war experiences of retaliatory actions and punitive 
measures, continued into the post-war period.
1
 Given the nature of mass 
organisations, it was hoped that such a society would challenge not just anti-Soviet 
sentiment amongst former National Socialists, but also the latent anti-Sovietism 
prevalent in East German society more generally in the late 1940s. In this context, it 
was considered critical to create a positive public image of the Soviets as an 
occupying power in order to contribute to facilitating the transition from Nazism to 
socialism. Therefore, through the DSF, the SMAD and the SED embarked on an 
energetic marketing campaign in order to improve the image of ‘the Russians’ as 
part of the wider push, by the late 1940s, to politically integrate wide sections of the 
population back into society, both politically and economically.  
Whilst some more general studies on the DSF have appeared, to date the DSF 
in Brandenburg and its reception at a grassroots level has been significantly under-
researched.
2
  This chapter therefore intends to contribute to the historical literature 
by using archival and oral history material in order to attempt to reconstruct the 
activities of the early DSF with particular emphasis on the grassroots responses to 
these top-down strategies to create a new dominant discourse of German-Soviet 
amity across Brandenburg. The first section concentrates on the grassroots responses 
to the DSF in relation to one particular target group – returning POWs – which 
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appeared to be especially likely to be a potentially destabilising factor in the post-
war political transition. The subsequent sections examine the responses of the wider 
grassroots population in Brandenburg to the DSF and explore some of the factors 
which influenced grassroots participation. The final section of this chapter provides a 
more in-depth understanding of the longer-term attitudes to the occupying army in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde outside of the officially sanctioned top-down 
activities of the DSF.  
 
6.2 The establishment of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship 
(DSF) 
The forerunner to the DSF, the ‘Society for the Study of Soviet 
Culture’ (Gesellschaft zum Studium der Kultur der Sowjetunion), had been founded 
in June 1947. This culture society aimed not only to combat anti-Soviet sentiment, 
but also to create ‘active friends of the Soviet Union’.3 On 17 November 1946, a 
‘House of Culture of the Soviet Union’ had been established in Berlin through 
Decree no. 2498 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was located in the 
former Prussian Ministry of Finance on Unter den Linden, and in the words of 
Colonel Sergej Tjulpanow was to ‘play an important role in the ideological re-
education of the German population’.4  It was here that the founding meeting of 
the ‘Society for the Study of Soviet Culture’ took place on 30 June 1947. The central 
managing committee was made up of ten individuals, including the author Anna 
Seghers as well as academics, artists and directors, seven of whom were in the SED, 
while the remaining three were not affiliated to any party.
5
  
The SMAD Department of Information Management assisted in financing the 
work of the Society, and in December 1947 and April 1948 made payments of 2.9 
million RM and 190,000 RM respectively. Of this, over 2 million RM were spent on 
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subsidies for Brandenburg and the other regional organisations and 178,000 RM for 
‘cultural propaganda activities’.6 In the post-Third Reich context the portrayal of 
Soviet superiority of culture was ‘particularly important, since for more than a 
decade the Nazis had denigrated Soviet culture as the low-grade product of the 
inferior Judeo-Bolshevik civilisation’.7 These cultural propaganda activities therefore 
included the staging of exhibitions in larger towns and villages on themes such as 
‘Hitler and his Clique’, ‘30 Years Soviet Union’ and ‘Industrial, agricultural and 
cultural developments in the Soviet Union’.8 Through this emphasis on economic 
and cultural achievements, exhibitions such as these systematically attempted to 
begin to alter the East German public discourse in relation to the Soviet Union.  
Yet growth of the Society and its desire to create ‘active friends’ of the 
Soviet Union remained modest, expanding from 2,200 initial members to 19,116 in 
spring 1948 and 69,707 members by March 1949.
9
 By the summer of 1949, the 
membership numbers had not yet increased to the level desired by the leaders of the 
Society, the SED and the SMAD, and at the second congress on 2 July 1949 it was 
decided to change the society’s name to the ‘The Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship’ (DSF).10 This name change was accompanied with a shift in rationale. 
As Naimark points out: ‘while the program of the Society for the Study of Culture 
spoke mostly of exchanges, exhibitions, publications, theatre, and Russian language 
courses, that of the Friendship society had a much more political edge to it’.11 The 
new statute of the DSF set itself the task of ‘spreading the truth about the Soviet 
Union, to fight all forms of enmity and agitation, thereby strengthening and 
deepening the friendship of the German people with the people of the Soviet Union’. 
It was decided that all individuals over the age of fourteen could become members, 
irrespective of ‘party affiliation, world view, religion, education or social status'.12  
The hierarchy of the organisational structure was divided into a central 
association, regional associations, district associations, local associations and 
primary units. The organs of the DSF consisted of a main congress, regional 
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delegates’ conferences, district delegates’ conferences, local delegates’ conferences 
in towns and villages and members’ meetings of the primary units.13 An increase in 
the number of factory branches was considered essential in the transformation of the 
Society into a mass organisation, and was therefore made an important goal, whilst 
the most successful tactic in attracting members was to be the annual introduction of 
a month of German-Soviet friendship which was to be carried out in conjunction 
with the parties and other mass organisations. In Brandenburg the first of these 
‘friendship months’ took place in autumn 1949 and in the following years became a 
highly ritualised event,  intended to break down vestiges of anti-Soviet sentiment and 
to contribute to creating a new dominant ideology as part of the political transition 
from Nazism. 
 
6.3 The DSF and POWs in Brandenburg 
Given that the period which followed the collapse of the Third Reich saw the return 
of a steady stream of many thousands of POWs to the Soviet zone, one of the 
primary tasks of the DSF in the early years, similar to the NDPD, was to aid in 
facilitating the political (re)integration and assimilation of this important target group 
so that they could be utilised to help to build up the new political system in East 
Germany.  
The first mass repatriation of German POWs from camps inside the Soviet 
Union had already begun in mid-1946 and of the 1,125,352 POWs who were 
released from the Soviet Union, 387,839 were to stay in the Eastern zone.
14
 In 
Brandenburg/Havel 3,690 POWs had returned by January 1946, over 50% from the 
Soviet Union.
15
 Similarly, in Fürstenwalde 1,668 soldiers and 429 non-
commissioned officers had returned by July 1947 from POW camps abroad, just 
under half from the Soviet Union.
16
 In addition, a camp had also been established in 
Fürstenwalde for returning POWs and by August 1946, 2,350 POWs were housed 
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there.
17
 Yet contemporary reports from the Ministry of the Interior indicate a grave 
concern that the political consciousness amongst some of the returning POWs in 
Fürstenwalde was ‘very weak’, and suggestions for an isolated barracks were 
therefore made in which ‘elements’ which were considered to be ‘infested with 
fascism or anti-Sovietism’ should be housed and kept under special observation, so 
that they would not have the opportunity to spread ‘subversive propaganda’ amongst 
other returning POWs in Fürstenwalde.
18
 Reports such as these illustrate uneasiness 
at the highest level of government at the destabilising effect which politically non-
converted POWs could have at a grassroots level in Brandenburg.  
Given this reluctance of some POWs to readily assimilate to the new political 
order, it was perhaps unsurprising that the official doctrine in the Soviet zone, which 
continued to demonise German soldiers in official rhetoric as ‘agents of fascism’, 
was gradually altered in order politically to accommodate this growing stratum. In 
contrast to the fallen German soldiers explored in chapter two, POWs returning to 
East Germany were increasingly given a more lenient treatment in order that they 
could be rapidly integrated into the new political system. This required a certain 
redefinition of perpetrators and victims within the National Socialist regime. As 
Frank Biess has argued: 
East German officials gradually moved away from their earlier assertions of 
collective guilt and held an increasingly narrow segment of the German 
population responsible for Nazi crimes. Conversely, they attempted to build 
ideological bridges to the former Wehrmacht soldiers by incorporating them 
into the expanding community of Hitler’s victims.19 
In this context, ‘returnee conferences’ were organised by the DSF across East 
Germany between June and October 1949. Scheduled around the formal founding of 
the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949, these conferences were 
intended to help facilitate not only conversion, but also the recruitment of new staff 
as well as propagandists and agitators for the DSF. Some of the returning POWs 
were to be employed full time, while the propagandists and agitators were to be 
organised into groups and deployed for local lectures in factories and businesses 
across Brandenburg as well as the remaining East German states.
20
 These 
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conferences ‘represented constitutive acts in the formation of the East German state’ 
as the returnee conferences ‘universalised the experience of antifascist POWs and 
applied it to the nation at large’.21 As noted in a DSF working plan: 
The returnee conferences are of enormous importance for the propagation of 
German-Soviet friendship. The fact that at these conferences, masses of 
former POWs from the Soviet Union appeared and proclaimed an outright 
positive acknowledgement to the friendship with the Soviet Union, delivers a 
decisive blow against the anti-Soviet propagandists.
22
  
The orators at these conferences were therefore to epitomise this political conversion 
and spoke on themes such as ‘how I became a different person through Soviet 
imprisonment’, ‘the Soviet people know no hatred against us Germans’ and ‘the 
progressive culture of the Soviet Union’. These conferences were then presented to 
the local public under the slogan ‘the population asks: the returnees answer’ during 
which the returned POWs sat on stage and responded to audience questions.
23
  
In Brandenburg, the first ‘returnee conference’ took place in Potsdam in June 
1949 and was attended by roughly 450 people. Subsequently, similar meetings took 
place in other towns across the region. In Brandenburg/Havel a ‘returnee conference’ 
took place in July with roughly 250 POWs participating. Pronouncements such as 
‘the Soviet Union has no hatred against the German people — they want nothing but 
peace’, by POW participant Hermann S., were common. Another, Viktor L., 
declared that given the ‘widespread negative attitude towards the Soviet Union’, it 
was his ‘noble duty to spread the truth about the land of socialism’.24 Biess maintains 
that such statements by seemingly reeducated and converted returnees from the East 
assumed a crucial role as ‘they illustrated the virtually unlimited ideological 
malleability of human beings on which the SED counted in its attempt to win over 
ordinary Germans’. Nonetheless, he highlights that, as in the denazification cases 
discussed in chapter four, individual admissions of guilt were absent in such 
confessions and instead ‘newly converted antifascist returnees portrayed themselves 
as passive objects of Hitler’s policies’.25  
Such a redemptive framework, which emphasised a lack of Eigensinn under 
Nazism, proved beneficial for both the DSF and those POWs who wished to benefit 
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from political conversion, and the returnee conferences continued to be utilised ‘for 
mass agitation’ throughout 1949. Yet some limits to the practical implementation of 
this campaign emerged when it transpired that the DSF suffered from a frequent 
shortage of adequate speakers at Society functions and events.
26
 Nonetheless, the 
campaign finally culminated in 1949 with a large central conference in Berlin on 27 
October, whose attendees included ten delegates from Brandenburg/Havel, as well as 
the Honorary President of the DSF, Wilhelm Pieck.
27
 Here the campaign reached its 
rhetorical pinnacle when in the opening speech the society’s president, the historian 
Prof. Jürgen Kuczynski, declared: ‘They are returnees, who have experienced their 
political Damascus, the major turning point in their lives in the Soviet Union’.28 This 
use of biblical imagery illustrates the portrayal of the returnees’ experience in terms 
of a ‘pseudoreligious progression leading from confession to conversion and 
redemption’.29 Moreover, by evoking the parable of the road to Damascus and 
thereby comparing the former POWs to Saul, the former Pharisee who had ended his 
persecution of early Christians and instead became an apostle of Christ, the emphasis 
here was not just on personal redemption but that the POWs should from here on in 
act as missionaries for German-Soviet friendship.  
Yet whilst the DSF invested huge energy in trying to harness the potential 
political power of the returning POWs in Brandenburg, these experiences of apparent 
political conversion are not necessarily representative of all POWs returning to the 
region. In fact, the archival material generated by the DSF often tended to omit the 
responses of both those POWs who returned from Western imprisonment as well as 
those who returned from Soviet POW camps, but chose not to join the DSF. As a 
consequence, the DSF archival material is somewhat limited in the range of 
experiences which it depicts. Nonetheless, by transforming some of these men from 
perpetrators into victims, the DSF created a rhetorical framework which enabled 
those POWs who desired this to experience at least outward political conversion. 
This in turn provided many of these men with the opportunity to therefore partake in 
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the ‘successful’ transition from Nazism to socialism and avail themselves of 
associated economic and social opportunities within the new political system.  
 
6.4 The DSF and the wider grassroots Brandenburg population 
Whilst the DSF focused on gaining members amongst this particular target group of 
POWs and utilising them for propaganda purposes, they also aspired to build up 
membership within the wider population across Brandenburg and the Soviet zone. 
However, the initial membership statistics for 1949 indicate that these various public 
campaigns were initially proving only somewhat successful as the grassroots 
experiences did not necessarily match the political rhetoric of friendship propagated 
by the ‘Society for the Study of Soviet Culture’ and subsequently the DSF. In 
January 1949, the month the punishment for rape finally increased in severity and 
contacts between the Germans and Red Army were severely curtailed, the 
membership of the ‘Society’ in the Soviet zone stood at only 58,553.30  Up to this 
point, sexual assaults by some Soviet soldiers had continued, often affecting women 
from all walks of life, irrespective of political affiliation. For instance, in late 1947 
the central committee of the SED was still receiving reports on assaults and rapes of 
young female FDJ functionaries by Russian officers.
31
 Likewise, other contemporary 
reports from across the Soviet zone indicate that FDJ and KPD/SED functionaries 
were just as susceptible to being raped as other women.
32
 Although membership 
numbers of the DSF increased gradually to 158,311 in August 1949, the DSF did not 
provide a forum where such grievances could be aired and, as shall be discussed 
below, this was to have a significant effect on public support at a grassroots level.
33
  
In Brandenburg/Havel membership numbers of the DSF remained modest in 
August 1949 at 645.
34
 Here factory branches had been set up in a local shipyard and 
tractor factory and the district secretary was an electrician named Kurt Hildenstein 
who had been imprisoned in a Soviet POW camp and had joined the SED on his 
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release to Germany.
35
 The majority of local DSF secretaries across Brandenburg at 
the time had in fact received their ideological training either in POW camps or in 
special SMAD or SED training schools, suggesting that the strategies for employing 
young former POWs explored in the previous section enjoyed some successes. Yet 
these considerable successes amongst this target group did not necessarily reflect on 
the wider population and, similarly in Fürstenwalde, where the district secretary was 
a young carpenter and SED member named Heinz Rabe, membership numbers of the 
DSF also remained sluggish by August 1949 with 262 members, a mere 1% of the 
population.
36
  
Yet two months later, with the founding of the GDR in October 1949, the 
tasks of the DSF began to change. Now the main aim was no longer to just improve 
the relationship of the population to the occupying power, but also to mobilise all 
strata of society in order to legitimise the new state.
37
 The society’s long awaited 
growth across East Germany finally came in late 1949 and early 1950 and by March 
1950 the organisation had expanded to reach 986,003 members. This growth 
continued, increasing to 1,962,569 members by December 1950.
38
 In the state of 
Brandenburg, the DSF had a total of 80,616 members by January 1950, organised 
into 295 local branches and 1,119 factory branches. Yet not all of these members 
appear to have been active as that same month, only 21,370 Brandenburgers were 
reported to have attended film screenings and 10,000 were to have attended 
exhibitions organised by the DSF.
39
 Assuming that these attendees also included 
members of the general public as well as DSF members, it appears likely that only a 
relatively low proportion of members regularly engaged with the cultural activities 
of the DSF. Throughout 1950 the DSF embarked on an even more extensive public 
campaign printing placards, brochures, organising exhibitions, press and radio 
releases, film screenings, theatre performances and essay competitions in schools. 
They also printed books and literature for adolescents and children.
40
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With these public campaigns across grassroots Brandenburg, growth 
continued to increase and by April 1950 the DSF had a total of 105,187 members in 
the state of Brandenburg, steadily growing to 189,649 in December 1950, reaching 
246,958 members by May 1951.
41
 The Society’s budget also increased as the 
membership numbers continued to rise. By 1951, the DSF had a budget of over 30 
million Marks, 780,000 of which came from revenue from the sale of literature and 
merchandise such as flags, emblems, badges, books and brochures. However, the 
large majority of the financial support for the Society came from the GDR state, 
which by 1951 was making annual payments of over 28 million Marks to the 
Society. Of this budget of 30 million, the DSF in Brandenburg received 2.3 million 
Marks in 1951 which in turn funded events and functions, art and science, 
exhibitions, and ‘general ideological expenses’.42 
By early 1952, the DSF had over 2.7 million members across the GDR, 
almost 300,000 of whom were in Brandenburg, making up 11% of the population of 
the state.
43
 The DSF continued to remain active in their attempts to promote 
friendship between the German and Soviet peoples organising memorial events, 
lectures, films, concerts, theatres, study groups and language courses.
44
 It had also 
expanded its lecture series in an attempt to connect with a wider audience of women 
and teenagers, covering issues such as ‘Soviet pedagogy’, ‘the woman in the Soviet 
Union’ and ‘youth in the Soviet Union as a role model for the youth of the world’.45 
In the context of this ‘politicised culture’ much energy was also invested in the area 
of films in an attempt to utilise the post-war entertainment vacuum. Often 
educational and didactic films such as ‘die große Wende’, or ‘die russische Frage’ 
were screened as well as entertaining and children’s films such as ‘Aschenbrödel’ 
and ‘der Zauberfisch’.46 Such strategies were designed with the clear intention of 
reaching target audiences beyond POWs to increasingly include East German 
children and their parents, marking a dramatic departure from the punitive 
occupation measures which had been exercised only a few years previously. 
                                                 
41
 BArch, DY32/10086, no pag. 
42
 BArch, DY32/10024, pp. 56- 60. 
43
 BArch, DY32/529, ‘Zentralstatistische Übersichten und Analysen über die Mitgliederbewegung, 
1952’, no pag. 
44
 Ibid., no pag. 
45
 BArch, DY32/10125, p. 18. 
46
 Klingenberg, Kultur, p. 84. See also, Naimark, Russians, p. 399. 
201 
 
As a result of its increased membership numbers, budget and cultural 
activities, the political influence of the DSF in Brandenburg began to grow and, by 
late 1951, the Landtag was adorned with a large Stalin portrait, a gift from the 
DSF.
47
 Collaboration with the bloc parties had also begun to increase, particularly 
from 1950 onwards, as the DSF became tightly integrated into the political and 
institutional framework of the GDR, increasingly fulfilling its role as a transmission 
belt for SED policy.
48
 At a grassroots level, the publicity campaigns, coupled with 
the growth of local and factory branches, appeared to have been somewhat 
successful and by December 1951, 17% of the population of Brandenburg/Havel had 
joined the DSF.
49
  
This anchoring of the DSF into political and work life at a grassroots level 
was also reflected in some of the oral history interviews. Despite their somewhat 
ambivalent memories of the post-war Soviet occupying army explored in chapter 
two, twelve of the interviewees from Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde became 
members of the DSF.
50
 The analysis of the interviews revealed that the reasons for 
joining the DSF loosely fell into four main groups ranging from conviction on the 
one hand, to perceived fear of negative repercussions on the other hand. 
The first group of DSF members amongst the interviewees were those who 
claimed to have been motivated both by personal persuasion as well as by the 
perceived improved employment chances and political advancement which 
membership in the Society would offer them. Berol Kaiser-Reka, a musician, joined 
the DSF because of the potential for increased job opportunities, while also claiming 
that he believed that friendship with another country ‘wasn’t a bad thing’.51 
Likewise, Paul Gärtner, a manual labourer, became a member of the DSF because of 
his employment but simultaneously maintained that it was a ‘positive movement’, 
whilst Wolfgang Heinrich claimed to have joined both out of a personal ideological 
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conviction as well as to pursue his career as a functionary in the FDJ in the late 
1940s.
52
 
The second group within this interview cohort claimed that they joined the 
DSF as a strategy to avoid SED membership, as in this case it was perceived as the 
lesser evil. Dr Edith Dorn, a lecturer at a third level institution, claimed that she was 
‘forced into the DSF’ in later years as she was not a member of the SED.53 Likewise, 
Christine Küster, a business director in a construction factory in Fürstenwalde, 
joined in order to avoid joining the SED instead: ‘Later I became the chairwoman of 
the factory [...] and that was the only opportunity to not go into the Party’.54 Here, 
amongst both the first and second groups, Eigensinn appears to have manifested 
itself in the form of joining the DSF either out of political conviction or to avoid 
other forms of political commitment in the SED which was presented as being even 
more politically stifling than the DSF. 
The third group of DSF members amongst the interviewees claimed that they 
became members of the DSF because it was the expected norm. Dr Siegfried Reinke, 
an economist, recalled that he joined because he considered it to be his duty and that 
the GDR’s ‘specific structural system was evaluated on that basis’.55 Ulla Beck 
recalled joining because she felt that it was ‘just the way things were’, claiming that 
she and her friends would only participate in the annual march on 8 May because of 
the fete which took place afterwards.
56
 Alfred Wegewitz, a lawyer, recalled that he 
joined ‘unavoidably’ at the end of the 1950s, while Carmen Jung, an office clerk, 
claimed to have joined the DSF because ‘we had to, even though we didn’t think that 
highly of it, because it wasn’t a friendship in that sense’.57  
Finally, the last group of DSF members amongst the interviewees claimed 
that they only joined the DSF out of fear, feeling that they were forced to outwardly 
conform, while internally continuing to harbour an antipathy towards the Soviet 
occupier. For instance, Gunther Dietrich claimed to have joined the DSF out of a fear 
of negative repercussions if he refused, despite having an ‘aversion’ towards it.58 
Even Arnold Schulze, whose parents had been murdered by looting Soviet soldiers, 
                                                 
52
 Gärtner, 27.06.09. Heinrich, 01.09.09. 
53
 Dorn, 24.06.09. 
54
 Küster, 01.09.09. 
55
 Reinke, 23.06.09. 
56
 Beck, 27.08.09. 
57
 Wegewitz, 07.09.09. Jung, 09.09.09. 
58
 Dietrich, 11.06.09. 
203 
 
reluctantly joined for a short period of time in the later GDR years due to work 
pressures, despite the fact that: ‘the concept was repulsive to me, this German-Soviet 
Friendship was a despicable organisation’.59 Thus, here the third and fourth groups 
presented their membership as being constrained by social, political and economic 
expectations, emphasising a sense of coercion in retrospectively claiming that this 
was the only course of action available to them. Nonetheless, despite this general 
emphasis on constraint and a lack of possible alternatives during this process, it 
could also be argued that the interviewees may have enjoyed certain economic and 
political advantages through their DSF membership which might have otherwise 
been difficult to attain. In this manner, it is possible that some of the interviewees 
may not have been as entirely passive in their DSF membership as they may wish to 
present retroactively in the present day. 
In fact, even taking into account the different jobs and employment grades of 
the interviewees, arguably this suggestion that there was some element of choice, no 
matter how restricted in the process, is supported by the fact that eight of those 
interviewed maintained that they successfully refused membership of the DSF 
entirely. Some such as Hans Gericke, an engineer who had been a member of the 
Hitler Youth and NS Studentenbund prior to 1945, stated that he never joined the 
DSF because he ‘wanted to be non-political’.60 Amongst the majority of this group 
of oral history interviewees, the main motivation for refusing DSF membership 
appears to have been due to the long-term reverberations of personal, negative 
encounters with the Soviet occupier, in the form of rape, expulsion or imprisonment, 
during the post-war period, illustrating Richard Bessel’s observation that ‘politics 
does not occur in an emotional vacuum, and political commitment is based not just 
on rational calculation’.61 Wilhelm Fiedler, a teacher, refused to join the DSF 
throughout the GDR because of the rape of his fiancé in the post-war period, stating 
that he ‘couldn’t have feelings of friendship’.62 Similarly, Kurt Michel, an 
electrician, claimed that he did not join the DSF because his wife was an expellee, 
and he had witnessed her hardship first-hand.
63
 All three of the former NKVD 
prisoners, despite being able to assimilate politically to some extent in later years, 
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nonetheless claimed to have vehemently refused DSF membership. Erika Schulz 
recalled that when she was approached by her boss, cadre leaders and local DSF 
functionaries to join the organisation due to her management role she claimed to 
have responded: ‘“I’m sure you know my cadre file and you know that I was arrested 
for 38 months by our friend” — ‘our friend’ was meant cynically [...] my boss turned 
a blind eye every year’.64 Similarly, Fritz Krause never joined the DSF, while 
Reinhold Rösner also refused membership: ‘I couldn’t say, you know, I was locked 
up by the Russians for three years [...] and after that a friendship developed’.65  
This evidence suggests that these interviewees exercised their Eigensinn by 
refusing to participate in the DSF, despite the political and economic pressure to 
conform, and thereby illustrate that anti-Soviet feelings continued to be a critical 
impeding factor in the transition from Nazism to socialism. Whilst this refusal to join 
the DSF may be somewhat influenced by post-1989 narratives, the archival material 
below also provides evidence of how the ongoing difficulties created by the punitive 
post-war Soviet practices and policies explored in part one of this thesis, were to 
have longer-term reverberations on membership patterns of the DSF at a grassroots 
level across Brandenburg. 
 
6.5 The DSF, the expellees and the Oder-Neisse question in 
Brandenburg 
In addition to the punitive Soviet measures experienced by many in the immediate 
post-war period, there were two further issues which were to have a continued 
impact on German-Soviet relations and the DSF at a grassroots level in the early 
years – the question of expellees and the final drawing of the Oder-Neisse border. 
Given that Brandenburg had lost one third of its territory in 1945, uprooting a 
significant proportion of its population, these issues were particularly salient. 
Already by November 1945, 635,321 expellees (Umsiedler) had arrived in 
Brandenburg, not just from East Brandenburg, but from across the former eastern 
territories of the Reich.
66
 Of these, just over 6,000 had settled in Brandenburg/Havel 
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in the autumn of 1945, and some tentatively began to develop informal grassroots 
networks.
67
 In one instance, it was discovered in November 1945 that an expellee, 
Hermann W., had been organising regular illegal local meetings of expellees which 
had attracted an average of over 800 people. The local authorities had been 
concerned that these meetings were fostering and continually ‘artificially breeding 
traditional excessive local patriotism’ amongst evacuated East Prussians, as well as 
inciting the population against the Soviet Union and preaching a ‘tremendous hatred 
against the Poles’.68 This concern over the destabilising effect or ‘enormous 
explosive power’ which the expellee presence could have, meant that every effort 
was made to put a halt to future public gatherings and political meetings of any 
kind.
69
 Yet despite such attempts by the SMAD and SED to eradicate this form of 
self-organisation in Brandenburg/Havel, Michael Schwartz has found that similar 
public mass meetings of expellees continued until at least 1953 across the Soviet 
zone.
70
  
Fürstenwalde also had a significant presence of expellees. By late 1947, the 
town was housing 2,790 expellees out of a total population of 22,616 inhabitants; 
while a further 3,000 expellees had been accommodated in a camp in the former 
‘Waldlager Pintsch’.71 The authorities here also feared that the presence of these 
expellees could reinforce anti-Soviet sentiment and a sense of German victimhood at 
the loss of their homelands in the East, and so attempts were made to integrate and 
assimilate expellees as soon as possible. It was also hoped that such a rapid 
integration would aid economic as well as political stability. In order to facilitate 
integration, an ‘expellee week’ was declared in October 1947, in order to drum up 
support and empathy for the expellees. In advance of this event, guidelines were 
issued to the mayor of Fürstenwalde by the District Administrator in Lebus on 
running an advertisement campaign on the matter. Local cinemas were to carry 
slogans such as ‘You must all help!’ and ‘Create a new home for the expellees’, 
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while the plight of the expellees was to be blamed on Hitler who had ‘gambled’ 
many people’s homes.72 Yet rather than blaming National Socialist aggressive 
expansionism for the displacement of millions of Germans, the archival evidence 
strongly indicates that it was the Soviets who were held responsible, resulting in the 
existence of a widespread reluctance to engage with the political and cultural work 
of the DSF in Brandenburg in the early post-war years. Particularly in Brandenburg’s 
border districts which housed a large number of expellees, the DSF frequently 
complained that the Society’s progress was ‘very poor’.73 The evidence therefore 
suggests that the existence of a large number of expelled Germans served to limit the 
DSF project in Brandenburg, at least in the early years. 
Moreover, by the late 1940s the issue of anti-Soviet and anti-Polish sentiment 
was further heightened in these regions by the permanent establishment of the Oder-
Neisse border in July 1950. Uncertainty ensured that rumours, especially in affected 
border towns, were rife. This was particularly the case in Wilhelm Pieck’s 
birthplace, the Brandenburg town of Guben, which had, as a result of the drawing of 
the new border, lost both the town’s centre and the majority of residential housing to 
Gubin, the now Polish half of the town.
74
 This physical reduction was further 
compounded by the fact that 60% of the town had already been destroyed by the end 
of the war.
75
 The impact and climate of uncertainty created by this division of a town 
was strongly reflected in the contemporary archival material which displayed 
widespread anti-Polish and anti-Soviet attitudes. For instance, a Brandenburg 
Ministry for Information report on Guben from May 1950 had noted a conversation 
overheard in a dentist’s surgery in which rumours were circulating that ‘the Polack is 
keen on the abattoir and the railway station’.76  
Another report for the Brandenburg Ministry for Information had examined 
the political affiliation of railway workers in Guben in relation to the DSF in March 
1950. Here, 72 people were employed in the railway freight department of whom 21 
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had previously belonged to the NSDAP. All of the employees were now members of 
the FDGB, while 16 were SED members. Yet every single one of the 72 employees, 
including the SED members, refused to join the DSF. The situation was said to be 
similar in the railway maintenance department and in the railway building itself, 
where 163 people were employed, including ten women, not one employee was a 
member of the DSF, although 128 were members of the SED.
77
 In fact, the report 
found that only approximately 10% of the total number of 687 railway workers in the 
town of Guben and its hinterland were members of the DSF. The railway employees 
cited numerous reasons for their unwillingness to join the DSF which, consistent 
with the evidence of some of the above oral history interviewees, illustrated the 
longer term reverberations of Soviet retaliatory violence on patterns of participation 
in the DSF. The report found that the large majority of the Guben railway workers, 
including the SED members, remained bitter that ‘our women’ were raped in 1945. 
In addition, a train driver and stoker had been shot by Soviet soldiers at Christmas in 
1949, to which one employee responded: ‘there you have your German-Soviet 
friendship and something like that wants to be our friend’. Moreover, the division of 
the town was also further spurring on these anti-Soviet attitudes and on a placard 
which had been erected in the Guben train station which championed the Oder-
Neisse border as a border of peace, had been scrawled in capital letters the word 
‘Never’.78 Similar demonstrations of dissatisfaction at the new political status quo 
can be seen across Brandenburg in this period and the distribution of hand-written 
pamphlets protesting the Oder-Neisse border were a regular problem both for the 
local authorities and the DSF.
79
  
Uncertainties in a period of transition also played a role here. For instance, an 
internal public opinion report for the central administrative office in Fürstenwalde’s 
district of Lebus in July 1950 noted that amongst a certain percentage of the 
population the question of the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border as a border of 
peace was still ‘an urgent problem’. Interestingly the report employed a somewhat 
artificial binary distinction in order to differentiate between two apparent sub-groups 
in the region. The first group was seen to be ‘acting unwittingly’ and their negative 
attitude could be attributed to ‘political unclarity, a lack of national consciousness 
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and indifference’, while the second group was said to be consciously taking a 
negative standpoint, deliberately carrying out ‘RIAS-propaganda and anti-Soviet 
agitation’, and intentionally influencing the first group. The report stated that ‘time 
and again one can notice in trains, in pubs etc. how many indifferent people fall 
victim to the enemy propaganda, whether it is broadcasted by RIAS or passed on 
through whisper propaganda’.80 By creating this somewhat apocryphal delineation 
amongst individuals who held anti-Soviet sentiments, this district report credited 
only a small group within the population with active defiance, whilst the remaining 
larger group were considered to be suffering from a form of false consciousness. Yet 
by simplifying the issue into such polarised types, the report failed to acknowledge 
the enormity of some of the post-war problems in this regard, thereby disregarding 
the personal experiences which many in the Brandenburg population had made with 
the Soviet occupiers in the preceding five years and the subsequent negative impact 
which this could have on grassroots sentiment towards the DSF and the Soviets more 
generally.  
Contemporary grassroots reports indicate that anti-Soviet sentiments in 
Brandenburg remained widespread throughout this period. For instance, in March 
1948 a local school report in Brandenburg/Havel noted that in the local Wredowplatz 
secondary school, a class of sixteen year old students were given the task of writing a 
piece on Soviet culture. In response, the students were said to have handed their 
teachers a note with the signature of nearly all students in the class, bar three, on 
which they refused to participate in the given task as ‘it appeared to them to be too 
political’.81 In 1950, an entire Abitur class in a Potsdam secondary school were 
punished because they had disturbed Stalin’s birthday celebrations with jeering and 
clapping and had then played football with the Stalin portrait which had been hung 
up on the wall.
82
 Similarly, in September 1950, it was reported to the Office for 
Information in the Brandenburg State Government that a schoolgirl in Fürstenwalde, 
the sixteen year old daughter of a headmaster, had defaced a picture of the president 
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of the newly founded GDR and Honorary President of the DSF, Wilhelm Pieck, in 
her schoolbook, by redrawing him as Hitler instead.
83
  
In their recent research on the East German population’s ‘iconoclastic 
reactions to intensively propagandized personality cults’, Alexey Tikhomirov and 
Jacqueline Friedlander have argued that ‘through their reactions, actors interpreted – 
then reconsidered – the boundaries of public rhetoric and the prescribed forms of 
behaviour and struggled to expand their social autonomy under the conditions of 
dictatorship’. They maintain that ‘covert or anonymous iconoclasm’ which ‘ranged 
from taking down and ripping up the posters, banners, and insignia put up by the 
state to breaking shop windows displaying leaders’ portraits’ were widespread, yet 
contend that ‘it was damage inflicted on visual images – specifically, on the facial 
features of political leaders – that constituted the most serious insult to the regime’.84 
Given the experiences of post-war retaliatory violence and punitive measures 
explored in chapter two, this persistence of anti-Soviet attitudes is perhaps 
unsurprising. However, what is noteworthy is that, despite the shifting political 
climate, in these instances these anti-Soviet sentiments were expressed in such an 
overt manner by refusing to partake in the propaganda projects in Brandenburg 
schools, or by desecrating hallowed Soviet or East German images. Similar to the 
example from Guben above, this anti-Sovietism amongst youths was also apparent in 
the mass organisations, and grassroots political reports from across the GDR in the 
early 1950s indicate that amongst some members of the FDJ there was a continued 
lack of support for German-Soviet friendship.
85
 
Indeed, at the DSF Congress in 1951 the President, Friedrich Ebert, was 
forced to admit that ‘the fact remains that still a great many men and women are of 
the opinion that we cannot learn anything from the ‘Russians’’.86 In fact, regardless 
of all the publicity, in some years 80% of meetings for the DSF could not take place 
simply because not enough people turned up.
87
 This recognition by Ebert that, 
despite the millions of marks spent on propaganda campaigns in the previous years, 
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that the DSF was still encountering widespread negative responses, illustrates some 
of the clear limits to the attempts by the DSF to alter the public political discourse in 
relation to German-Soviet friendship and win members at a grassroots level.   
Arguably one of the contributing factors to this significant lack of public 
support and engagement was to do with the highly regimented rhetorical framework 
with which the DSF operated.  In fact, the evidence suggests that the DSF in many 
ways developed into a rather superficial organisation which did not aspire 
fundamentally to address the full spectrum of experiences between Brandenburgers 
and Soviets in the post-war period. For instance, after an initial period of public 
political discussion of rapes around 1948, the DSF rapidly stifled any further 
articulation in the official political domain; yet ‘although the rapes attained no 
explicit public articulation, “silent knowledge” of them was pervasive’, and 
continued to have an impact on patterns of DSF membership across Brandenburg.
88
 
Similarly, Silke Satjukow has found that the forced reconciliation so soon after the 
war, which was accompanied by simultaneous silencing of traumatic experiences on 
both sides, led to superficial compromises which were always to remain fragile. 
Moreover, she argues, the long-term politics of the DSF did not aspire to personal 
friendships between Russians and Germans; instead they attempted to create a 
‘cognitive-political’ connection without ‘any intimacy’.89  
Therefore, whilst the oral history evidence suggests that a small proportion 
did join the DSF out of genuine political conviction, it also appears that many others 
joined as a mere formality in an attempt to use their membership as a vehicle for 
economic advancement, producing what Matthias Klingenberg describes as ‘file 
corpses’.90 Moreover, the example of the railway workers in Guben is consistent 
with some of the oral history evidence in illustrating that a certain room for 
manoeuvre was available to some grassroots Brandenburgers in choosing not to join 
the DSF. As a consequence it appears that, outside of the campaign tailored to the 
returning POWs in the post-war period, the attempts by the DSF to re-write and alter 
the official historical and cultural discourse towards the Soviets was to have a 
                                                 
88
 On the ‘silent knowledge’ of rapes see: Ashplant et al, Politics, p. 19. 
89
 Satjukow, Befreiung, pp. 255,211,128. For example, the paradox of the propaganda was that 
marriage between Russians and Germans was in theory possible from 1953 onwards, but in practice 
filled with obstacles by the Soviet government. 
90
 Klingenberg, Kultur, p. 63. 
211 
 
somewhat limited impact on Brandenburgers at a grassroots level more generally 
throughout the post-war period.  
 
6.6 Reflections on longer term German-Soviet relations in the oral 
history interviews 
Outside of the official friendship framework of the DSF, the interrelations between 
Germans and Russians appear to have developed their own dynamic at a grassroots 
level that was shaped by other factors which were not necessarily orchestrated by 
top-down DSF strategies. Although interaction between Soviets and Germans had 
been increasingly curtailed from late 1947 onwards, possible points of contact 
continued to exist, particularly through the officer families who were housed outside 
of barracks and ‘Russian-German relations in the zone were influenced as much, if 
not more, by the everyday interactions of Soviet soldiers and German civilians as 
they were by formal administrative arrangements’.91 In fact, the oral history 
interviews suggest that at times such everyday interactions could both moderate and 
mediate the occupation and helped to ease some of the tensions and stereotypes 
between the local Germans and the Soviet occupier at a grassroots level.  
Of those interviewed, eight claimed that their initial negative attitude from 
1945 changed towards ‘the Russians’ in the years following the collapse of the Third 
Reich, primarily as a result of increased daily contact with the occupying power. For 
instance, in Brandenburg/Havel Hans Gericke, although he did not join the DSF, 
recalled that with increased contact to the Red Army, especially with Russian 
officers, his attitude to the Russians became more positive.
92
 Similar shifts in 
attitudes are also evident amongst some of the interviewees who joined the DSF, 
although it is difficult to ascertain whether the increased positive contact at a 
grassroots level may have made them more amenable to DSF membership or 
whether DSF membership successfully managed to gradually change the previously 
negative attitude of the interviewees. For instance, DSF member Gunther Dietrich 
felt that his opinion towards the Russians changed positively as he got to know them 
on a personal level: ‘Beforehand we believed the propaganda, and then we got to 
                                                 
91
 Naimark, Russians, p. 5. 
92
 Gericke, 09.06.09. 
212 
 
know the people’.93 Similarly, DSF member Ulla Beck also recalled that through 
increased contact in the late 1940s, due to her employment with the Russians, that 
her fear of them diminished somewhat, especially through contact with one officer in 
particular:  ‘He would say “sing!” and we would have to sing German folksongs 
including one with a Russian melody which he also knew – he was so homesick’.94 
This increased empathy with the plight of individual Russians is also reflected in 
some of the other interviews. Dr Siegfried Reinke, also a DSF member, felt that 
particularly after 1953, relations improved:  
With the end of the Stalin era something changed in the consciousness of the 
Russians [...] Stalin was at least as criminal as Hitler [...] such an ideology 
poisons individuals and manipulates their behaviour. In essence I often felt 
sorry for them [...] they suffered twice, once because of the Stalin era and 
once because of the war”.95  
Here the negative actions by the Russians are blamed not on the individual soldiers 
themselves, but on their ‘poisoning’ through an ideology. In this manner, this 
presentation of the innocent German and Russian masses as victims of Hitler and 
Stalin who was ‘at least as criminal’ as his German counterpart, appears to reflect 
elements of the attempts by the DSF to move away from assertions of German 
collective guilt and place the blame with the political elites. Moreover, the appraisal 
of the Russians as victims (‘I often felt sorry for them’) seems to present a shift in 
the perceived power dynamic between occupiers and occupied away from the 
‘brutal’ soldiers who had raped Dr Siegfried Reinke’s neighbours or imprisoned his 
uncle in Sachsenhausen special camp, instead being portrayed as passive pawns of 
larger political developments. Whilst these recollections may also reflect post-1989 
discourses, it is nonetheless conceivable that these positive interactions between 
Germans and Soviets from the late 1940s onwards, combined with aspects of the 
political rhetoric of the DSF, suggest that the East German leadership were able to 
make some inroads into reducing the perceived negative impact which Soviet 
occupation was having in local Brandenburg in the longer-term. 
In contrast to this, twelve of the interviewees claimed that their negative 
attitude towards the Soviets remained unchanged throughout the post-war period as 
well as in the later GDR years. This solidification of negative sentiment appears to 
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have been primarily due to the long-term reverberations of Soviet retaliatory 
violence, punitive policies and NKVD operations which had previously directly 
impacted some of the interviewees in the immediate post-war period. Former NKVD 
prisoner Reinhold Rösner recalled somewhat ambivalently that: ‘I did not have 
hatred towards the Russians, but I was never able to forgive them’.96 In fact, half of 
those interviewed claimed that they could not recall one event which influenced 
them positively towards the occupying army in the years after 1945. Those 
interviewees who still harboured negative sentiments to this day maintained that they 
completely avoided any interaction with the occupying army. For instance, Kurt 
Michel, who did not join the DSF, recalled that his opinion of ‘the Russians’ 
remained negative and ‘he never became friends with them’, while Dr Edith Dorn 
stated that despite her DSF membership she continued to ‘steer clear of them’.97 
Thus, by claiming to have refused any interaction with the Soviets, these 
interviewees, contrary to the first group, claimed to have endeavoured to moderate 
the impact of occupation on their daily lives as best they could by maintaining a 
clear delineation between the local German population and the Russian other without 
attempting to engage with the Soviet soldiers stationed in their towns in 
Brandenburg. 
Satjukow’s research on the Mentalitätsgeschichte of East Germans towards 
their Soviet occupiers points out that the blanket term ‘the Russians’, which did not 
reflect the multitude of nationalities united under the Soviet army, continued to be 
loaded with negative connotations for many decades.
98
 This lingering linguistic 
phenomenon can also be observed in the oral history interviews, where the term 
appeared, consciously and unconsciously, to be frequently utilised in a derogatory 
manner by a substantial number of interviewees. On the one hand, this may be a 
function of the negative personal experiences of some the interviewees after the war.  
On the other hand, these negative stereotypes may also reflect the cultural template 
of Goebbels’s doomful propaganda in 1945. Yet it is also conceivable that Jeffrey 
Herf’s observations that the racial aspect of National Socialist ideology was not 
challenged by the East German leadership due ‘to a pessimistic assessment of racist 
anti-Slav sentiment’ among the East Germans may have also played a role in the 
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manner in which some of the interviewees construed their experiences.
99
 Similarly, 
the archival evidence from Brandenburg also suggests that official revision of anti-
Soviet sentiment by the DSF, especially in the early years, focused on cultural 
overtures as well as political integration and instrumentalisation of potentially 
damaging forces in East German society, but did not attempt to fundamentally 
deconstruct the National Socialist ideology with respect to racial pre-conceptions. 
Moreover, the sense of internal cultural superiority which emerged in relation to the 
Soviets in some of the interviewees’ post-war memories in chapter two was further 
reinforced by the fact that from the 1960s onwards, the standard of living in the GDR 
had risen above that in the USSR, thereby further reinforcing feelings of economic 
superiority amongst many East Germans.
100
 
Nonetheless, it appears that some inroads were indeed made into easing some 
of the animosity towards, and pre-conceptions about, Soviets in the decades which 
followed the collapse of the Third Reich. Yet despite some thaw in relations, both 
the archival and oral history evidence suggests that the notion of bilateral amity 
between the occupiers and the occupied remained emotionally loaded for many who 
still carried scars from negative post-war experiences. Whilst some people began to 
view the stationed Soviet soldiers with interest and even empathy, others continued 
to steer clear of them, thereby reinforcing a sense of otherness which continues to 
remain prevalent in the present day despite almost fifty years of co-existence in 
Brandenburg until 1994. This may in part reflect the fact that the DSF and the GDR 
authorities did not provide an adequate public forum in which to air grievances 
honestly, therefore somewhat missing the opportunity for a genuine reconciliation to 
take place on both sides. It perhaps also reflects the fact that outside of the official 
DSF rhetoric of German-Soviet friendship, in actuality the majority of ordinary 
Soviet soldiers, despite being stationed in East Germany, were given little 
opportunity to interact with the local Brandenburg population and, with the 
exception of official commemorative events, their daily lives remained mostly sealed 
off from the East German population. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
The establishment of the DSF in East Germany marked a clear departure from the 
punitive, retaliatory measures which had greeted many Brandenburgers in the wake 
of the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945. By the time that the GDR was officially 
established in 1949, the DSF was charged with altering the more general official 
political discourse on German-Soviet relations as well as providing a favourable 
rhetorical framework with which particularly the returning POWs from the Soviet 
Union could be integrated into society, both politically and economically. The 
evidence suggests that a significant number of POWs and wider sections of the 
population joined and availed themselves of the opportunities in the new political 
system. However, despite some successes by the DSF in making inroads into the 
anti-Sovietism of certain target groups the organisation failed to address the gulf 
between their own political rhetoric and the reality of grassroots experiences. It 
therefore missed the opportunity to engage meaningfully with a wider East German 
audience and somewhat limited the impact of their project on a significant proportion 
of the grassroots population. Indeed, both the archival and oral history evidence 
suggests that membership of the DSF was not necessarily matched with active 
participation within the organisation. In this manner, this mass organisation was only 
partially successful in fulfilling its statute’s aim of ‘strengthening and deepening the 
friendship of the German people with the people of the Soviet Union’ and it 
therefore appears that the DSF only had limited success in facilitating the transition 
from Nazism to socialism, at least in the early years. 
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Chapter VII: Political transition, reorientation and 
integration for the oral history interviewees 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Whilst the previous two chapters have examined the political transition through the 
lens of two specific political organs, this final chapter aims to investigate the process 
of post-war political transition in grassroots Brandenburg from the perspective of the 
oral history interviewees who were aged between twelve and twenty-four in 1945. In 
1945, the KPD had considered individuals in this age group to be an important 
cornerstone in attempts to remove the National Socialist ideology from the public 
sphere as they were not only considered to be the ones most influenced by Nazism, 
but also the future of the new state.
1
 As Michael Buddrus highlights, by autumn 
1945 leading KPD and SMAD youth officers agreed that for ‘pragmatic reasons’ 
German youth was to be given a general amnesty. The ‘Hitler Youth generation’, 
according to the new political formula, had been ‘misused by the Nazis’ and it was 
utterly inconceivable that young people might have had positive memories of the 
Third Reich’.2  
Correspondingly, the aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the 
present cohort of interviewees had negative or positive memories of the Third Reich 
and their patterns of response to the subsequent political caesura.  Specifically, the 
question of how this cohort of young Brandenburgers experienced this political 
transition will be addressed as well as exploring factors which may have both 
impeded and facilitated the process of transition. Furthermore, the patterns of post-
war personal and economic integration and their potential impact on processes of 
‘normalisation’ will examined.3 The final section of this chapter briefly explores the 
extent to which the Third Reich remained a reference point for the oral history 
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interviewees after 1952 against the backdrop of the official antifascist discourse of 
the GDR. 
 
7.2 Political transition and reorientation in the shadow of the Third 
Reich  
This section will explore some of the personal processes and perceptions of 
ideological transition amongst this specific age cohort, thirteen of whom had been 
teenagers, while seven had been young adults in 1945. Whilst none of the 
interviewees had been old enough to become personally active as significant Third 
Reich functionaries, almost all had been previously involved, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in National Socialist youth groups. Whilst their personal experiences and 
memories of the Third Reich in Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde had been 
heterogeneous, certain patterns did emerge. 
Irrespective of their current political views, fourteen of the oral history 
interviewees stated that they had personally experienced the Third Reich as being a 
very positive or predominantly positive time, corresponding with Confino’s findings 
that often ‘people remembered the Nazi era positively in the private sphere and 
everyday life’.4 The most positive memories associated with pre-war Germany in the 
interviews revolved around the re-emergence of Germany as an economic power 
post-1933 and around childhood experiences of the Jungvolk, Hitler Youth and 
BDM. Especially the older males emphasised their positive recollections of the 
reduction of unemployment as well as the building of the Autobahn and the 
armament industry, which provided their fathers and uncles with job opportunities, 
as well as creating apprenticeship positions and future career paths for the 
interviewees themselves. Likewise, Widera has also found that for many people in 
post-war Dresden, memories of the National Socialist dictatorship were closely tied 
to the memories of the economic prosperity after the world economic crisis.
5
  
Almost all of the twenty interviewees had been involved in the various 
National Socialist youth groups such as the Jungvolk or Jungmädel, while half of 
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them had additionally been a member of the Hitler Youth, the BDM or the NS-
Studentenbund or a combination of these.
6
 It appears that particularly when the 
activities of these youth groups overlapped with games, theatre and music that the 
positive memories were most pronounced. By the time of the outbreak of the war in 
September 1939, the average age of the interviewees had been ten years, with the 
youngest being six years old and the oldest being eighteen years old. Some, 
especially those who had been young boys at the time, still recalled the excitement of 
perceived military victory and adventure. War, at least initially, had been perceived 
by the majority of the interview cohort as not necessarily negative and did not seem 
to be equated in the interviews with a re-evaluation of National Socialist ideology 
and foreign policy. For instance, Gunther Dietrich, who was aged eleven at the 
outbreak of the war, recalled that ‘we understood why Germany acted the way it 
did’.7 Three quarters of the interviewees reported that they had positive memories of 
the war, frequently recalling the infectious wave of enthusiasm about war which had 
spread across Germany with the quick victories in 1939 and 1940. The hero cult 
surrounding the Wehrmacht spread rapidly, and particularly amongst the males, the 
idealised image of pilots and flying became central to many memories of the Third 
Reich. This appeared to be closely linked to a ‘normalisation’ of military life and the 
expansion of its influence into the civilian sphere. For instance, Dr Siegfried Reinke 
recalled that ‘I remember that we were fanatical in the Third Reich [...] I was proud 
to walk through Brandenburg/Havel in my flak uniform at fifteen years of age [...] 
we were trimmed for the defence and preservation of the German Reich, our 
homeland’.8  
This normalisation of violence was also adapted and integrated into daily 
children’s games in both towns, as a game called ‘fragment collecting’, where bomb 
fragments would be eagerly searched for and swapped amongst children, became 
immensely popular. Similarly, Paul Gärtner recalled with enthusiasm that: ‘the best 
thing was when you found a steel helmet [...] or a rocket propelled grenade [...] 
because they were all things we played with as children’.9 Common terminology also 
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existed across the interviews for the formation of the bombs which fell on Berlin, 
with a large number of the interviewees describing them as ‘Christmas trees’, an 
apparent paradox where the narrative of the symbol of peace and reconciliation is 
juxtaposed with the violence of civilian deaths. For most of the interviewees, it was 
only the very end of the war, bringing with it the bombing attacks on 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde, which finally appeared to have brought the 
reality of the magnitude of Third Reich violence home, as it became something 
utterly tangible and personal.  
In 1945 the KPD and in particular Erich Honecker had high hopes that 
elements of this ‘Hitler Youth’ generation could be absorbed by both the five bloc 
parties as well as the mass organisations, specifically the FDJ.
10
 For this reason, 
significant resources were invested in building up the FDJ after the war, and by June 
1946 its first parliament took place in Brandenburg/Havel, attended by roughly 1,000 
delegates.
11
 However, the historiography on the process of political transition from 
one ideological system to another on the other end of the political spectrum, 
especially among this younger so-called ‘Hitler Youth generation’, is divided.12 Alan 
McDougall maintains that the transition to the FDJ ‘was relatively straightforward, 
helped in no small part by the age-based exoneration of the Hitler Youth 
generation’.13 In contrast, others such as Leonore Ansorg argue that ‘the FDJ was 
received by many youths with resentment – after their experiences with the National 
Socialist regime, they were more unwilling to join a new organization immediately 
and tie themselves to a new political idea’.14 Alexander von Plato has taken a more 
differentiated approach, maintaining that reactions varied, with a smaller proportion 
seeking a ‘new clear ideological framework’ within the new socialist movement, 
while many others found it ‘hard to accept the new political leaders’ and ‘resolved 
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never again to join a political party’.15 For the oral history interviewees who, being 
aged between twelve and twenty-four in 1945, largely fell into this amnestied youth 
generation, this conversion process also appears to have developed in a differentiated 
manner, with the retrospective recollections of political transition varying greatly 
from negativity, through passivity, to positivity.  
A proportion of the oral history interviewees claimed that they found both the 
transition from Nazism as well as the prescribed reorientation to socialism extremely 
difficult in the post-war period. Dr Siegfried Reinke, who was fifteen in 1945, and 
had previously recalled being an ‘ardent patriot in the Jungvolk and in the Hitler 
Youth’, now also felt that: ‘It was difficult, it was difficult because one was still far 
too much connected with that which had come before’. He recalled his strong 
wariness at the rapid political shift which took place in Brandenburg/Havel in 1945: 
It was an extremely difficult time. It was immediately the Stalinist doctrine, 
there were completely different administrative structures staffed with people 
who frequently did not have the necessary qualification, but were simply 
members of the KPD. My uncle was a builder and suddenly he was made a 
town councillor because he was in the KPD. I perceived it with great 
uneasiness and distrust.
16
  
Dr Reinke, who in later years became an SED member, recalled that the realisation 
that ‘fascism’ had been a negative concept took time: ‘it is a process [...] I didn’t just 
wake up one morning [...] it took two or three years’.17 He claimed that the fact that 
the new political system had been brought to Brandenburg by the Soviets played an 
important role in his refusal to undergo political transition in the early years.  
Eight interviewees claimed to have viewed communism in predominantly 
negative or very negative terms in the early post-war years. Whilst Dr Edith Dorn, 
also fifteen at the end of the war, claimed to have found the transition from Nazism 
relatively easy, she nonetheless also perceived the required reorientation towards 
socialism as being extremely problematic as the system had been ‘forced’ on them 
by ‘the Russians’: ‘because we had experienced what we had [...] it would have been 
impossible for me to become a communist’.18 Similarly, Gertrud Hirsch, who was 
seventeen at the end of the war, stated that she found the transition away from 
Nazism quite straightforward, yet claimed to have rejected the new political system 
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outright: ‘we didn’t want anything to do with them because they were all too pro-
Russian’, recalling that the newly converted antifascists in her workplace were 
ridiculed and considered to have been ‘smug and self-important’.19 Whilst these 
interviews suggest that anti-Soviet attitudes acted as an impediment to political 
conversion and mobilisation for some individuals in the post-war period, there were 
also some who claimed that they strategically accommodated themselves to the new 
political context, despite their antipathy towards both the Soviets and the 
communists. Wilhelm Fiedler, twenty-four at the time, claimed that he quickly 
adapted to the new political status quo, despite feeling frustration that ‘the Russian 
commander was in charge’, recalling that ‘I didn’t agree with the communist system 
[...] but it was about building up an existence’.20  
 There were also those interviewees who claimed they had felt either 
powerless or apathetic about the new politics which were being introduced in their 
towns after 1945. Karl Schmidt, twenty-four at the time recalled feeling absolutely 
passive, believing that ‘there was nothing one could do’, while Ulla Beck, fourteen 
in 1945, felt that when it came to the political transition ‘that we were the defeated 
[...] and had to feel and act accordingly’.21 Alongside these feelings of utter passivity 
in the face of macro political developments were those who claimed to have been 
uninterested in the political transition which was taking place around them. Eight 
interviewees claimed that they had no opinion on the concepts of communism and 
antifascism in the post-war period, and did not occupy themselves with the issue as 
they felt that they were too preoccupied by more salient existential issues. For 
instance, Wolfgang Fried, eighteen years old in 1945, claimed that he was not 
interested in the political transition, while Arnold Schulze, fourteen at the time, 
claimed that he ‘didn’t even know what communism or antifascism were’.22 
Similarly, Carmen Jung, seventeen years old at the end of the war, felt that ‘it was all 
about food’ and that this divergence of interests created a gulf between high politics 
and grassroots developments: 
It was not an issue [...] not us little people, it was others who did that [...] the 
little person had to see how he would pull through [...] a new government 
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was established and then there was simply a new government there [...] we 
were happy that the war was over at long last.
23
  
Here the use of the term ‘us little people’ suggests a sense of disconnection from 
larger political developments and changes which were taking place in the Soviet 
zone. Instead, Carmen Jung emphasises a feeling of detachment as one government 
was replaced with another and the ‘little people’ were left to concern themselves 
with urgent existential matters while the big politics took place in a different realm. 
What appeared to matter most here was not the political system which was to replace 
Nazism, but rather the more immediate relief for a young woman that the war had 
finally come to an end in Fürstenwalde. 
The third group within the group of interviewees were those who recalled the 
post-war political transition and reorientation in relatively positive terms. Gunther 
Dietrich, eighteen years old at the time, who recalled having believed in German 
victory until the very last days of the war, now claimed to have felt that ‘communism 
in principle was not bad’ and that ‘we would fight against fascism any time [...] that 
was strong’.24 Similarly, Berol Kaiser-Reka, fifteen in 1945, who during the Third 
Reich had claimed to have ‘avoided the Pimpfe as much as I could’, now considered 
the political transition to be a new beginning and recalled: ‘It was like starting in a 
new school and learning a new subject which had hitherto been completely unknown 
to me’.25 Paul Gärtner, fourteen at the time, was even more enthusiastic about the 
opportunity for political transition claiming that he found it easy to leave the 
previous political framework behind and quickly identify with and support the new 
political system: ‘One learned about Marx, one learned about Engels, one heard 
about Liebknecht [...] one learned that [...] just like we learned fascism [...] as a child 
you forget a lot afterwards [...] that is the past’. He went on to claim that on learning 
about communism and antifascism, he was ‘enthralled with the concepts’ and that 
‘that was the school of my life’, later becoming an ardent member of the SED.26  
Yet, in addition to these outright positive recollections there were also those 
amongst the interviewees who claimed to have had positive attitudes towards 
socialism in principle, whilst maintaining that they were somewhat critical about its 
realisation in practice. These particular interviewees recalled that their attitudes 
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towards the post-war political transition were very much influenced by political 
sentiments within their families, especially the political convictions of their fathers. 
Hans Gericke, who was twenty-one in 1945 and had previously admitted that ‘the 
National Socialists certainly had excellent propaganda and a strong persuasive 
power’, recalled that: ‘My father was an avowed communist and we welcomed the 
fact that National Socialism finally came to an end’.27 In contrast, those whose 
families had Social Democratic backgrounds appeared to find the transition 
somewhat more challenging. Alfred Wegewitz, eighteen in 1945, recalled that it was 
easy for him to leave National Socialism behind, but somewhat more challenging to 
embrace the new political status quo: ‘It was difficult because for many it was a leap 
from Weimar democracy [...] I think about my father [...] now suddenly he should be 
subservient to the communist ideology [...] He remained a Social Democrat’. He 
claimed that ‘as long as you take the [communist] theory by itself it’s wonderful’ but 
felt that ‘at some stage there is a point where it is demanded of you that you must 
believe’ and that in practice he could not convert to the new ideology.28 Similarly, 
Kurt Michel, fourteen at the time, also recalled the difficulty of the transition for his 
socialist father who, as chair of the local SPD branch after 1945, supposedly 
boycotted the union of the SPD with the KPD.
29
 Whilst this emphasis on the 
idealistic aspects of socialism in theory juxtaposed with the realisation of socialism 
in practice in the GDR may have indeed been the case for the interviewees and their 
families, it also appears to mirror aspects of what Sabrow has termed the 
‘Fortschrittsgedächtnis’ which continues to vie for influence in current political and 
cultural discourses in united Germany.
30
 
Yet not all of the interviewees appear to have been cautious about the new 
official ideology in the GDR and whilst some seem to have been swayed by political 
attitudes within their families, the opposite was also the case. For instance, for 
Wolfgang Heinrich, twelve years old in 1945, a generational gap became evident, 
when his enthusiastic enrolment in the FDJ was met with caution and scepticism by 
his more conservative parents and grandparents.
31
 These interviews therefore suggest 
that familial political traditions could have a strong impact on the manner in which 
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some of the interviewees claimed to have responded to the new political system in 
the early post-war years. However, familial influences could also be rebelled against, 
suggesting that different attitudes to the political transition could also create rifts 
within families and relationships. 
These memories, which ranged from positively embracing the new ideology 
and the perception of a new beginning, to feeling politically lost, or reminiscing 
about the past, illustrate the diversity amongst recollections of post-war political 
transition. Furthermore, the oral history evidence suggests that a transition from a 
seemingly passive observer to an active political agent of the new ideology was 
limited amongst the interviewees, at least in the early post-war period. Seventeen of 
the twenty interviewees stated that they had felt that political engagement had been 
unimportant to them personally in the years which followed the collapse of the Third 
Reich.  
However, despite their apparent lack of political interest, when one examines 
the political memberships amongst the interviewees all of them had become a 
member of a mass organisation or political party by the 1950s. In addition to the 
twelve who had become DSF members, fourteen had joined the FDGB, seven had 
become FDJ members and a further four had joined the Kulturbund and other mass 
organisations.
32
 The motivation for joining, or abstaining, appeared to differ from 
one mass organisation to another.
33
 When it came to members of the FDGB, their 
self-representation was generally that of detached passivity, with the interviewees 
apparently being recruited knowingly or unknowingly through their jobs. Fritz 
Krause claimed: ‘that was a given, we weren’t asked’, while Karl Schmidt joined the 
FDGB because of his job, comparing it to the ‘apolitical’ KdF in the Third Reich: 
‘That wasn’t a political organisation’.34 This claim that FDGB membership did not 
translate into political mobilisation or support of the new system was common across 
the interviews.  
In contrast, the majority of those interviewees who had joined the FDJ 
claimed to have actively sought membership in order to avail themselves of related 
                                                 
32
 In her theory of ‘participatory dictatorship’ Mary Fulbrook emphasises the ‘huge area of overlap’ 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’ in the GDR as ‘literally millions of people were involved in one way or 
another with the activities of the state institutions, parties and mass organisations’. Fulbrook, People’s 
State, p. 295. 
33
 Across the GDR, virtually all of the adult working population had belonged to the FDGB, while 
half had belonged to the DSF; see Fulbrook, Anatomy, p. 85.  
34
 Krause, 09.09.09. Schmidt, 10.06.09. 
225 
 
career advancing opportunities. Dr Siegfried Reinke recalled joining the FDJ in 1952 
in order to improve his chances at getting a university place.
35
 Likewise, Dr Edith 
Dorn claimed that she joined the FDJ in 1949 in order to be eligible for a university 
scholarship: ‘It’s not a noble reason, but many did that’.36 In contrast to FDGB 
membership, where many of the interviewees claimed that they had become 
members against their knowledge or will, these particular interviewees appear to 
have used their Eigensinn in order best to utilise the opportunities available to them 
through the FDJ within a restricted political context.  
Nonetheless, although all the interviewees became members of at least one 
mass organisation, only three claimed to have later joined a political party. Whilst 
Paul Gärtner and Wolfgang Heinrich enthusiastically joined the SED, subsequently 
becoming avid supporters of the GDR and its ideological system, Dr Siegfried 
Reinke, although later not being entirely averse to the new political system, claimed 
to have joined the SED for more pragmatic reasons in order to benefit from increased 
employment opportunities. 
In sum, the impact of the ideological transition process for the interview 
cohort in the shadow of the collapse of the Third Reich appears to have been 
complex and marked with memories of negativity, passivity as well as positivity. 
Although fourteen of the interviewees claimed to have been, to a greater or lesser 
extent, positive towards National Socialism, twelve of the interviewees claimed to 
have found the transition away from the Third Reich relativity straightforward. 
Despite this claim, this was not necessarily matched by active political participation 
in the initial post-war years by the large majority of the interviewees. Instead, for 
most of the interviewees, gradual political mobilisation into mass organisations 
began to occur only in the early 1950s, corresponding with reaching adulthood as 
well as reflecting wider patterns of mass membership which, as in the cases of the 
NDPD and the DSF, began to occur more generally at this time. Yet when it came to 
engaging meaningfully with the new ideological message, the large majority of the 
interviewees claimed to have had feelings of either apathy or aversion. Only four of 
the interviewees recalled believing that communism was ‘good’ in the post-war 
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period, while the antifascist discourse appeared to have been conducted on an 
abstract plane, to which many could not relate.  
The fact that only four interviewees claimed to have had a positive attitude to 
the new political system in the post-war period must be treated with an element of 
caution. By claiming that one joined organisations against one’s will or without 
one’s knowledge may perhaps also be used on occasion to distance the interviewee 
somewhat from complicity with the GDR regime today. Similarly, the claim that one 
simply used organisations like the FDJ in order to facilitate social and economic 
advancement presents the individual as an active agent rather than a passive 
participator. Whilst the potential for retroactive interference and conscious or 
unconscious embellishment of one’s past actions applies to the oral history 
interviews throughout this entire thesis, arguably the question of political 
participation in the second German dictatorship has an even higher potential for 
retrospectively downplaying one’s support of the socialist system and instead 
adapting one’s past to fit better into current dominant political discourses. This 
applies both to the memories of how quickly the interviewees felt they were able to 
abandon National Socialist ideology as well as to how enthusiastically they may 
have partaken in the new socialist system.  
Nonetheless, the oral history memories cannot be completely disregarded in 
this respect and the spectrum of the oral history responses appear to reflect 
Alexander von Plato’s findings, cited above, that a proportion of the amnestied youth 
generation eagerly embraced the new ideological framework in the post-war period, 
whilst many others had difficulties in accepting the new political status quo and 
instead chose to disengage somewhat from the political system in the GDR. 
However, the post-war transition from Nazism to socialism did not just occur at a 
political level for the interviewees, and as shall be explored in the following section, 
opportunities for economic integration were also to play an important role in 
stabilising and cementing the passage from the Third Reich to the GDR in 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde. 
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7.3 The beginnings of normalisation and the resumption of daily life 
under new political parameters  
Although a substantial number of the interviewees claimed to have been inactive in 
the newly imposed political sphere in the immediate aftermath of the Third Reich, 
they nonetheless often experienced a degree of integration after 1945, albeit in a 
personal and economic, rather than initially in a political, sense. The oral history 
interviews suggest that a desire for personal happiness and economic considerations 
frequently superseded more abstract reflections on contemporary political 
developments. This was perhaps unsurprising given that this age cohort averaged 
sixteen years of age in 1945, and was therefore often not burdened with the same 
responsibilities as their parents’ generation. Despite the post-war violence, chaos and 
destruction, the interviewees recalled many memories of personal positive 
experiences from this period, focusing both on pleasant private experiences, as well 
as a resumption of scholarly and economic pursuits, reflecting a post-war desire to 
‘escape into everyday life’.37 It was arguably these personal and economic factors 
which were just as effective as, or even more important than political re-education in 
aiding post-war normalisation and integration into the new political system for the 
oral history interviewees. 
In contrast to the previous restrictions created by regimented Hitler Youth 
activities and the war, a substantial number of the interviewees emphasised having 
more free time and freedom in the immediate post-war period. Despite extreme 
material shortages, both Hans Gericke and Gunther Dietrich enthusiastically helped 
to rebuild their local rowing clubs by the river Havel, while Dr Siegfried Reinke 
recalled that he was happy that he could finish his apprenticeship.
38
 The youthful 
wish of this generation to enjoy oneself once again could be most clearly seen in the 
repeated stories of going to dances, thereby attempting to overcome obstacles such 
as material shortages and the presence of Soviet soldiers, and in doing so illustrated 
the scope of action available to individuals despite the severely restricted context. 
Although the post-war scarcity of commodities was acute, Christine Küster recalled 
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with delight how her aunt had sewn a dress for her out of an old duvet cover, which 
was ‘white with pretty pink diamonds’ in order that she too could go dancing, while 
Ulla Beck recalled that in Fürstenwalde:  
A large dance floor was built in the Goetheplatz [...] and we learned a little 
dancing amongst ourselves in school [...] I was allowed to go at six in the 
evening and the first boys came in FDJ blue shirts and asked the girls to 
dance [...] at night we weren’t allowed on the street on our own, that was 
dangerous, we always had to walk home from dancing in twos, if possible 
with two boys.
39
  
Similar to the collective precautions taken against sexual assaults explored in chapter 
two, this organised walking home in groups from dances emerged as a salient 
memory for the majority of the interviewees. In this manner, the interviewees appear 
to have attempted to adapt their desire to pursue their youthful wish for frolicking to 
the reality of the often dangerous incursions by some Soviet soldiers, thereby carving 
out a certain room for manoeuvre for themselves despite the confined post-war 
circumstances. 
This desire for normalisation after experiencing often extreme violence 
during and after the war is also mirrored in the contemporary local media. A glance 
at the local ‘Fürstenwalder Nachrichtenblatt’ newspaper from the summer of 1949, 
for instance, reveals that the announcement section was dominated by 
advertisements for building materials, dances and classified ads from women seeking 
‘a good husband’, suggesting that the most salient local concerns at the time were of 
a practical, personal and not overtly political nature.
40
 Similarly, the oral history 
interviewees emphasised their own positive associations with the post-war period in 
connection with personal experiences of love and marriage which often occurred in 
this period. The mean year of marriage of the oral history cohort was 1953, and 
seventeen later had one or more children. Kurt Michel recalled that the post-war 
period was the time when he met his future wife and fell in love, while Ulla Beck 
also felt that the nicest thing about the post-war period was meeting her future 
husband.
41
 Similarly, Fulbrook has found that for those born in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, the 1950s, despite political constraints, was a period of post-war 
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‘normalisation’ for many, where a ‘sense of “normal” family life was accompanied 
by a renewed sense of personal agency’.42 Likewise, for many of the interviewees 
the emotional component of their post-war memories and the important caesurae of 
love and childrearing appeared to have been much more important in anchoring them 
in the early GDR and returning to a ‘normal’ daily life than were contemporary 
political developments. Moreover, this (re)building of personal and familial 
connections after 1945 was to be further strengthened by subsequent economic 
integration of the majority of the interviewees in Brandenburg/Havel and 
Fürstenwalde. 
The economic sphere in both towns experienced changes as well as some 
continuity after the collapse of the Third Reich. Local administrative reports from 
Fürstenwalde indicate that already by July 1945, despite severe material shortages, 
smaller tradesmen and businesses such as cobblers, tailors, bricklayers, roofers and 
nurseries had slowly begun to start functioning again, while the larger industries 
continued to lie dormant as a result of war damage, dismantling and an acute supply 
shortage.
43
 By October 1945, out of a total population of 2,478,369 in the state of 
Brandenburg, official figures indicate that unemployment was at 30%, while in 
Brandenburg/Havel, 50% of the 76,715 residents were officially unemployed.
44
 
Similar high levels of unemployment were also reported in Fürstenwalde in the 
ensuing period and these grassroots economic developments had an effect both on 
the parents of those interviewed as well as on the interviewees themselves.
45
  
In terms of the social and economic standing of the family, the interviews 
provide evidence of continuities, fissures and ruptures after 1945 often manifesting 
themselves in upward as well as downward social and economic mobility. Despite 
the multitude of structural changes associated with the post-war transition, more than 
half of those interviewed reported that their father held the same job after 1945. Dr 
Siegfried Reinke’s father returned to Brandenburg/Havel from the war in 1948 and 
once again worked in the railway station as a station master, despite the fact that the 
changed political situation and conditions ‘made it difficult for him’.46 Christine 
Küster’s father began to rebuild his painting business after the war, but was soon 
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forced into a production co-operative, while Alfred Wegewitz’s father experienced a 
promotion due to his political background as a Social Democrat and SED member, 
becoming head of the waterworks in Fürstenwalde.
47
 In contrast, others such as Ulla 
Beck’s father could not continue in his old job because the factory he had worked in 
was dismantled by the Russians, while Reinhold Rösner’s father was also unable to 
continue in his previous job as the local cable works in Fürstenwalde were 
dismantled, later becoming a caretaker.
48
 Downward mobility after the Third Reich 
had a negative effect on some of the interviewees. Ulla Beck from Fürstenwalde 
recalled the drop in social and economic standing for her family:  
Previously we lived comfortably [...] and afterwards when we had nothing to 
eat I felt that we were poor people – that is a really, really terrible feeling, my 
father could no longer work and my mother had to work for a farmer, we 
really were poor people.
49
  
It was not just the parents of those interviewed, but also the interviewees themselves, 
who were forced to adjust to the changed employment situation in the new political 
system after the war. Many had to adapt to the new industrial demands as the 
economy shifted from war production to post-war reconstruction. Hans Gericke had 
worked in aviation prior to 1945; yet after the war the demand for his skills was no 
longer there, so he re-trained in the construction industry.
50
 Likewise, Gunther 
Dietrich had aspired to be an aircraft engineer before 1945 but became a construction 
engineer instead.
51
 Many others had to adapt by showing flexibility and utilising 
entrepreneurial skills. Some, such as Reinhold Rösner, capitalised on his local pre-
1945 connections in the tyre factory in order to find a job on his release from NKVD 
captivity.
52
 Gertrud Hirsch, seventeen when the war ended, resorted to working in 
many different jobs in the post-war period, from hard physical labour, to knitting, to 
being a typist in the local ‘Gaselan’ company (which had been rebuilt on the 
‘Pintsch’ site) and various other local administrative positions.53 Likewise, Carmen 
Jung, also seventeen at the time, had dreamed of becoming a draftswoman before 
1945, yet instead was forced to work in a number of different unskilled jobs after the 
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war and also moved from hard physical labour, to knitting, to various administrative 
positions.
54
  
Whilst the entire interview cohort subsequently integrated relatively well into 
the new economic system, it appears as though it was the youngest interviewees who 
experienced the most rapid levels of social and economic mobility due to the vacuum 
created after the Third Reich as a consequence of war deaths as well as the 
absconding of people to other German occupation zones. Arnold Schulze, fourteen in 
1945, felt that ‘everything was new, the intelligentsia mostly fled to the West’, 
recalling that he therefore received a good lecturing post, despite feeling that he 
‘really wasn’t very qualified’.55 Likewise, the accountant Ulla Beck, also fourteen in 
1945, recalled that her generation was ‘given the opportunity [for advancement] and 
those that were stupid, those that didn’t do that, that was their own fault’.56 
Similarly, Wolfgang Heinrich, twelve years old in 1945, recalled the opportunities 
which he received in the post-war period because he was from the ‘right’ kind of 
background: ‘It was wonderful [...] everything that you wanted was supported for 
you by the officials’. He was given the opportunity to attend an ABF (Arbeiter–und–
Bauern-Fakultät) which offered great chances for social mobility, becoming an 
engineer.
57
 Consequently, Heinrich now viewed his political engagement in the post-
war period as extremely important for his political, economic and personal 
advancement: ‘It was strongly linked to my development, it could not be 
separated’.58  
In this manner, a substantial number of the interviewees were presented with 
a large number of economic opportunities, albeit within a constrained political 
context, on which they were given the chance to capitalise. As a consequence, a 
proportion felt loyal to the new political system which had enabled their economic 
mobility. Alfred Wegewitz was able to use his family’s economic and political 
background to his advantage after his return from an English POW camp:  
I could attend secondary school with exceptional permission of the 
communist Ministerpräsident of Brandenburg [...] I had of course written to 
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him and said that my father was a member of the SED and that I belonged to 
the working classes, both were of course true, and as a result I got the special 
permission.
59
  
Yet, not all of the interviewees were offered this room for manoeuvre in the 
post-war period as the economic and political backgrounds of individuals and their 
families appear to have also acted as an impediment to climbing the economic 
ladder. Christine Küster was not given the opportunity to attend the ABF after the 
war because her father was a self-employed tradesman. Only in later years was she 
able to study engineering and economic construction in the 1960s and become a 
trading director. She claimed that these difficulties which she experienced as a 
consequence of being from a bourgeois background had a longer-term negative 
impact on her political attitude and activity in the GDR: ‘A party which only 
supports workers and farmers [...] and not the rest [...] I can’t follow such an 
ideology and I won’t join such a party’.60 Similarly, former NKVD internee 
Reinhold Rösner later faced great challenges in economically integrating in the new 
political system: ‘I wanted to study and kept getting rejected and later could only 
study via distance learning [...] I always thought it was due to the fact that I was in 
the camp and was classified as a National Socialist perpetrator’.61 Nonetheless, 
despite these impediments, Rösner was successfully able to become an economist as 
the restrictions against him were increasingly relaxed in the later GDR years. 
When one examines the entire biographical trajectories of this interview 
cohort in terms of employment, the significance of social mobility and shifting status 
becomes apparent. By the time the interviewees had reached retirement age, nine 
held high professional posts, eight had middle level jobs in supervisory or executive 
roles, while three had semi-skilled or skilled manual jobs. This stands in contrast to 
the positions of their fathers in the previous generation, none of whom had held a 
high professional post: half had worked in middle level jobs in supervisory or 
executive roles while the other half had worked in semi-skilled or skilled jobs. When 
compared with the interviewees’ mothers, the differences become even more 
apparent. Three quarters of the mothers had either been unskilled or semi-skilled 
manual workers, three had been skilled manual workers, while only two had held a 
supervisory or executive position. Whilst these developments are in no way 
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representative of wider Brandenburg society, they do, however, appear to reflect 
more general social trends, especially in relation to female economic mobility and 
emancipation, particularly in the GDR but also more generally across Europe in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Yet the high level of social mobility, 
particularly between the male interviewees and their fathers, nonetheless point to the 
unusually large number of economic opportunities available to this generation as a 
result of the post-war vacuum as well as the absconding of people to the West. The 
interview evidence in turn illustrates the important role which economic 
opportunities seem to have had in anchoring this group of oral history interviewees 
within the new political system after 1945. Whilst self-representations such as these 
can perhaps partly be attributed to post-1989 discourses of having strategically 
accommodated oneself to the political system of the GDR without personally 
supporting the underlying ideology, the archival evidence indicates that a similar 
trend of using political membership simply as a stepping-stone and then disengaging 
from active participation was also evident in the NDPD and DSF during this period. 
It therefore appears that where the interests of the new administration and the 
grassroots population most closely converged, there were the most positive effects in 
facilitating the post-war political transition for the interviewees. Yet given the fact 
that this interview group had, by definition, remained living in Brandenburg these 
developments are not reflective of the wider grassroots population at that time. 
Indeed, there were many, including those who were permanently excluded from their 
communities through denazification or sequestering and were not given this 
relatively wide latitude for economic mobility, who instead exercised Eigensinn by 
leaving their towns and not partaking in this process of integration and stabilisation. 
Even amongst these interviewees, a substantial number stated that they had, at some 
point in the post-war period, considered absconding to the West, but claimed that 
they had been motivated to stay due to emotional ties to families and homesteads.
62
 
Instead, it appears that the new system, despite its enormous political restrictions, 
provided this group of interviewees, who had been young people at the end of the 
war, with opportunities for a form of normalisation after the chaos of the war in 
which they were able to pursue their own personal happiness as well as beginning or 
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continuing with interrupted career paths. By providing the majority of the 
interviewees with this limited room for manoeuvre and a degree of support in the 
economic sphere, it seems that the authorities somewhat moderated the impact of the 
political transition from Nazism to socialism in grassroots Brandenburg. In turn, the 
increased economic participation of local Brandenburgers subsequently appears to 
have contributed to the gradual stabilisation of the regime from the early 1950s 
onwards. 
 
7.4 The salience of the National Socialist past beyond the post-war 
transition period 
This final section will explore whether the National Socialist past held any relevance 
for the interviewees beyond the transition period of the late 1940s and early 1950s 
and in what way the memories of the interviewees in this regard may have been 
influenced by subsequent attempts to politically instrumentalise the past in the 
official discourse of the GDR in later decades.  
The oral history evidence suggests that half of the interviewees did not 
perceive the Third Reich to be a salient personal reference point in the post-war 
years and in the decades which followed. Wolfgang Heinrich maintained that 
everyone was now agreed about the past and that ‘no one ever spoke about the Third 
Reich anymore’.63 Carmen Jung felt that because her generation had a more ‘light-
hearted and rosy view of the world’ they were able to adapt more quickly to the new 
system than her parents’ and grandparents’ generations.64 Similarly, Berol Kaiser-
Reka felt that he had no reason to think or speak about the past, and instead only 
thought about the future, while Erika Schulz stated that she just focused on her life 
and her job.
65
   
In contrast, the remainder felt that their experiences and memories of the 
Third Reich did continue to play a salient role, both during the post-war political 
transition as well as in the GDR. Some, such as Arnold Schulze, felt that ‘one likes 
to remember things that used to be better and is maybe annoyed by things that are 
now worse’.66  These memories also appear to have been discussed in social or 
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workplace contexts. For instance, Gunther Dietrich recalled that he would talk about 
the Third Reich with his colleagues, with many of them fondly reminiscing about the 
technical advances of the Third Reich, especially when compared with the stark 
reality of post-war East Germany: ‘We thought about the fact that the Nazis had built 
up an unparalleled economic power between 1933 and 1939 [...] one must say that, 
regardless of what came of it’.67 Dr Siegfried Reinke stated that he and his 
colleagues would share adventure stories from the Hitler Youth amongst each other 
in the workplace.
68
 Christine Küster stated that they would often talk about the Third 
Reich amongst their circle of friends, especially in the early years, sometimes 
singing military songs from this period, although she was keen to stress that ‘they 
were not Nazi songs’.69 Wilhelm Fiedler recalled:  
The memory is of course alive [...] negative in the sense of the whole 
rearmament, the ideological manipulation [...] then of course the horrific war 
period [...] but positive in the sense that once again rebuilding was carried 
out, people once again had jobs and food, that there was once again calm and 
order [...] that the trains ran properly again.
70
  
These ‘arenas of articulation’ appear to have played an important part in solidifying 
memories of the Third Reich for many of the interviewees.
71
 
Such sentiments, in which positive and negative perceptions of Nazism exist 
side by side, were also reflected in the recent flurry of debate which followed the 
Eva Herman debacle on German public television in October 2007 in which she was 
perceived to be claiming that the Nazis’ pro-family policies had had certain 
advantages. Similarly, whilst these assertions by some of the oral history 
interviewees also correspond to Alexander von Plato’s findings that in most accounts 
‘individual positive memories may exist with a broader recognition of the horrific 
shadow side of National Socialist rule’, what is perhaps more remarkable is that 
these enduring positive associations outlasted forty years of socialist antifascist 
rhetoric in the GDR, suggesting some of the limits of the SED’s desired 
transformative project amongst some elements of this Hitler Youth generation.
72
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In claiming that these kinds of exchanges involving families, friends and 
work colleagues could take place throughout later decades, the oral history evidence 
somewhat challenges McDougall’s claim that ‘private thoughts and memories of the 
Third Reich – whether positive or negative, defiant or remorseful – remained 
powerful. They were simply given no public outlet in the GDR’.73 Whilst these loci 
may not be defined as ‘public’ in the sense of an open debate on the issue within the 
official discourse, as recent studies by Paul Betts have illustrated, given the fact that 
the private sphere in the GDR became increasingly porous, such claims to have 
positively reminisced about the National Socialist past amongst friends and even in 
the workplace suggest a certain limited flouting of the officially prescribed norms of 
how the Third Reich should and could be represented in the GDR.
74
 It appears that 
even to the present day, the persistence of positive recollections of the Third Reich 
amongst some interviewees continue to run somewhat counter to the acceptable 
norms of remembering the past.  
One possible explanation for this may be that given the young ages of the 
majority of the interviewees during the Third Reich and their corresponding lack of 
accountability for the crimes of that regime, they may feel somewhat more leeway to 
reminisce positively about what they perceive to be positive childhood, teenage and 
young adult experiences in their interviews. Moreover, those interviewees who 
claimed to have flouted the officially prescribed norms in the GDR by ‘publicly’ 
speaking amongst friends and colleagues about topics which were forbidden may 
have also done so in order to present themselves as somewhat challenging the norms 
of the second German dictatorship with which they could have been potentially 
complicit. Whilst this may be the case, contemporary reports in the local archival 
material also indicate that elements of the population continued to make positive 
public references to the Third Reich throughout the post-war years. For instance, 
throughout the late 1940s the Fürstenwalde town council received a number of 
reports that elements of the population in the post-war period were reported to have 
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publicly reminisced that ‘everything was better under Hitler’.75 Similarly, the 
Brandenburg authorities also reported on the public singing of ‘fascist’ and military 
songs across the region, particularly in pubs.
76
  
In contrast, some of the interviewees, such as Christine Küster, claimed that 
the Third Reich was used primarily not as a positive, but as a negative comparative 
reference point to the new political developments in the GDR: ‘we used to say “just 
like with Hitler”’.77 Similarly, Alfred Wegewitz recalled how sometimes he and his 
friends would cynically recall certain events from National Socialism in later years:  
If a few people [...] who knew each other from back then happened to meet 
on that day then it was always said ‘Gosh, are you thinking about it too, 
today is the Führer’s birthday’ [...] cynical yes [...] and on 1 May there were 
parades here [...] and it was said that back then the Kreisleiter used to stand 
there and now the comrade so and so is standing there [...] such cynical 
comparisons.
78
  
In this manner this particular group of interviewees claimed that the new GDR state 
was negatively equated by them with the Third Reich, thereby somewhat distancing 
the interviewees from complicity in both dictatorial systems. Yet this use of the 
Third Reich as a negative point of comparison was also utilised in reference to more 
recent political events as a number of the interviewees, particularly those who stated 
that they had suffered longer-term traumas from the bombing campaigns, claimed 
that their painful memories were freshly triggered by the images of the Afghanistan 
war on television. 
The National Socialist past did not just remain personally salient for some of 
the interviewees; it was also later repeatedly instrumentalised in the official sphere of 
GDR political doctrine as ‘the communists kept memory alive and put it in the 
service of current policy’.79 These official attempts at instrumentalising 
contemporary developments with reference to the Third Reich and Nazism appear to 
have both influenced and acted as a counterpoint to the current memories of the 
interviewees in this regard. In some cases the individual memories appear to have 
somewhat converged with the official GDR state narrative on certain issues, while in 
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other instances the memories amongst the interviewees seem to have diverged from 
the dominant political discourse of the SED. 
One area where this partial dissonance between official discourse and private 
perception was visible was in the case of the uprising on 17 June 1953, which had 
been officially declared by the SED to be the doing of ‘fascist provocateurs’.80 Yet in 
the oral history interviews, where a quarter of those interviewed claimed to have 
personally known someone involved, the majority of the perceptions and memories 
stand in contrast to this official state narrative. Instead, a large proportion felt that 
those involved were merely dissatisfied workers or ordinary people ‘just like you and 
me’, and that ‘everyone knew that it wasn’t the fascists’.81 Whilst these assertions 
appear to reaffirm the current popular debates on this issue which circulate today, 
these interviewees were arguably also exposed to unofficial counter-memories of this 
tenor already before 1989. Myriam Renaudot has found that throughout the GDR 
years the 17 June remained a topic of conversation, both within families as well as in 
the pub. Nonetheless, she also contends that traces of the SED’s ideological 
utilisation of 1953 can still be observed in unified Germany to this day.
82
 
Corresponding with this, a small number of interviewees provided evidence that the 
official state discourse had indeed crossed over and had been absorbed into 
individual perceptions and memories. Paul Gärtner believed that it was ‘fascists’ 
who were involved in the uprising, claiming to have seen people with swastika flags 
and recalling it as a ‘deliberate provocation’; while Wolfgang Heinrich felt certain 
that the uprising was supported by ‘secret financial sources’.83  
Following from this, the GDR state subsequently attempted to continue to 
instrumentalise the National Socialist past, particularly during the highly strained 
Cold War context in the 1950s and 1960s. The framework adopted for rhetorically 
dealing with the Third Reich in official discourse, both domestically and 
internationally, was that of antifascism. As Josie McLellan highlights: ‘The 
relationship between history and official antifascism worked in two directions: on 
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the one hand, antifascism was a means of interpreting the past. On the other, the past 
was used to bolster and legitimate the antifascist state’.84 These propagandistic 
attempts to present East Germany as an antifascist success story were frequently 
presented in radio programmes, while the infamous ‘Brown Books’, which 
‘externalised the Nazi past’ by accusing West Germany of being ‘a paradise for Nazi 
and war criminals’, and attempting to shame hundreds of politicians and high 
ranking officials with incriminating Nazi pasts were an important contemporary 
strategy for the SED state.
85
 These were further complemented with orchestrated 
trials against prominent former National Socialists living in the Federal Republic.
86
  
Whilst only six of those interviewed felt that the Third Reich remained 
topical in official state discourse throughout the GDR it appears that the interviewees 
continue, consciously or unconsciously, to reproduce elements of this Cold War 
propaganda, even in the present day. This was particularly the case with reference to 
the supposedly less thorough denazification process which had taken place in West 
Germany after the war. For instance, Dr Edith Dorn was of the opinion that 
‘certainly more vigorous action was taken here than in other parts of the Federal 
Republic […] they admit that today […] that they continued to work as judges, I 
don’t think that’s good’, while special camp survivor Reinhold Rösner felt that in 
East Germany the former Nazis were ‘left to rot’ in the NKVD camps while in the 
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Federal Republic ‘a large part of the country was built up with active National 
Socialists’.87 Likewise, Dr Siegfried Reinke felt that:  
I would have wished that denazification in the former Federal Republic or 
West Germany had been somewhat more thorough; it is intolerable that Nazi 
judges who shortly before the end of the war gave the order to shoot sailors, 
that they are in leading positions.
88
  
The repeated mention of Bonn’s alleged ‘blood judges’ by the interviewees appear to 
reflect much of what was propagated by GDR itself, particularly until the late 1960s. 
Moreover, it seems likely that Dr Reinke’s reference to the judges who gave the 
order to shoot sailors is perhaps an allusion to the ‘Filbinger Affair’ which concerned 
the uncovering of the severe penalties passed down by the military judge Hans 
Filbinger at the end of the war. These first garnered media attention in 1972 in West 
Germany and finally came to the fore in August 1978 when Filbinger was forced to 
resign his long-running position as the CDU Minister President of Baden 
Württemberg.
89
 This public resignation was utilised in East German propaganda, and 
recently hit the headlines again on Filbinger’s death in 2007, therefore perhaps 
freshly influencing the current memories and opinions of some of the interviewees. 
Yet it also appears possible that this influence may also have an additional source. In 
fact, in January 1971, the year before the Filbinger affair became public, a five-part 
East German television film entitled ‘Rottenknechte’ premiered in the GDR, which 
focused on the death penalties of mutinous sailors in 1945 as well as the subsequent 
successful careers of the former Nazis in the West-German navy and NATO. As the 
Filbinger affair escalated throughout the 1970s, East German television showed re-
runs of ‘Rottenknechte’ up until July 1978, a month before Filbinger finally resigned.   
As Lynn Abrams has argued ‘memory – both individual and collective – 
exists in a symbiotic relationship with the public memorialisation of the past’, and it 
is reasonable therefore to assume that some of these oral history memories and 
opinions on the Third Reich are perhaps directly or indirectly attributable to aspects 
of such Cold War discourses as well as more recent differing political discourses and 
cultural influences.
90
 Yet just as current discussions on the past are multifaceted, so 
too do the interviewees present ‘multiple voices’, which are not seldom 
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‘contradictory and opposed to each other’.91 Whilst the majority of the interviewees 
claim to have generally embraced the fall of the Wall in 1989 and adapted relatively 
well to the third major political transition of their lives, there were some, such as 
Paul Gärtner, who felt fundamentally disillusioned with the society in which he now 
finds himself:  
If one still shows images of Adolf Hitler today on public television then for 
me it is a provocation [...] I see all of the war literature of the fascist army in 
the supermarket and I ask myself what kind of societal development that is.
92
 
Paul Gärtner is not alone in these sentiments as a recent representative study from 
2008 has shown that roughly every ninth East German supposedly longs for a return 
of the GDR.
93
 Whilst such sentiments hint at some of the ambivalences and 
complexities surrounding the most recent ideological changeover in Brandenburg, 
the political transition post-1989 is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
such disillusioned utterances as those by Paul Gärtner, in which he vehemently 
reproduces the antifascist terminology of the ‘fascist army’, perhaps illustrate Biess’s 
observation that ‘participation in antifascist activity was not just motivated by 
opportunism or material needs, but also by a genuine search for new meaning after 
the collapse of National Socialism’.94 In this manner, the antifascist doctrine appears 
to have provided an important framework for some individuals with which to make 
sense of the political system which they had experienced in their youth. 
On the other hand, there is a general consensus in the historical literature that 
there were severe shortcomings in the ability of the antifascist doctrine to adequately 
deal with the impact and legacy of the National Socialist past. As Wierling has 
argued, by defining ‘fascism’ as ‘the politics of the most aggressive segments of the 
capitalist class’ and ‘neglecting National Socialism as a broad political movement’, 
the broader masses of the population in East Germany were able to ‘feel morally 
exonerated’.95 The impact of this can be seen in relation to the widespread perception 
amongst the interviewees that it was the ‘big Nazis’ who supposedly ended up in the 
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West while the ‘small Nazis’ in the East should be allowed to re-integrate into their 
communities in Brandenburg. This relatively wide latitude for reintegration provided 
by the antifascist ideological framework enabled a significant number of individuals 
to re-establish themselves within the new political system as they were absolved 
from moral guilt, and, similar to the NDPD and the DSF, were re-classified as 
victims of the ‘fascist’ machine.  
The flipside to antifascism was that whilst it may have been an effective tool 
for integrating large elements of society as well as being a useful form of self-
representation throughout the ideological wrangling of the Cold War, both the oral 
history and archival evidence suggest that it created a certain gulf between political 
discourse and personal perceptions and memories. As a consequence, it appears that 
no fundamental engagement with one’s own potential complicity could take place in 
the official public sphere in the GDR and instead created the appearance that there 
had been ‘no normal daily life in the Third Reich’.96 This simplified dualistic 
interpretation of the Nazi past, argues von Plato, ‘did not necessarily match the 
experiences of those people who had lived ‘perfectly normal’ lives in the Third 
Reich’.97 In this manner, it appears as though the oral history interviewees were able 
to, in the words of Kansteiner, ‘integrate diverse images’, as the memories of 
positive experiences and perceptions on the Third Reich could continue to co-exist 
parallel to acknowledging the regime’s destructive characteristics.98  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The oral history evidence suggests that  the attempts made by the East German 
administration to rehabilitate and reintegrate young individuals into the new political 
structures after 1945 proved to be a complex undertaking. For Germans who had 
been too young to carry functions in the Third Reich, the oral history evidence 
suggests that the process of political transition was characterised by apathy, 
ambivalence as well as acceptance. It appears that for some interviewees, personal 
memories of the Third Reich remained salient until the present day. For those with 
positive recollections, these were often apparently used as a way to find fault with 
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aspects of GDR development, while others seem to have clung to positive childhood 
experiences and what were portrayed as innocent National Socialist activities as 
youths. Conversely, the Third Reich also appears to have been utilised as a cynical 
reference point as well as a basis for genuine reflection about some of the horrors of 
the past.  
For those who were permitted and willing to avail themselves of its 
opportunities, the new political system appeared to provide some of the interviewees 
with a certain room for manoeuvre, despite the extremely restricted political 
circumstances, and enabled them to re-build their lives within the new system.  
Whilst these self-representations may in part reflect post-1989 narratives, the 
archival evidence from both the NDPD and DSF in the previous chapters seems to 
suggest similar trends. It therefore appears that particularly the economic 
opportunities for advancement proved to be an important mediating factor in tying 
people to their communities and directly or indirectly helping to build the new East 
German state.  By establishing this post-war framework for political transition and 
integration it appears that the desires of both the authorities and large sectors of the 
grassroots populace for a swift normalisation somewhat overlapped, thereby 
eventually contributing to the partial stabilisation of the emerging East German 
socialist state. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined grassroots responses and their relative implications within 
the context of both punitive and rehabilitative measures in post-war Brandenburg 
during the transitions from Nazism to socialism. Two main research questions were 
explored.  
First, in what ways did people at the grassroots attempt to challenge the 
imposition of punitive measures, and did their responses have any effect on the 
manner in which these policies were implemented at a grassroots level? The punitive 
measures aimed to change the political, economic and social system and diverged 
from the immediate needs and desires of grassroots Brandenburgers who were 
attempting to survive amidst the utter chaos and very real existential challenges with 
which they were faced in the wake of the collapse of the Third Reich. The archival 
and oral history evidence suggests that despite the severe practical and political 
constraints, when faced with an immediate existential threat grassroots 
Brandenburgers attempted to challenge the imposition of these measures in three 
main ways: written complaints, informal networks of communication and unofficial 
counter-memories.  
In relation to the initial phase of retaliatory violence and the policies of 
dismantling and displacement the findings indicate that the attempts of grassroots 
Brandenburgers to negotiate the impact of these measures on their lives were mainly 
unsuccessful and reinforced feelings of passivity, anger and victimhood. Likewise, 
whilst grassroots Brandenburgers attempted to moderate the immediate existential 
threat posed by NKVD activities in a number of ways, these grassroots responses 
were not in themselves effective in altering the manner in which these punitive 
Soviet policies were carried out. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that both the 
NKVD arrests and the cumulative protests and unofficial public commemoration of 
their dead appear to have placed the SED leadership under a certain amount of 
pressure and, combined with larger domestic and foreign policy considerations, 
appear to have acted as a contributing factor in altering some of their policies. 
However, clear limits to grassroots challenges also existed, as can be seen in the 
manner in which the authorities responded to the public manifestation of counter-
memories in Ketschendorf in the early 1950s. Similar patterns of grassroots 
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complaint in the form of written petitions were evident in response to the various 
denazification measures. The findings revealed that in some instances the persistence 
of grassroots Eigensinn, and the dynamics it created at a local and regional level, 
could somewhat affect the manner in which various denazification measures were 
implemented.  
In sum, the punitive measures which attempted to remove the remnants of the 
National Socialist regime often posed an existential threat to grassroots 
Brandenburgers and elicited various degrees of grassroots Eigensinn despite the 
practical and political constraints. Often these responses were not necessarily 
intentionally political, but instead attempted merely to ameliorate the impact of a 
particular punitive measure on individual lives. However, the present study 
acknowledges that this restricted room for manoeuvre was not just a product of 
individual acts of Eigensinn but a combination of a plethora of other factors which 
also served to dilute and curb Soviet and SED aspirations for hegemony. It appeared 
that the aftermath of the war acted as both a limiting and enabling factor for the 
ability of grassroots actors to exert Eigensinn in the face of punitive measures. On 
the one hand, the very real existential challenges they were faced with in the 
immediate post-war years meant that the grassroots population was extremely 
constrained in their room for manoeuvre. On the other hand, local Brandenburgers 
could also take advantage of the infrastructural problems and shortages in qualified 
labour in an attempt to negotiate and shape their own lives. Furthermore, the extent 
to which the grassroots challenges in relation to the specific punitive measures 
appeared to have an effect on the manner in which these policies were implemented 
varied. In many cases these grassroots challenges had little or no effect; however, in 
certain instances these grassroots responses occasionally did have some local impact. 
However, the relative importance of grassroots challenges should not be overstated 
and must be seen as just one among many different factors which somewhat affected 
the manner in which top-down rule in post-war Brandenburg was realised, 
particularly in the wider context of foreign policy considerations and the beginning 
of the Cold War.  
The second research question examined the extent to which grassroots 
Brandenburgers participated in political organisations which were designed to 
integrate East Germans during the rehabilitative stage, and the possible impact these 
responses may have had on the post-war transition. These rehabilitative measures 
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were designed to facilitate political reorientation and integration amongst grassroots 
Brandenburgers and were strongly linked to the solidification of SED hegemony 
from the late 1940s onwards. Both the NDPD and the DSF had been expressly 
established to challenge previous National Socialist sentiments and aid in facilitating 
the political transition from ‘fascism’ to socialism. The second part of this study 
explored grassroots responses to these political overtures in Brandenburg as well as 
investigating some of the factors which may have both impeded and facilitated the 
process of post-war transition for the young age cohort of oral history interviewees. 
By rhetorically shifting the parameters of Nazi victims and perpetrators, it appears as 
though a large number of Brandenburgers were provided with the opportunity, if 
they so wished, to avail themselves of the chance for political, economic and social 
advancement.  
Both the archival and oral history evidence suggests that a significant 
proportion of people became members of these political organisations. While some 
appear to have joined these organisations with a clear strategy for economic 
advancement, others seem to have joined due to acquiescence; there were also those 
who refused membership. In fact, notwithstanding the fact that an organisation such 
as the DSF had 5.5 million members by the late 1970s, roughly half of the GDR 
population also did not join the friendship society. Moreover, the evidence suggests 
that whilst these organisations provided a redemptive framework, in many ways both 
the DSF and NDPD remained rather superficial institutions which avoided a 
fundamental confrontation both with certain tenets of National Socialist ideology as 
well as the actual reality of Brandenburgers’ experiences throughout the early years 
of the Soviet occupation. It therefore appears that they alienated a considerable 
proportion of the grassroots population who felt that they could not reconcile the 
official rhetoric with some of their own post-war experiences. 
The findings of the present study indicate that attempts by these political 
organisations at re-writing the official political doctrine and altering the previous 
political framework did not go unchallenged at a grassroots level in Brandenburg. 
Particularly the persistence of anti-Soviet sentiments and distress about the 
solidification of the Oder-Neisse border continued to present themselves as 
grassroots obstacles throughout the post-war years. Whilst the impact of these 
objections should not be overstated, in some instances the policy makers were indeed 
forced to somewhat adapt their rhetorical approaches in order to accommodate the 
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popular mood at a grassroots level. Nonetheless, although these organisations may 
have provided some latitude for economic integration, the evidence suggests that in 
general the political room for manoeuvre was firmly controlled and these 
opportunities for integration were to occur with the caveat of outward political 
conformity.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties in politically converting the masses within 
the new ideological framework, it was arguably the economic stability and gradual 
post-war normalisation of daily life which played the most important role in 
facilitating the transition in Brandenburg after 1945, suggesting that simplified 
binary concepts of resistance and compliance do not adequately reflect the 
complexities involved in the transitions from the National Socialist to the socialist 
system after 1945. Whilst these claims of strategically accommodating oneself 
within the new political constraints in order to avail oneself of economic 
opportunities need to be interpreted with caution, as they may have been in part a 
product of post-1989 narratives and self-representations amongst the oral history 
interviewees, the archival evidence also indicates that political memberships were 
not necessarily matched by active participation at this time.  
These opportunities for economic mobility occurred against the wider 
backdrop of the redemptive antifascist ideological framework, which, combined with 
shifting notions of perpetrators and victims in the aftermath of the war, served to 
push potential complicity with the Third Reich regime into the background. 
Therefore, it was with the introduction of these rehabilitative measures that the 
interests of the new dictatorial regime and grassroots Brandenburgers most closely 
converged in the late 1940s and thereby acted as an important contributor in 
facilitating the post-war transition. 
This study has provided a multifaceted examination of a wide variety of 
grassroots responses to both punitive and rehabilitative measures in post-war 
Brandenburg and their possible implications. However, it must be noted that both the 
archival and oral history sources may have been affected in different ways as regards 
evidence of Eigensinn. First, it is conceivable that incidents demonstrating Eigensinn 
may have been overstated or understated amongst the oral history interviewees in 
order, consciously or unconsciously, to present their former selves in a more 
favourable light in the current political context twenty years after the collapse of the 
GDR. Specifically, in relation to the punitive measures this may have manifested 
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itself as somewhat exaggerating the extent to which they may have challenged the 
imposition of the new dictatorship. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that 
acts of Eigensinn may have also been understated amongst the oral history 
interviewees in order to emphasise a sense of victimhood in the face of punitive 
measures. Furthermore, in relation to the rehabilitative measures it is conceivable 
that the interviewees may have been inclined to minimise their sense of agency in 
order to downplay their potential complicity in the GDR dictatorship. The inverse of 
this may have also been the case with respect to those interviewees who claimed to 
have flouted the officially prescribed norms in the GDR and thereby may have 
somewhat overstated the extent to which they challenged the norms of the second 
German dictatorship.  
Second, in relation to the archival sources, the incidences of negative 
contemporary reporting in the archival material must be also treated with an element 
of caution, as they may have understated the many inroads which the authorities had 
made in Brandenburg, in particular by the early 1950s. The attempts by some 
citizens to exert their Eigensinn through Eingaben were not necessarily 
representative of the wider population and it must be assumed that there were many 
Brandenburgers who did not challenge the punitive post-war measures in this 
manner. Therefore, it is likely that a great many individuals participated in the new 
political system without ever overtly challenging the new political, economic and 
social status quo. However, it is also conceivable that at times acts of Eigensinn 
amongst grassroots Brandenburgers may have been underreported in order to create 
the impression that the new authorities were more in control at the local level than 
may have actually been the case. However, it is important to note that the present 
study attempted to overcome some of the inherent biases associated with both 
sources by combining contemporaneous and retrospective sources of evidence. 
Therefore, the extent to which their findings converged provided strong support for 
their validity.  
It must also be noted that the findings of the present study were based 
predominantly on two local case studies and therefore may be limited in their 
generalisability to other parts of Brandenburg and the GDR. Given that the oral 
history interviewees were aged between twelve and twenty-four in 1945, the present 
findings cannot be generalised to any other age cohort. In addition to these possible 
generational differences, the present study does not make any claims as regards the 
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interviewees’ representativeness of all young people who experienced these 
transitions from Nazism to socialism in Brandenburg between 1945 and 1952. 
Therefore, the present findings may be limited in their generalisability in terms of 
socioeconomic status, gender, political affiliation, or urban and rural differences, 
amongst many others. Finally, given that this study focused predominantly on 
stationary Brandenburgers, these findings do not necessarily correspond with the 
experiences of the roughly 876,200 citizens who attempted to exert their Eigensinn 
by leaving the Soviet zone for a variety of reasons in the years after the Third Reich 
collapsed.
1
  
Despite these methodological limitations, this study contributes to the 
existing historical scholarship on grassroots East Germany in the post-war period in 
a number of ways. First, this study has contributed to knowledge about the manner in 
which each specific policy under examination was responded to at a grassroots level 
in Brandenburg and the wider implications these responses had on the post-war 
transition. It therefore provides a base for similar examinations in the other regions 
of East Germany, especially studies of comparable towns which were also home to 
NKVD institutions in the post-war period.  
Second, rather than just focusing on one single policy, the present study 
presented a comprehensive and multifaceted examination of the grassroots responses 
to both punitive and rehabilitative post-war policies in Brandenburg. This afforded 
the opportunity to demonstrate the extent to which grassroots responses and their 
relative implications varied as a function of specific punitive and rehabilitative 
contexts. However, further studies will be required to examine the extent to which 
these findings can be generalised across Brandenburg and East Germany in the post-
war period. 
Third, whilst this study does not wish to downplay the extremely repressive 
political system established in East Germany, it moves beyond totalitarian 
approaches which have tended to neglect the potential influence which dynamics at a 
grassroots level could have on the implementation of policies in the post-war period. 
By providing evidence that grassroots actors could on occasion somewhat affect the 
manner in which policies were implemented in grassroots Brandenburg as well as 
strategically accommodating themselves within the system in order to receive 
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material and social benefits, this thesis contributed to a more differentiated 
perspective on post-war East Germany than some recent studies which have tended 
to simply emphasise violent oppression of the masses.
2
 Furthermore, the findings of 
the present study challenge assertions by some historians that grassroots actions 
which went against the regime were always politically motivated.
3
 Instead, this 
thesis has demonstrated that in the wake of the aftermath of the Third Reich those 
local Brandenburgers who challenged policies were mainly motivated by existential, 
social and economic concerns. 
In sum, the present study provided evidence that the latitude for grassroots 
responses and their relative implications varied as a function of specific punitive and 
rehabilitative contexts. Furthermore, the ways in which grassroots responses 
manifested themselves was determined by the extent to which the needs of the 
grassroots populace and the emerging dictatorship converged and diverged. 
Therefore, although macro events and considerations ultimately dictated the 
direction of political developments after 1945, the multifarious grassroots attempts to 
shape and negotiate their own lives did occasionally have some local impact and 
thereby could act as a contributing factor in both impeding and facilitating the 
political transition from Nazism to socialism in post-war Brandenburg.   
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Appendices 
 
Fig. 1: Map of Brandenburg illustrating the locations of 
Brandenburg/Havel and Fürstenwalde 
 
 
 
Source: Derivative by Julie Deering-Kraft, based on ‘Hanhil File Brandenburg location map G.svg,’ 
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported. 
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Fig. 2: Map of Brandenburg/Havel illustrating the locations of the 
NKVD operations 
 
 
Source: Derivative by Julie Deering-Kraft, based on openstreetmap & contributors, licensed CC BY-
SA.The NKVD operative prison in the Neuendorfer Straβe in the town centre is marked on the right 
hand side and the Zuchthaus Brandenburg on the town’s outskirts is marked on the left hand side. 
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Fig. 3: View of the NKVD Operative Prison in the Neuendorfer 
Straβe, Brandenburg/Havel 
 
 
Source: Courtesy of Wolfgang Fried in Brandenburg/Havel, from his the private collection, circa 
1945/46.  Note the bricked up windows in the left side of the photograph. 
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Fig. 4: Map of Fürstenwalde-South indicating the location of NKVD 
special camp no. 5 Ketschendorf 
 
Source: Renate Lipinsky and Jan Lipinsky, Die Straβe, die in den Tod führte: Zur Geschichte des 
Speziallagers Nr. 5 Ketschendorf/Fürstenwalde (Leverkusen: Kremer-Verlag, 1999), p. 318. Note the 
camp’s vicinity to the main Berlin-Frankfurt/Oder motorway. 
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Fig. 5: Map of NKVD special camp no. 5 Ketschendorf 
 
 
 
Source: KALOS F/Stadt-Museum/757 ‘Das “Speziallager Nr. 5 des NKWD” in Ketschendorf - 
Zwischenbericht für den “Runden Tisch” 26.04.1990’. Note the location of the mass graves and the 
Autobahn running along the south perimeter of the camp grounds. 
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Table 1: Biographical information of the interviewees (N=20) 
             
Names of  
Interviewees  
 
 Year  
  of        
birth 
 
Place of 
Residence 
during the  
Post-war 
Transition 
Period 
 
 
Political 
member- 
ships  
pre-1945 
 
Political 
member-
ships  
post-1945 
 
Occupation 
post-1945 
Beck, Ulla* 1931 Fürstenwalde Jungmädel DSF, 
FDGB   
Accountant 
 
Dietrich, Gunther 1927 
(†2012) 
Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk,  
Hitler  
Youth 
 
DSF, 
FDGB   
Civil  
engineer  
 
Dorn, Edith, Dr* 1930 
(†2010) 
Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungmädel DSF, 
FDGB,  
FDJ 
Third level 
lecturer 
 
Fiedler, Wilhelm* 1921 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
____ FDGB Teacher 
 
Fried, Wolfgang 1927 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk,  
Hitler  
Youth 
 
FDJ, 
Kulturbund 
Chemist 
 Gärtner, Paul 1931 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk,  
Hitler  
Youth 
 
DSF, FDJ,  
GST, SED 
Manual 
labourer 
 Gericke, Hans 1924 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk,  
Hitler  
Youth, 
NS-
Studenten- 
bund 
 
FDGB  Civil  
engineer  
 
  Heinrich, Wolfgang 
  
 
1933 Fürstenwalde Jungvolk DSF, 
FDGB,  
FDJ, GST, 
Kulturbund 
SED 
Engineer 
 
Hirsch, Gertrud * 1928 Fürstenwalde BDM FDJ, 
FBGB, 
Sportge- 
meinschaft 
Office clerk 
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Table 1: Biographical information of the interviewees. (N=20)    (continued) 
             
Names of  
Interviewees  
 
 Year  
  of        
birth 
 
Place of 
Residence 
during the  
Post-war 
Transition 
Period 
 
 
Political 
member- 
ships  
pre-1945 
 
Political 
member-
ships  
post-1945 
 
Occupation 
post-1945 
Jung, Carmen * 1928 Fürstenwalde Jungmädel DSF, 
FDGB   
Office and  
admin. clerk 
 
 Kaiser-Reka, Berol 
 
1930 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk DSF Musician 
Krause, Fritz * 1929 Fürstenwalde Jungvolk,  
   Hitler  
   Youth 
 
FDGB Structural  
engineer  
Küster, Christine 1931 Fürstenwalde Jungmädel DSF, 
FDGB   
Trading 
director 
in a 
construction 
company 
 (from 1960 
onwards)  
Michel, Kurt 1931 
(†2012) 
Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk FDJ  
(short 
period) 
 
Electrician 
Reinke, Siegfried.  
Dr  
 
1929 Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk,   
   Hitler  
   Youth 
 
DSF, FDJ, 
SED 
Economist 
Rösner, Reinhold 1929 Fürstenwalde Jungvolk,   
    Hitler  
    Youth 
 
FDGB Economist 
Schmidt, Karl* 1921 
(†2012) 
Brandenburg/ 
Havel 
Jungvolk FDGB Foundry 
moulder 
 
Schulz, Erika 1927 Fürstenwalde Jungmädel, 
BDM 
FDGB Innkeeper and 
Employee in 
Handels-
organisation 
 
 Schulze, Arnold 1931 
(†2012) 
Fürstenwalde Jungvolk DAV, DSF, 
FDGB,  
FDJ 
Biology 
lecturer at a 
technical  
college 
Wegewitz, Alfred 1926 Fürstenwalde Jungvolk,  
   Hitler  
   Youth 
DSF, 
Kulturbund 
Lawyer 
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Interview Schedule 
 
1. Persönliche Daten: 
    Alter, Familienstand, Ausbildung und Beruf 
 
1a. Wann wurden Sie geboren? _________________________________________ 
 
1b. Wo wurden Sie geboren? ___________________________________________ 
 
1c. Mit wie vielen Geschwistern sind Sie aufgewachsen? _____________________ 
 
1d. Sind sie verheiratet? 
Ja   Seit wann sind Sie geheiratet? _________ 
Nein 
Verwitwet  Seit wann sind Sie verwitwet? _________ 
Geschieden  Seit wann sind Sie geschieden? _________ 
 
1e. Haben Sie Kinder? Wenn ja, wie viele? Wann geboren? 
Anzahl der Kinder: ____________ 
Kind 1:   M        W                  Geburtsjahr 
Kind 2:   M        W                  Geburtsjahr 
Kind 3:   M        W                  Geburtsjahr 
 
1f. Wie viele Personen leben zurzeit in Ihrem Haushalt?  ________________ 
Wer? _______________________________________________________ 
 
1g. Welchen Schulabschluss haben Sie? 
Volksschulabschluss 
Mittlere Reife 
Abitur 
Kein Abschluss (Anzahl der Schuljahre und Schulart) 
 
1h. Wann haben Sie Ihre Schulausbildung abgeschlossen? 
Vor 1945 (wann/wo): __________________________________________ 
Nach 1945 (wann/wo): _________________________________________ 
 
1i. Haben Sie eine weitere Ausbildung nach Ihrem Schulabschluss gemacht? 
Vor 1945 (wann/wo ): __________________________________________ 
Nach 1945 (wann/wo): _________________________________________ 
Nein 
 
1j. Welchen Beruf haben Sie ausgeübt? 
Vor 1945 (wann/wo ): __________________________________________ 
Nach 1945 (wann/wo): _________________________________________ 
 
1k. Wann sind Sie in den Ruhestand getreten? ________________________ 
 
1l. Welchen Beruf übte Ihre Mutter/ Ihr Vater aus?  
Mutter: ______________________________________________________ 
Vater: _______________________________________________________ 
 
2. Kindheit und Jugend im Dritten Reich: 
    Bewertung der Kindheit und Jugendzeit  
    Einstellung zum Dritten Reich und politisches Engagement 
 
2a. Wenn Sie sich zurückversetzen, wie würden Sie Ihre Kindheit beschreiben? 
Sehr glücklich 
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Überwiegend glücklich 
Überwiegend unglücklich 
Sehr unglücklich 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2b. Wenn Sie zurückversetzen, wie würden Sie Ihre Jugendzeit beschreiben? 
Sehr glücklich 
Überwiegend glücklich 
Überwiegend unglücklich 
Sehr unglücklich 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2c. Wie haben Sie das Dritte Reich in Erinnerung ? 
Sehr positiv 
Überwiegend positiv 
Überwiegend negativ 
Sehr negativ 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2d. Erinnern Sie sich noch an das, was Sie selbst damals als Kind und Jugendlicher vom 
Nationalsozialismus hielten? 
Sehr gute Idee 
Überwiegend gute Idee 
Überwiegend schlechte Idee 
Sehr schlechte Idee 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2e. Welche Einstellung hatten Ihre Eltern damals in der Hitlerzeit zum Nationalsozialismus ? 
Sehr gute Idee 
Überwiegend gute Idee 
Überwiegend schlechte Idee 
Sehr schlechte Idee 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2f. Waren Ihre Eltern vor oder während des Dritten Reichs politisch engagiert? 
Ja   Seit wann? ____________________________ 
   Wer (Mutter/ Vater/ beide Eltern) __________ 
   Welche Partei/ polit. Organisation __________ 
Nein 
 
2g. Welche Rolle spielte das politische Engagement in Ihrer Familie in dieser Zeit (vor 1945)? 
Äußerst große Rolle 
Große Rolle 
Gewisse Rolle 
Geringe Rolle  
Keine Rolle 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2h. Haben Sie selbst vor 1945 Jugendorganisationen oder politischen Parteien angehört? 
Ja   Welche? ______________________________ 
Nein 
 
3. Der zweite Weltkrieg: 
    Erinnerungen an den Krieg 
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3a. Wie alt waren Sie bei Ausbruch des Krieges? __________________________ 
 
3b. Können Sie sich noch an den Kriegsbeginn erinnern? Falls ja, woran : 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3c. Wie haben Sie den Krieg in Erinnerung? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3d. Wurden irgendwelche Familienangehörige von Ihnen in den Krieg eingezogen? 
Ja   Wie viele? _________________________________ 
   Wer? _____________________________________ 
Nein 
 
3e. Was waren Ihre schlimmsten Erfahrungen während des Krieges? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3f. Haben Sie auch irgendwelche guten Erinnerungen aus der Kriegszeit? 
Ja   Welche? ___________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
Nein 
 
4. Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen: 
    Während des Krieges, Kriegsende, Nachkriegsjahre 
 
4a. Wie würden Sie Ihre Einstellung damals gegenüber den Russen während des Krieges 
beschreiben? 
Sehr positiv 
Ziemlich positiv 
Ziemlich negativ 
Sehr negativ 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4b. Erinnern Sie sich noch an den Einmarsch der Roten Armee im April 1945? 
Ja   Falls ja, wo waren Sie? _______________________ 
Nein 
 
4c. Welche Erfahrungen haben Sie damals im April 1945 mit der Roten Armee gemacht? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4d. Wie haben damals im April 1945 Ihre Eltern, Großeltern, Freunde und Verwandten den 
Einmarsch der Roten Armee empfunden? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4e. Wenn Sie an die ersten Monate nach dem Kriegsende zurückdenken, wie würden Sie Ihre 
Einstellung damals gegenüber den Russen beschreiben ? 
Sehr positiv 
Ziemlich positiv 
Ziemlich negativ 
Sehr negativ 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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4f. Hat sich Ihre damalige Einstellung zu den Russen in den darauffolgenden Jahren der 
Nachkriegszeit (1945-195) in irgendeiner Weise gewandelt? 
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4g. Gab es besondere Ereignisse, die Ihre Haltung gegenüber den Russen in den Nachkriegsjahren 
positiv beeinflusst hat? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4h. Gab es besondere Ereignisse, die Ihre Haltung gegenüber den Russen in den Nachkriegsjahren 
negativ beeinflusst hat? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4i. Was hielten Sie damals von der Gesellschaft für deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mitgliedschaft: Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5. Leben in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und frühen DDR: 
    Politische Übergangsphase und Neuorientierung,  
    Veränderungen der Lebenssituation (Beruf, Wohnort, Besitzverhältnisse, familiäre 
    Situation) 
    Politische Einstellung und politisches Engagement  
    Persönliche Einstellung zur Entnazifizierung, Enteignung und NKWD-Lagern/ 
    Gefängnissen 
 
5a. Wie haben Sie damals nach dem Krieg die politische Übergangsphase empfunden? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5b. Wie schwer oder leicht ist Ihnen diese Neuorientierung nach 1945 gefallen? 
Sehr einfach  
Ziemlich einfach 
Ziemlich schwer 
Sehr schwer 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5c. Was haben Sie damals vom Sozialismus gehalten? 
Sehr gute Idee 
Überwiegend gute Idee 
Überwiegend schlechte Idee 
Sehr schlechte Idee 
Keine Meinung 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5d. Was hielten Sie damals vom Antifaschismus? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5e. Wenn Sie an Nachkriegszeit zurückdenken , wie haben Sie damals das Leben für sich und Ihre 
Familie in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und der frühen DDR empfunden? 
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_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5f. Was ist Ihre schlimmste Erinnerung, wenn Sie an die Nachkriegszeit zurückdenken? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5g. Was ist Ihre schönste Erinnerung, wenn Sie an die Nachkriegszeit zurückdenken? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5h. Hat Ihr Vater vor und nach 1945 den gleichen Beruf ausgeübt?  
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5i. Haben Sie vor und nach 1945 den gleichen Beruf ausgeübt?  
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wie waren die Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten nach 1945 Ihrer Meinung nach? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5j. Haben Sie vor und nach 1945 im gleichen Haus/ in der gleichen Wohnung gelebt? 
Ja 
Nein   Gründe? _____________________________________________ 
 
5k. Welche Rolle spielte politisches Engagement für Sie in der Nachkriegszeit? 
Äußerst große Rolle 
Große Rolle 
Gewisse Rolle 
Geringe Rolle  
Keine Rolle 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5l. Haben Sie sich nach 1945 irgendeiner Partei, Jugendorganisation oder Massenorganisation 
angeschlossen? 
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5m. Welche Einstellung hatten Sie zu den verschiedenen Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der 
Nachkriegszeit? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5n. Was hielten Sie damals von der NDPD? 
Sehr viel 
Ziemlich viel 
Ziemlich wenig 
Sehr wenig 
Gar nichts 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5o. Welchen Ruf hatte die NDPD? 
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_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5p. Wer ist Ihrer Meinung nach in die NDPD eingetreten? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5q. Wie wurden Ihrer Meinung nach die ehemaligen Nazis in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
behandelt? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5r. Kamen Sie oder Familienmitglieder oder nahestehende Freunde von Ihnen vor eine 
Entnazifizierungskommission? 
Ja/ Nein:  
Wenn ja, wie haben sie das damals empfunden? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5s. Kamen Nachbarn oder Kollegen von Ihnen vor eine Entnazifizierungskommission ? 
Ja/ Nein:  
Wenn ja, wie haben sie das damals empfunden? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5t. Haben Sie Leute gekannt, die als Zuschauer zu diesen Entnazifizierungskommissionen gegangen 
sind? 
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5u. Welche Rolle haben diese Entnazifizierungskommissionen damals in der Öffentlichkeit gespielt? 
Sehr große Rolle 
Ziemlich große Rolle 
Ziemlich geringe Rolle 
Sehr geringe Rolle 
Gar keine Rolle 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5v. Hatten Sie persönliches Interesse daran? 
Sehr großes Interesse 
Ziemlich großes Interesse 
Ziemlich geringes Interesse 
Sehr wenig Interesse 
Überhaupt kein Interesse 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5w. Können Sie sich noch an die Gerichtsprozesse gegen ehemalige Nationalsozialisten erinnern? 
Welche Rolle haben diese Gerichtsprozesse Ihrer Meinung nach in der Öffentlichkeit gespielt? 
Sehr große Rolle 
Ziemlich große Rolle 
Ziemlich geringe Rolle 
Sehr geringe Rolle 
Gar keine Rolle 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5x. Hatten Sie persönliches Interesse daran? 
Sehr großes Interesse 
Ziemlich großes Interesse 
Ziemlich geringes Interesse 
Sehr wenig Interesse 
Überhaupt kein Interesse 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5y. Wurde bei Ihnen oder Ihrer Familie oder bei nahestehenden Freunden Eigentum beschlagnahmt 
oder enteignet? 
Ja/ Nein 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wenn ja, wie haben sie das damals empfunden? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5z. Wurde bei Ihren Nachbarn oder Kollegen Eigentum beschlagnahmt oder enteignet? 
Ja/ Nein 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wenn ja, wie haben sie das damals empfunden? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5zi. Haben Sie damals in der Nachkriegszeit von den NKWD Lagern oder Gefängnissen in der 
Nachkriegszeit in der Ostzone etwas gewusst? 
Ja/ Nein 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5zii. Hat man damals untereinander darüber gesprochen? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5ziii. Haben Sie jemanden gekannt der nach dem Krieg in solch einem Gefängnis oder Lager 
inhaftiert war? 
Ja/ Nein  
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_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wenn ja, wie haben sie das damals empfunden? 
Sehr gerecht 
Ziemlich gerecht 
Ziemlich ungerecht 
Sehr ungerecht 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6. Erinnerungen an das Dritte Reich und Gedenken an die Kriegsopfer: 
 
 
6a. Haben Sie in den Nachkriegsjahren noch manchmal an die Zeit im Dritten Reich zurückgedacht?  
Ja/ Nein 
Falls ja: An was haben Sie besonders gedacht? 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
6b. Hatten Sie damals je das Bedürfnis verspürt mit jemandem über die Zeit im Dritten Reich zu 
sprechen? 
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe______________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
6c. Haben Sie damals mit jemandem über die Zeit im Dritten Reich gesprochen? 
Ja/ Nein 
Falls ja, mit wem? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
6d. Haben Sie irgendwelche Andenken an das Dritte Reich behalten: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6e. Gab es in dieser Zeit in irgendeiner Form einen öffentlichen Dialog über die Zeit im dritten Reich? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6f. Wie ging man in der Nachkriegszeit mit dem Thema „deutsche Kriegsgefallene“ um? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6g. Konnte man offen über dieses Thema reden? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6h. Gab es in Ihrer Gegend während der Nachkriegszeit offizielle Gräber von deutschen 
Kriegsgefallenen aus dem 2. Weltkrieg? 
Ja/ Nein 
Welche Bedeutung hatte das für Sie? 
Äußerst große Bedeutung 
Große Bedeutung 
Gewisse Bedeutung 
Geringe Bedeutung  
Keine Bedeutung  
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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6i. Falls zutreffend, existiert eine Grabstätte oder Gedenktafel für Ihre gefallenen Angehörigen aus 
dem 2. Weltkrieg? 
Ja/ Nein (Wenn ja, seit wann?)   _________ 
Welche Bedeutung hat das für Sie? 
Äußerst große Bedeutung 
Große Bedeutung 
Gewisse Bedeutung 
Geringe Bedeutung  
Keine Bedeutung  
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6j. Wurden in Ihrer Gegend sowjetische Kriegsdenkmäler und/oder sowjetische Soldatenfriedhöfe 
errichtet?  
Ja/ Nein (Wenn ja, seit wann?)   _________ 
Welche Bedeutung hatte das für Sie? 
Äußerst große Bedeutung 
Große Bedeutung 
Gewisse Bedeutung 
Geringe Bedeutung  
Keine Bedeutung  
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Zusätzliche Fragen: 
 
 
7a. Kannten Sie jemanden der in der Zeit von 1945 bis 1952 in den Westen gegangen ist? 
Ja/ Nein 
__________________________________________________________ 
Haben Sie selbst in dieser Zeit mit diesem Gedanken gespielt?  
Ja/ Nein 
Gründe? _____________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
7b. Welche Gründe waren für Sie ausschlaggebend nicht in den Westen zu gehen? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7c. Welche Erinnerungen haben Sie an den 17. Juni 1953? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7d. Haben Sie, Ihre Freunde oder Verwandten bei diesem Aufstand eine Rolle gespielt? 
Ja/ Nein 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7e Wer hat sich Ihrer Meinung nach daran beteiligt? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7f. Was hielten Sie damals von diesem Aufstand? 
Sehr gute Idee 
Überwiegend gute Idee 
Überwiegend schlechte Idee 
Sehr schlechte Idee 
Gründe?__________________________________________________________________________ 
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_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7g. Blieb Ihrer Meinung nach der Nationalsozialismus privat oder öffentlich nach 1952 ein relevantes 
Thema in der DDR? 
Ja/ Nein 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7h. Rückblickend, welche politischen Ereignisse hatten den größten negativen Einfluss auf Ihr Leben? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7i. Rückblickend, welche politischen Ereignisse hatten den größten positiven Einfluss auf Ihr Leben? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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